Islamic and Western Views on the Dynamics of Collective Participation in the National Defence System

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ABSTRACT

Collective participation refers to the acts of two or more people in order to achieve a common objective and obtain rewards. However, some people disagree with this, resulting in participation alone. This is a dynamic of collective participation according to the argument on theories of collective participation such as Rational Logic and Expressive Logic, which are based on several factors such as rewards, incentives, and expressions of people's participation, particularly in the national defence system. Therefore, this study intends to discuss the dynamics of people's collective participation, particularly in the national defence system, from both an Islamic and Western perspective. The data collection is qualitative in nature, with comparative and deductive analysis conducted through sources such as books, journals, theses, and websites. This study revealed that the collective participation of individuals according to Islam, which is founded on the notions of jihad, *fard 'ayn*, and *fard kifayah*, is seen as relevant to solve the problem of 'paradox of participation' in collective participation theory due to the difficulty of quantifying the cost of incentives and expression of participation. It also aims to serve as a source of inspiration for the people, motivating them to work together to preserve the sovereignty of their beloved country.

Keywords: Collective Participation, Rational Logic Theory, Expressive Logic Theory, National Defence System, Jihad, Fard 'Ayn, Fard Kifayah.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of citizen collective participation is often understood to focus on their involvement in the country's political system, whether directly or indirectly, which has an influence on the government's execution of policies and guidelines. Citizen acts such as voting in elections, paying taxes, and expressing public opinions are manifestations of the concept of 'civic obligation' to the country. This also applies to citizens who serve in the national defence system, which requires unanimous agreement because it pertains a country's dignity and sovereignty.

However, there are a few individuals would rather not be involved in defending their nation because it is an essential duty of national security officials such as the military and police. Why might this happen? Why do some people have no problems getting involved? Is there an incentive or motivation that encourages an individual to participate collectively? To answer this refer to an 'actor' or 'individual' himself would determine whether the participation will be collective or not.

As a result, the emergence of collective participation theories is due to the existence of the aforementioned 'actor' entity. This would not inevitable over the abroad discussion among scholars especially between Islam and Western perspective. Thus, this study uses comparative analysis methodology to discuss collective participation based on Islamic and Western perspectives. The purpose of this paper will also be to examine

how the adoption of both perspectives is logical and relevant in resolving the problem of people's participation in the national security system. It is envisaged that this paper will contribute to the highlights of related research material and make a suggestion for a specific model for citizen participation within the national defence system to be presented one day.

Collective Participation: A Brief Definition

One of the most contentious issues in political science is the notion of collective involvement, sometimes known as 'collective action'. To this point, Ostrom (1998) emphasizes the following as the basis of justification for the state in defining government policies and policies toward foreign relations and domestic affairs:

The theory of collective action is the central subject of political science. It is the core of the justification of the state. Collective action problems pervade international relations, face legislators when devising public budgets, permeate public bureaucracies and are at the core of explanations of voting, interest group formation and citizen control of governments in a democracy.

To this extent, Tarrow (1994) defines collective action as:

Collective action takes many forms brief or sustained, institutionalized or disruptive, humdrum or dramatic. Most of it occurs within institutions on the part of constituted groups who act in the name of goals that would hardly raise an eyebrow. It becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others. They have power because they challenge opponents, bring out solidarities and have meaning within particular population groups, situations and political cultures.

Based on the above statements, it is evident that the idea of collective participation is subjective in character, requires numerous interpretations, and is outside the purview of logical and reasonable discussion among political intellectuals. The concept of participation in politics refers to a series of reviews of political science literature that reveal justifications for the 'paradox of participation'; which opposes the continuation of discussions based on current circumstances and situations while adhering to previously existing theories. For instance in sociological context, collective participation tends to necessitate a 'social support' role for one another inside a group that strives for effectiveness in terms of trust and political participation (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). While in psychological context viewed through the lens of initiatives meant to elevate the status of people within a community (Wright et al., 1990). As a result, Shriver et al. (2003) insists that the individual's attitude or conduct might shift into someone who is forward-thinking, self-assured, and constantly sympathizes with people in the group they represent.

Nevertheless, some people who hold distinct viewpoints may not agree on collective participation. Some individuals believe that participating in street protests with big crowds allows them to express their thoughts and feelings to the public, but others consider that such acts are useless and detrimental. Why do some Muslims use Islam to justify their terrorist operations, whilst other Muslims disagree with them? What are the primary reasons why certain members of the public are prepared to make sacrifices to protect the nation's sovereignty while others are unconcerned about the issue?

Islamic Views on Collective Participation

Discussion on collective participation in Islam may not be inevitable to rely on the perspective of Islamic Jurisprudence. It is under the purview of *siyasah shar'iyyah* (good governance) as to such extent it involves discussion on Governance of national defence for domestic and international purposes (*siyasah al-amniyyah al-dakhiliyyah wa al-kharijiyyah*). (Al-Qardawi, 2009). It is examined in terms of its application in the national defence system via government policies and regulations that govern the defence administration system, as well as how those policies further organize people's participation in defending the country through certain motivational factors.

Several questions arise: how can policies and concepts pertaining to the national defence system emerge in an

Islamic country? What must citizens do in order to collectively participate in the national defence system based on Islam? What motivates citizens in an Islamic state to become active in national defence, as happened in Islam's early history?

Islam, being a faith that is comprehensive in all subjects, emphasizes the need of a country having a strong and stable defence system aimed at safeguarding the country from any attack from enemies. This is due to the perfection and durability of the national defence policies and principles that have been developed, as well as the notion for the development of these policies and principles goes back to the early history of Islam, particularly in the Islamic State of Madinah. An Islamic state needs a solid defence and military structure to ensure its integrity and security, as well as to protect its sovereignty from enemy's threats. Conversely, weaknesses in the nation's defensive and military systems have been identified as one of the primary causes of a government's collapse throughout history (Lukman et al., 2017).

Therefore, one of the primary goals of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) after moving from Mecca to Medina was to setup military institutions and establish an armed forces capable of acting as a shield for the Islam and the state. Even more intriguingly, it involves not just regular armed forces but also the civilian people of Madinah, who stand together in protecting their nation's sovereignty (Subhi, 1996). If the conventional national defence system today adheres to the maxim "*Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum*," which means 'preparation for war in times of peace,' Islam also strongly emphasizes the element of 'preparedness' at all times and under all circumstances in the face of any enemy threat that could threaten the peace and security of the nation as Allah said in the Quranic verse 8:60: *And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows.*

Based on the above Quranic verse, Al-Qurtubi (1990) argues that meticulous preparation is an internal strategy that benefits the Islamic army while harming the opponent. This argument is supported by Wahbah Zuhayli (2014) where Allah asks every believer to be equipped with proper war equipment according to the circumstances and times, and to have the maximum degree of military capability to protect the *ummah* from any threat. The more profound interpretation means that war preparation is mandatory; solid preparation is in assembly; and preparation involves not only the army but also other vital factors such as equipment, economic integrity, mental and spiritual power (Abu Faris, 1993).

Every Muslim has the obligation to defend their nation's sovereignty. It is required to execute it to preserve the country, dignity, and property, and to avoid any violation and unfair persecution, as mentioned in the hadith of the Prophet SAW narrated by Imam Muslim as stated:

Ribat (guarding the borders of the Islamic territory from the attacks of the enemies of Islam) for a day and a night is better than Sunnah fasting and Sunnah prayers for a whole month, and if a murabbit dies while performing ribat, then his deeds will continue to be rewarded, and he will be given his sustenance in heaven, and will not be questioned in the grave.

Based on the above hadith, *ribat* is a noble conduct in the eyes of Allah SWT. It is inside the purview of necessary jihad, such as carrying out public welfare, and is based on each individual's capabilities. Indeed, protecting the homeland from foreign attackers is considered a good duty in Islam and is rewarded greatly by Allah SWT (Adnan, 2001).

Citizens dan Defence System

The power of military equipment, which varies depending on a government's conditions and position, is one aspect that influences the strength of the notion of defence in Islam. This is determined by a variety of factors, including the type and structure of administration, qualification criteria for military personnel, the nation's climate, the circumstances and form of the terrain, and so on (Malik, 1997). For example, when Islam first established in Medina, there was no defensive system with a standardized and structured military organization. There was no 'standing army' because the majority of the troops were citizens who worked as traders, farmers, and others (Al-Waqidi, 2001).

Furthermore, the financial resources for military equipment came from donations and *infaq* (charity) from Muslims with a genuine desire to serve. When compared to the might of the Roman and Persian empires at the time, the Islamic defensive and military system was still in its early stages. This was due to reasons such as changes in the environment and new living conditions that need incremental adaptation, as well as the community's readiness to join in the battle (Al-Waqidi, 2001). Due to an abundance of danger both inside and outside Medina, which experienced various conflicts, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) eventually succeeded in establishing a strong national defence organization under his command, as stated in the Medina Charter. The Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) wisdom of managing Medina's defence and military was the start of the Islamic empire's grandeur, which extended to all corners of the world. The glory of Islamic civilization began with the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and was also seen in the government's policies that successfully united people of various races, one of which was the people's readiness and willingness to participate and work together to defend the country's sovereignty. (Anwar et al., 1999).

How could this happen? What prompted the majority of Madinah people, who were of diverse religions and ethnicities, to be so loyal to the state and eager to maintain its sovereignty? So, the answer lies in the strength of the 'covenant' entrenched in the Medina Charter, which has demonstrated that residents' rights, regardless of religion or racial origin, have been flawlessly enforced. This was paralleled with Khadduri (1990) argument:

Thus the foundation of the Islamic polity was made on the basis of a compact of agreement, being understood that this agreement was by no means one between two equals. It was rather a compact of submission, which reflects the nature of Allah's covenant with man. Not only is this true in terms of theology, but also in terms of Islamic law; for the very basis of a contract in Islamic law is merely a formal proposal made by one party and acceptance by the other.

As a result, the influence of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as the Prophet of Allah and also the head of state is highly believed in and respected by the people of Madinah, and it is also one of the factors that draws people to defend the sovereignty of the nation when there is a threat of war from the enemy.

Responsibility of Soldiers: The Role of Citizens

In early Islamic history, there were two categories of people in Madinah: ordinary residents/people and soldiers/army. Civilians are frequently work 'real' occupations to support their everyday life, such as business, farming, carpentry, and so on. This is distinct from the military profession, which requires proficiency in military knowledge as well as skills in the art of war and survival in order to maintain the nation's sovereignty. In this circumstance, people are frequently unconcerned with national defence and security because the army already fulfils its essential duties. However, for the ordinary people of Madinah, protecting the sovereignty of the state is an obligation that must be fulfilled, as stated in the Medina charter. This was evidenced by early Islamic history, when the Battle of Badr saw 313 warriors recruited and imposed with defending Medina against threats and attacks by Mecca's polytheists (Ibn Kathir, 1999). Al-Butush (2014) argues that the process of 'recruiting the army' or, in other words, urging people to protect the country was unique to the Battle of Badr. In terms of time and circumstances, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) had just recently established the state of Madinah when an unexpected threat came.

According to Islamic history, one of the key provisions of the second 'Aqabah covenant between the Prophet Muhammad and 72 people of Madinah was that they pledged they would fight to preserve Islam and their homeland. (Ibn Hisham, 2013). The covenant was made prior to the official establishment of the Madinah Charter, which is one of the reasons why the people of Madinah are so driven to safeguard their homeland. According to Al-Buti (1993) and Al-'Umari (1993), the second 'Aqabah covenant clarifies that the people of Madinah are willing to defend the religion of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad SAW from attacks by the Quraish of Mecca. However, it also includes defending Madinah's sovereignty as part of 'jihad' due to the presence of Islam and the Prophet SAW in the country.

Among other reasons that influenced the reliability of their spirit in defending the state: First, Madinah has always exposed to dangers that may emerge at any time and in any condition, forcing them to always be prepared to face any possibilities that might occur. As Khair Haykal (1996) emphasizes, this has resulted in the

majority of Arab males during that period being proficient with weapons as well as knowledgeable about the intricacies of combat. Second reason is the disputes and conflicts that frequently arise within society such as tribal rivalries and power struggles prior to the establishment of the Islamic state of Madinah. (Burhanuddin, 2019).

One of the unique features of the Islamic state of Madinah was the existence of a diverse mix of ethnicities, tribes, and religions, all of whom were recognised as legitimate citizens. The responsibility of defending the sovereignty of the state did not rest solely on the Muslim population; rather, the Jewish and Christian communities residing in Madinah also bore the same duties and responsibilities. Although Clauses 12 and 19 of the Constitution of Madinah emphasised the special status of Muslims through the concept of the *ummah*, these clauses also provided a form of 'social guarantee' for the rest of Madinah's inhabitants. (Redzuwan, 2001)

A form of 'social contract' was thus established, guaranteeing that the Jewish people and followers of other religions would be treated equally, as long as they remained loyal and obedient to the Islamic government of Madinah (Khair Haykal, 1996). Based on this contract, the Jews were required to contribute to wartime expenses if the state faced threats. Moreover, they were prohibited from sharing internal information with external enemies, even if those enemies belonged to their own ethnic group.

As citizens, safeguarding state secrets was regarded as a form of 'patriotism' deemed vital in protecting the country from enemy attacks. Disclosing such secrets was considered an act of treason of the highest order, as it intertwined with one's sense of identity and personal integrity as a citizen.

Western Views on Collective Participation

In Western political science studies, much of the literatures discuss collective participation in matters related to citizens' fulfilment of responsibilities to the state, such as paying taxes, participating in elections, and so forth. However, citizen participation in the national defence system is also a form of collective involvement, as argued by Schwartz (1984) through the lens of a 'multi-subjective interpretative approach' in bearing responsibilities towards the state.

Therefore, this study discusses the application of three theories of collective participation—namely the Rational Logic Theory and the Expressive Logic Theory—particularly within the framework of national defence. These theories are used to explain factors such as the rationalisation of costs and rewards, as well as the expression of motivation that can drive individuals to engage collectively in the defence of the nation.

Rational Logic Theory

The work *"The Logic of Collective Action"*, which emerged in 1965, stands as Mancur Olson's most significant contribution to the discussion of collective participation theory within the field of political science. His work is considered to have successfully clarified and rejected the ambiguities of previous theories by introducing a 'universal method' grounded in the individual perspective and the economic calculus of costs (Czech, 2016). Despite the decades that have passed, Olson's rational logic theory remains highly relevant and continues to serve as a key reference in contemporary literature, while also being subject to scholarly critique by modern political theorists (Ostrom, 2000).

One of the undeniable strengths of Olson's rational logic theory lies in its emphasis on human individualism. The 'methodological individualism' he employed proved effective in identifying rational behaviour and the tendency of individuals to engage in collective action. According to Czech (2016), earlier theories described humanity as undergoing an evolutionary process—from small bands of hunters to complex societies—which ultimately led to the dissolution of tightly knit groups that were bound by a strong sense of belonging and individual protection. This is one of the reasons Olson rejected earlier theories that denied individuals the right to exercise rational judgment within group decision-making processes.

Nevertheless, Olson did not completely dismiss prior theories. Rather, he argued that they lacked sufficient

explanation as to why some individuals choose to participate collectively in a group while others do not, even when they share the same goals and purposes. This point underscores the notion that human actions are typically driven by personal agendas and objectives, evaluated through rational behaviour. If an individual seeks personal benefit by gaining the sympathy and support of others while promising happiness and well-being as their main objective, they are referred to as a politician or *homo politicus*. Meanwhile, when individuals exhibit risk-taking, strategic thinking, logical reasoning, and the ability to secure incentives, they are considered as *homo economicus* or economic agents (Faber et al., 1997).

Fundamentally, these assumptions about human behaviour are rooted in the idea of rational choice—where actions are preceded by a reasoned assessment of potential benefits or risks. In other words, any rational action must involve a consideration of the expected 'benefits' and 'costs,' with the decision left to the individual. This concept forms the core of Olson's *rational choice theory*, a point also supported by Dicky Sofjan (2004) in his writings:

The extension of this assumption is that any and all actions undertaken by man are attached to some specific identifiable values, and assessed using rational valuations. Any risk is therefore measured against the necessity of an action and the benefits that one accrues from undertaking. Thus, the imagery that emerges is that of an actor, who instinctively calls upon his basic arithmetic skills to decide whether to go ahead with the planned action despite the costs and risks involved or to abandon the idea altogether.

Expressive Logic Theory

If previously Olson's theory tended to discuss logically and rationally how an individual participates collectively based on the costs and incentives calculated from the outcome of that action, the following theory leans more towards emphasising an individual's rational attitude based on self-expression and personal desires in collective participation. The book *"A Logic of Expressive Choice"* by Alexander Schuessler (2000) is a work that still uses the rational choice theory approach, but with some additions from the perspective of individual identity expression and the need to join collectively with others.

The question arises: why does someone involve themselves in a group collectively? Why are some individuals interested in getting involved in associations, non-governmental organisations, charities, and political parties? What motivates them to engage in such activities? According to Schuessler, a person is often motivated by the desire for something that can be expressed through various elements of self-expression, as this expression actually influences their way of thinking and lifestyle. This expressive action also has a strong principle — the individual's need to integrate collectively with others — which is the original aim of the theory.

Western and Islamic Dynamics Forms of Collective Action: An Evaluation

Western Views

Free Ride Problems in Rational Logic Theory

It can be concluded here that the benefits and rewards received individually are smaller compared to those gained collectively, and they are insufficient to cover the costs previously incurred. Similarly, if all members of a group receive benefits and rewards collectively, then there is no specific incentive for individuals, which could lead to 'non-participation' among some members (Olson, 1971). The term 'non-participation' is the main factor underlying the issue of collective participation. This is also referred to as the 'free rider' problem, as argued by Ostrom (1990) who describes it as a 'universal issue'—where individuals seek to gain benefits and rewards from collective efforts without contributing themselves.

This issue may have a negative impact on collective participation, where active members begin to question the fairness of the process. If an individual who does not participate can obtain the same benefits as one who actively contributes, then what is the point of participating? The 'free rider' problem in collective participation can be illustrated through the diagram below:

Diagram 1: The *'Free Rider'* Problem in Collective Participation

This issue is particularly complex due to the dynamic between the 'individual' and the 'group', as explained above. Therefore, Olson introduced the concept of the 'selective incentive' to address the gap between those who receive benefits and those who do not. This means that incentives or rewards are given only to those who are genuinely active in participation. Conversely, those who are not active should be denied such rewards. Olson emphasises this point as follows:

Group action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively toward the individuals in the group. The incentive must be selective so that those who do not join the organisation working for the group's interest, or in other ways contribute to the attainment of the group's interest, can be treated differently from those who do.

He further stresses that achieving the 'collective good'—the shared benefit within a group—can only be realised through mutual agreement in leading the organisation as a whole. For example, a large enterprise composed of smaller companies may adopt a joint investment scheme, where the primary condition is a shared agreement to invest according to pre-established regulations. By adhering to this agreement, the group is entitled to benefits such as profits, dividends, and others. If a party fails to comply, they are not entitled to these agreed benefits or rewards.

Olson (1971) also suggests another approach to tackling the 'free rider' problem commonly seen in collective participation: applying coercion to compel group members to contribute towards the agreed collective good. This may serve as a last resort to achieving the goals and success of collective participation. For instance, to ensure that citizens benefit from public infrastructure, the government may require all citizens to pay the relevant taxes as a reciprocal act for the public goods they receive.

Rational Logic VS Expressive Logic Theory

Why is the expressive theory seen as more current and effective compared to the rational theory in voting behaviour? The answer lies in the cost and implications that follow the voting process. As is commonly known, the rational theory emphasises 'instrumental rewards'—that is, the benefits or rewards voters expect to receive after voting, based on predictions of the likely outcome of the election. However, the expressive theory, developed by Schuessler (2000) is more inclined to focus on the process leading up to the vote, alongside a specific model used to study and predict voters' attitudes towards election candidates.

According to him, campaign strategists play a significant role in influencing voters by creating party images or symbols, campaign slogans, and election promises in the manifesto, all intended to attract voters to a particular political party's candidate. This practice is common in political campaigns, where an 'expressive campaign' approach is used to evoke emotions—whether confidence or suspicion—towards a candidate.

In this context, Schuessler (2000) provides examples from political campaigns in the United States: Ronald Reagan's slogan "It's Morning Again in America" and Bill Clinton's "Building a Bridge to the Twenty-First

Century." These slogans are evidence of expressive campaign strategies designed by political strategists to create ambiguity and hesitation among voters, while simultaneously generating positive sentiments towards the candidates. The resulting emotional reflection does not compel voters to choose based solely on policies or slogans. Instead, it is the sense of comfort and affinity with the candidate that primarily motivates voters.

This raises the question: do individuals who vote for a particular candidate feel at ease and satisfied with their choice? The answer is subjective, as it depends on each person's expression and interpretation of their decision. However, a near-concrete response lies in the principle of *civic duty*—a responsibility to the nation that should be instilled in every citizen. This sense of duty cultivates emotional attachment—patriotism and a willingness to serve the country under any circumstance (Hillman, 2010).

Moreover, fulfilling one's duty to the nation through voting is a natural form of expressive participation in political affairs for the greater good. It also offers voters a sense of emotional and intellectual satisfaction, as they feel they are contributing positively to the country's welfare. On the other hand, citizens who choose not to vote are often perceived as selfish and irresponsible towards their nation. For example, this idea is reflected in expressive campaigns such as the one conducted by the Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM), which introduced the motto *"national sovereignty is a shared responsibility"* (Astro Awani, 2020). This indirectly encourages Malaysians to unite in defending the nation should any threat or attack arise. If the expressive value of such a motto is viewed positively, the ATM is unlikely to face problems in the future. However, if it is disregarded, numerous challenges may arise for the country.

Islamic Views

The involvement of citizens in defending national sovereignty was also articulated by Ibn Qudamah (1997), who explained that due to the ruling of *fard kifayah* (a collective duty), preparations to strengthen national defence must include establishing a military force, whether composed of soldiers appointed by the government or ordinary citizens volunteering to serve in defence of the homeland against threats and attacks from enemies. This demonstrates the existence of volunteer groups acting as reserve forces in matters of national defence.

On this matter, Khair Haikal (1996) mentioned the term *jaysh al-ikhtiyati*, referring to volunteer or reserve soldiers, which has its own discussion within the study of *siyasah* (Islamic political science). The *jaysh al-iḥtiyati* lies outside the scope of the regular army (*jaysh al-nizami*) and comprises individuals who qualify as *mukallaf* (those held religiously accountable) and are eligible to participate in jihad to defend the homeland, on the condition that their involvement is required.

This is supported by Mahmud Syit Khattab (2007), who emphasized the term *al-nafir al-'am*—a situation where, if the country is attacked, the service of reserve forces is required to defend the nation, making it *fard 'ayn* (individual obligation) upon the citizens. In contrast, *al-nafir al-khas* refers to offensive operations in enemy territories for the purposes of da'wah (Islamic missionary work) and territorial expansion, which fall under the responsibility of the regular army and do not require the participation of reserve troops (civilians).

However, there is a marked distinction between the two types of soldiers in terms of rank and status. The regular army (*jaysh al-nizamī*) is known as *ashab al-diwan*, who receive privileges from *diwan al-jund* such as salaries, allowances, pensions, compensation, and other benefits. Meanwhile, the reserve forces (*jaysh al-iḥtiyati*) are referred to as *ashab al-mutatawwi'ah* and receive fewer privileges compared to regular soldiers. The logical argument here is that regular soldiers bear full responsibility, as their livelihood depends on serving in the military and they cannot retreat from the battlefield. In contrast, volunteers act on a voluntary or conscripted basis and have the option of whether to participate in combat or not.

In this context, Al-Qurtubi (1990) narrated the story of the Prophet Muhammad's companion, `Abdullah Ibn Ummi Maktum RA, who joined the Battle of Uhud despite being blind—demonstrating that personal limitations did not deter him from the spirit of jihad. Similarly, there is a narration about the *tabi'in* (followers of the companions), Sa'id Ibn Musayyib, who also fought in battle despite suffering from an eye ailment. These accounts show that physical limitations do not hinder a person from participating in warfare, as long as it is within their capabilities. The key lesson from these stories is the exemplary fighting spirit and unwavering

moral commitment to defending religion and homeland.

Certainly, the factors that influence such strong spirit and morale are closely related to a solid personal character and identity, cultivated both physically and spiritually in fulfilling responsibilities as citizens. Nonetheless, the decision to undertake jihad or engage in warfare to defend the nation ultimately lies with the head of state, as discussed in *fiqh siyasah*. The willingness to undertake jihad in defence of the country is still dependent on individual capacity and is not limited to bearing arms—it also includes other forms of contribution such as financial donations, specialised expertise in logistics, medicine, education, public infrastructure, and more (Khair Haikal, 1996)

Hence, the involvement of the entire populace is crucial when the nation is under attack. A ruling that is originally *fard kifayah* transforms into *fard 'ayn* when the government orders citizens—be they regular or reserve soldiers—to defend the nation's sovereignty. This aligns with a principle of *fiqh*: *"Whatever is necessary to complete an obligation is itself obligatory."*

According to Khair Haikal (1996), carrying out Allah's commands is a duty, and it can only be fully realised by establishing an Islamic state that implements Islamic law entirely (Abu Zahrah,2010). Accordingly, proper preparation and planning to strengthen the defence system and military capabilities are obligatory and vital responsibilities for the leadership of an Islamic state. If there is a threat from enemies, it becomes obligatory for them to defend the land from being invaded. In this context, one obligation fulfils the requirement of another subsequent obligation.

Fard 'Ayn and Fard Kifayah: A Dynamic Solution

Undoubtedly, for Muslims, defending the nation is seen as part of a religious obligation, which by default is classified as *fard kifayah* – a responsibility that mainly lies with members of the security forces such as the military, police, and others (M. Zaidi et al., 2008). However, this ruling can shift to *fard 'ayn*, meaning that it becomes an obligation upon all citizens to defend national sovereignty if circumstances demand it, based on specific criteria recognised by Islamic law (Qardhawi, 2009).

For non-Muslims, on the other hand, their perspective on participation in national defence differs according to their own beliefs and religious teachings. It can be inferred that their involvement may be driven by expressive and motivational elements such as material rewards, the cultivation of tolerance, strong interethnic unity, high patriotism, and love for the country. These factors provide the valuable social cohesion rewards that underpin the expressive logic theory.

However, expressive logic theory is not exempt from issues such as non-participation and the free rider problem. For instance, according to the laws of war, during times of conflict, the safety and rights of women, children, and the elderly must be protected. These groups are generally discouraged from going to the battlefield, even though they may possess a strong expressive motivation to defend national sovereignty and a desire for martyrdom. Such expressive acts are manifested without direct participation in combat (Majid Khadduri, 1990).

Yet it is important to understand that *non-participation* here does not mean absolute inaction. These individuals can still contribute behind the scenes by offering moral support to fighters, donating financially, providing medical assistance, and so on—actions that are in line with Islamic legal rulings. As for the *free rider* issue, Schuessler (2000) argues that it does not arise within the expressive logic framework, because participation is driven by the immediate emotional and expressive experience rather than by the end results of participation. While this argument is not rejected, it must be scrutinised to assess its applicability in contexts such as national defence participation.

From the researcher's perspective, the concept of the free rider can still emerge within expressive logic theory when individuals choose not to engage collectively, depending on the situation. This appears not so different from the free rider issue within rational logic theory or the non-participation concept previously explained. The key distinction lies in the absence of expressive and emotional motivation within an individual, resulting in a

failure to participate and a tendency to leave responsibilities to others.

For example, an individual may still consider national defence as *fard kifayah* even when the country is at war, and continue to believe it is solely the duty of the armed forces—despite the fact that the situation now necessitates it as *fard 'ayn* (an individual obligation). As a result, the country could suffer immense destruction due to the irresponsibility of individuals lacking expressive motivation and emotional attachment to their homeland (Qardhawi, 2009). This issue must be examined thoughtfully and addressed wisely to ensure the future of the nation and its generations are instilled with expressive spirit and patriotic fervor to preserve the sovereignty of their beloved homeland (Mohd Kamarul Amree et al., 2021).

Concept of Rewards Afterlife vis-à-vis Jihad

The awareness of mind and spirit among the people in loving and being willing to defend their country is a matter greatly emphasised from the perspective of *siyasah shar'iyyah* (good governance). This is not a foreign concept in applying Islamic principles as an ideology to guide national life (Abd Rahman, 1995). The application of the concept *hubb al-watan min al-iman* (love for the country is part of faith) in motivating citizens, especially Muslims, to defend their nation, showcases a unique ideological feature of Islam in merging the notions of "religion and state," which are inherently inseparable.

Al-Qardhawi (2009) insists that the perseverance of the people of Madinah during the early history of Islam in defending the sovereignty of their city reflects the embodiment of ideas born from a strong sense of identity rooted in national love, underpinned by a solid religious understanding. This demonstrates the relevance of the argument that "when the nation is threatened, so too is the religion (faith)," encouraging public involvement based on the combination of religious and nationalistic ideologies in defence of the homeland. This notion is mirrored in Malaysia, where during times of war, even places of worship from various religions are not spared from destruction, as discussed previously.

This parallel can be seen in the example of how national and religious ideologies are unified in the struggle of the Palestinian people in defending their sovereignty from Israeli occupation. The *Intifada* that began in 1987, as discussed by Mary King (2009) in her writings, was a massive civil resistance movement by Palestinians without resorting to violence. Her records note that over 100 methods were employed by Palestinians to protest and resist the occupation. These included closing shops, boycotts, communal public prayers, symbolic funerals, rejecting ID cards, renaming streets and schools, among others. This illustrates a mass movement driven by the Palestinians' love for their faith and country, formed even without "taking up arms." What can be learned here is the strong character and identity necessary to defend the homeland through various non-violent means, highlighting the abstract nature of such participation.

Siyasah shar'iyyah also upholds the ideology of *jihad* to enhance spiritual awareness in defending the sovereignty of the nation in the path of Allah (SWT). Islam decrees that as long as there is no threat from enemies, peace must be maintained. However, if there is a threat of oppression or invasion, then it becomes obligatory for Muslims to defend it, as stated in the words of Allah in Quranic verse 2:190: *Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.*

This Qur'anic verse clarifies that permission for warfare (*jihad*) is granted solely for defence against enemy attacks. According to Sheikh Abu Zahrah (1990), this ruling aligns with the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in resisting enemy violence. This view is supported by scholars like Hassan al-Banna (2004), Maḥmud Shaltut (1992), and Wahbah al-Zuhaili (1981), who also consider this form of *jihad* a motivational force for Islamic fighters. Sheikh Ramadan al-Buti (1993) adds that the government must rise alongside its people to confront the enemy, with unity being the only viable course of action.

When enemies approach the territory of a Muslim nation, it logically poses a threat that must be repelled and eliminated to secure the country's borders. A strong national defence must be established through the involvement of the military and civilian population. Allah (SWT) says in Quran 8:45: *O you who have believed, when you encounter a force, be steadfast and remember Allah much that you may be successful.*

This verse means that those defending the nation must remain firm in their ranks and resolute against enemy attacks. Feelings of fear and anxiety are normal in battle, but the solution given by Allah to boost motivation is through the remembrance of Him via *dhikr* and prayer, so that divine assistance may come. The following verse warns fighters not to retreat from the battlefield except under specific circumstances. Doing so invites Allah's punishment, as in the Quranic verse 8:16: *And whoever turns his back to them on such a day – unless it be a stratagem of war, or to join another group – he indeed incurs the wrath of Allah. His abode is Hell – and what a wretched destination.*

According to Al-Tabari (1995), although this verse was revealed specifically to the fighters of Badr, it remains a legal ruling for all Muslim warriors to this day, forbidding withdrawal from defence lines, as Allah disapproves of such an act. Ibn Kathir (1999) interprets the phrase "to join another group" as referring to the Muslim forces led by the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), supported by many narrations from the companions and their successors.

A hadith also warns that fleeing the battlefield is one of the seven deadly sins to be avoided, as stated by the Prophet (SAW) in the hadith narrated by Imam Bukhari (1981): *Avoid the seven destructive sins: associating others with Allah, sorcery, unjust killing, consuming usury, consuming the property of orphans, fleeing from the battlefield, and accusing chaste, believing women of adultery.*

CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded in this chapter that the concept of collective citizen participation is one of the key topics in the study of political science. This concept has given rise to pragmatic forms of collective involvement among the people concerning political issues such as voting, tax payment, and others. The emergence of rational choice theory and expressive logic theory has also helped explain the notion of public participation in the national defence system, particularly in terms of cost-benefit analysis and the values and benefits derived from such involvement. Both Islamic and western share a common emphasis on mental and spiritual awareness in cultivating love for the nation. However, the difference lies in the added value of spiritual rewards—such as the merit of *jihad* and martyrdom—which are unique to the perspective of *siyasah shar'iyyah*. There is no significant difference between the two perspectives when it comes to stressing national unity as a motivational and encouraging factor in safeguarding national sovereignty. The most notable divergence lies in the matter of acquiring rewards and incentives for participation. This issue has persisted and led to what is termed the "paradox of participation" in the context of collective action. In this regard, the *siyasah shar'iyyah* perspective, through the concepts of *fard 'ayn* (individual obligation) and *fard kifayah* (communal obligation), offers a comprehensive and flexible solution to the problem of determining rewards—whether individual or collective. Here, religious obligations are aligned with individual or group efforts, thereby ensuring fairness in the distribution of rewards in collective participation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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