

Unclear international agreements; It's a sociopsychological and domestic political phenomenon.

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Abstract: Turkey's veto on Finland and Sweden's NATO membership was exceeded at the NATO meeting. The positive outcome of Sweden and Finland's membership in this agreement is clear and unmistakable. It is unclear what Turkey has achieved and what it has vetoed in return.

NATO leaders gathered in Madrid, Spain, to discuss important issues facing the Alliance. The Madrid Summit has set NATO's strategic direction for the future, ensuring that the Alliance will continue to adapt to a changing world and keep its one billion people safe.

After the NATO meeting in Spain, the typical headline of the newspapers affiliated with Erdogan was "Erdogan slammed his fist on the table and got what he wanted." However, there has been no development regarding Erdogan's wishes, how the embargo will be lifted, his entry into the F35 project, and the results regarding the F16 warplanes. The agreement is unclear, and the issue regarding the extradition of those considered terrorists by Sweden and Finland by Turkey was limited to the constitutional regulations of Finland and Sweden.

Since international agreements are mainly used as domestic policy material, autocratic leaders mostly make their agreements in a way that goes wherever they are drawn. Thus they can use them as domestic policy material and create the desired effect on their uneducated voters.

Key Words; NATO, International Relations, International Sociology

I. INTRODUCTION

Erdogan, President of Türkiye, has decisions on several matters, unclear. One of them is the American citizen priest Brunson. The Andrew Brunson crisis, which caused the tensest days in the history of US-Turkey relations and brought the two countries to the point of imposing mutual sanctions, was resolved with the release of the US evangelical priest.

US cleric Andrew Craig Brunson, sentenced to 35 years in prison for "committing crimes and spying on behalf of terrorist organizations" in Izmir and was under house arrest, was sentenced to 3 years, one month, and 15 days in prison. However, considering the time the priest had been in jail, it was ruled that he would not be imprisoned again. Trump thanked the release, explaining that Erdogan

did not break his request. However, it is not known how the bargain was made (Tuncer 2022). (tr. euronews.

com/2018/10/12/adimadim-brunson-krizi-and-Turkiye-iliskilerinde-yaptirimlarnoktasina-nasil-gelindi).

Another incident is the case of German citizen Deniz Yücel. Die Welt Turkey correspondent Deniz Yücel was detained in Istanbul to testify to the investigation teams about the news he wrote about the hacking of the private e-mail address of the Minister of Energy then by RedHack. He was arrested on February 27, 2017, to whom he was referred on charges of "propagandizing for a terrorist organization and inciting the people to hatred and enmity."

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke on the subject: "It turns out that this terrorist was the cause of all these events. Unfortunately, this man is a terrorist, not a journalist, and the German administration puts my ministers on the same scale as such a terrorist". German Chancellor Angela Merkel talked with President Erdoğan to let him go. 'Merkel stepped in for Yücel, and the journalist was released after being detained in Turkey between 14 February 2017 and 16 February 2018. German Chancellor Merkel did not explain the negotiations for Yücel's release (tr. euronews.

com/2022/01/25/aihm-gazeteci-deniz-yucel-in-act-g-davadaturkiye-yi-mahkum-etti).

The Turkish public knows about Erdogan's negotiation, which is not transparent whether such non-transparent bargains existed in NATO's Finland and Sweden decision. International relations do not need to say what it says explicitly. Sociopsychological effects are a much more critical expectation for the parties (McSweeney 1999).

The full text of the agreement signed between the parties (tr.euronews.com/2022/06/28/):

"Turkey, Finland, and Sweden express their commitment to the principles and values set out in the Washington Treaty. One of the most fundamental elements of the alliance is full solidarity and cooperation in combating all forms and manifestations of terrorism that threaten the member states' national security and international peace and stability. As future NATO allies, Finland and Sweden will fully support Turkey against all threats to its national security. In this context, Finland and Sweden will not support the PYD/YPG and the organization defined as FETO in Turkey. Turkey will

also respond to all threats against its national security. It gives full support to Finland and Sweden.

Finland and Sweden most strongly reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Finland and Sweden openly and unequivocally condemn the attacks by all terrorist organizations against Turkey and express their deepest feelings of solidarity with Turkey and the victims' families. Finland and Sweden confirm that the PKK is a banned terrorist organization. Finland and Sweden undertake to prevent the activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations, their extensions, and the activities of persons involved in or affiliated with affiliated organizations and front organizations. Turkey, Finland, and Sweden have decided to increase their cooperation to prevent the actions of these terrorist organizations. Finland and Sweden rejected the ambitions of these terrorist organizations."

"Sweden confirms that a new and more effective Terrorist Offenses Law will come into force as of 1 July and that the government will further tighten up anti-terrorism legislation. Turkey, Finland, and Sweden confirm that there is no longer any national arms embargo. Sweden, NATO allies "In the future, defense industry experts from Finland and Sweden will be carried out in line with Allied solidarity and the spirit and letter of Article 3 of the Washington Agreement."

"They will establish a structured intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation mechanism at all levels, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to enhance consensus-based cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and other common challenges. Finland and Sweden will continue fighting terrorism in line with the relevant NATO documents and policy provisions. In line with the European Extradition Convention, Finland, and Sweden, considering the information, evidence, and intelligence provided by Turkey, demand the deportation or extradition of Turkey suspects of terrorism. They will act immediately and in all dimensions and make the necessary bilateral contractual arrangements with Turkey to improve extradition and security cooperation."

"Finland and Sweden will initiate and prohibit investigations into the fundraising and recruitment activities of the PKK terrorist organization and all its affiliated organizations and front organizations, within the framework recorded in paragraph 5. Turkey, Finland, and Sweden will undertake to fight against disinformation and ensure that their laws "Finland and Sweden will ensure that their arms export legislation enables new commitments to Allies and is compatible with their membership status in NATO."

"Finland and Sweden will support the broadest possible inclusion of Turkey and other non-EU allies in current and future initiatives of the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy, including Turkey's participation in the PESCO project on military mobility. To implement these steps, Turkey, Finland and Sweden will establish a Permanent Joint Mechanism with the involvement of experts from the

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Justice, intelligence services, and security institutions. The Permanent Joint Mechanism will be open to the involvement of other countries. Turkey has long adhered to NATO's open-door policy. reaffirms its longstanding support and expresses its support for the invitation of Finland and Sweden to become NATO members at the Madrid Summit.

What has been said in domestic politics has been that Turkey showed its power with the NATO agreement and got what it wanted. However, when we look at the agreement, there is no objective criterion in Turkey's interest.

- Turkey was not included in the F35 project, which was issued due to the purchase of the S400.
- There has been no development regarding the acquisition of the Patriot defense system.
- The agreement did not include an element related to the economic bottleneck Turkey is in.
- In Sweden, to which Turkey attaches importance, there has been no mention of the burning of the Holy Quran.
- The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that may be against Turkey and the energy policy initiatives of Greece and France against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean are not mentioned. The possibility that these issues may have been discussed as confidential matters should not be ignored. Moreover, his meaningless decision about Osman Kavala, who was imprisoned for a long time due to the violation of rights due to the Gezi events right after this agreement, is a sign that these issues may be on the agenda, albeit partially.
- The issue of Turkey's membership in the European Union is another critical issue that is not included in the agreement. Erdoğan voiced these issues before he went to the NATO meeting, and he had openly declared that he would not withdraw the veto decision for Finland and Sweden's NATO membership until these issues were resolved.
- The issue of the military embargo was not included in the agreement's text, although it was the issue that Turkey emphasized the most. Only Turkey, Finland, and Sweden were included in the understanding that there would be no embargo.
- The content of this international agreement has only one purpose, "to make an ambiguous/unclear agreement that does not contain objective clauses to overcome Turkey's veto."
- Although the agreement did not fulfill Turkey's true wishes, it was more critical for Erdoğan to save his prestige. This psychological effect of the agreement was fulfilled by strengthening it through the pro-government media. Even though he did not fulfill any of Turkey's wishes, Erdogan achieved the personal prestige he wanted to get. His desired domestic political influence was fulfilled by using

the agreement as a tool for domestic politics (Klamberg 2015).

2022 Strategic Concept of NATO

NATO's guiding document, reflecting the new security reality that has emerged since the previous Strategic Concept was agreed upon in 2010, identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, addresses China for the first time, and includes other challenges like terrorism, cyber and hybrid download the 2022 Strategic Concept.

Strengthened deterrence and defense the most significant overhaul of Allied collective defense and deterrence since the Cold War upgraded defense plans, with more forces at high readiness and specific details pre-assigned to defend specific Allies, more troops, and more pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles in the east of the Alliance, enhancing NATO's eight multinational battlegroups Investing more in defense reaffirmed commitment by Allies to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024 more common funding for NATO.

A strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, including support in areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems and fuel long-term help for Ukraine to transition from Soviet-era military equipment to modern NATO equipment, new support packages for other partners at risk, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova Adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions by NATO as an organization by at least 45 percent by 2030, down to net-zero by 2050 launch of the NATO Innovation Fund, which will invest EUR 1 billion over the next 15 years in start-ups developing dual-use emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence edge to continue enhancing national and collective resilience, so that Allied societies are prepared for any threat or challenge Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea joined a NATO summit for the first time to deepen cooperation and address global challenges.

Finland and Sweden's membership in Strategic Plan

Official invitation to Finland and Sweden to become NATO members reaffirmed commitment to NATO's "Open Door" policy for aspiring members.

II. CONCLUSION

Turkey's veto attitude toward Finland and Sweden's NATO membership was resolved by psychologically satisfying Erdogan's prestige with the help of NATO countries, America.

The most ambiguous statements are in the following paragraphs (www.bbc.com/turkce);

1. The three countries agree to establish joint mechanisms to strengthen cooperation to "fight terrorism and organized crime."
2. "Finland and Sweden will address Turkey's pending deportation or extradition requests promptly and in

detail," which will follow the decisions of the European Commission.

3. The three countries pledge to "prevent the use of their local laws for the benefit of terrorist organizations and to combat disinformation."
4. The statement states that "Turkey confirms its support for NATO's open-door policy and agrees to support the invitation of Finland and Sweden to NATO membership at the 2022 Madrid Summit", which is the most precise and most apparent item.

Despite Finland and Sweden's formal application for membership in NATO, Turkey publicly voiced against the membership of these two countries.

Erdogan, who claimed that Finnish President Sauli Niinisto told him that he would support Turkey's NATO membership in a phone call by saying, "I am confused" on the contrary, reiterated that they are against Finland and Sweden's membership in the security pact (www.amerikaninsesi.com). These contradictory statements are Erdogan's typical politics, and he uses such approaches as domestic policy material.

Those who know and apply international sociology well will be the permanent winners of international agreements (Lawson 2010). NATO executives analyzed Erdoğan sociologically and psychologically and made a plan they were sure would withdraw their veto right, winning. NATO got what it wanted. Although Turkey did not get what it wanted, Erdogan got what he wanted (Mersheimer 2010).

As a result of Erdogan's decision, it will be watched how the relations between Turkey and Russia will progress, how Erdogan will explain this stance to Putin, and whether he will try to make amends by purchasing new weapons from Russia. As it is known, the previous Russia-Turkey friction was extinguished with the purchase of the S400 system from Russia. As it is known, \$2.5 billion was paid for the S400 system, and it was put into storage to be unused.

The most obscure point in this fuzzy agreement is the definition of terrorist by Sweden and Finland, namely who they consider terrorists or not. Therefore, it is not clear what the parties will do and who will be deported. In addition, it is unknown whether the Finnish and Swedish laws will allow the deportation of those Turkey wants and call terrorists. Erdogan should know that Sweden and Finland are a state of law and do not resemble Turkey in this respect.

It should be remembered that the European Court convicted Turkey of Human Rights on the grounds of human rights violations against those whom Erdoğan called terrorists with personal preferences. Despite this, will other European Union countries, including Finland and Sweden, be able to set aside these human rights violations for membership?

Despite the progress, the road to membership for Sweden and Finland is still likely to be fraught with bumps as all existing NATO members need to ratify their accession protocols. Turkey would prefer to delay this process, so Ankara can use

it as leverage to press the Nordic duo to implement their commitments and even make new demands, not in the trilateral agreement (www.chathamhouse.org).

As a first result of the unclear agreement, The Prime-minister of Sweden, Andersson, said that the Swedish government's decision to deport a person wanted for fraud to Turkey "was made by Swedish and international law, and they will continue to take steps in this way."

However, in the written agreement, the extradition of those wanted on terrorism charges was written. However, the person who decided to be deported is a common criminal who is wanted for fraud. In other words, it is not the extradition of a person whom Turkey calls a terrorist and an asylum seeker in Sweden (www.haberler.com/dunya). Anders Eka, President of the Supreme Court in Sweden, said that 19 people who were among those who Turkey wanted extradition had been tried before and would not reconsider their extradition cases (tr.euronews.com/2022/07/04/). Samnytt newspaper, published online in Sweden, wrote that the person Sweden is preparing to extradite to Turkey on fraud charges is 35-year-old Okan Kale. In the news, it was reported that Kale fled to Sweden in 2010-2011 due to being accused of card fraud against three banks in Turkey. In the statement that drew attention to the fact that Kale received a temporary refugee residence card for two years in Italy and that she came to Sweden in 2016 and married a Swedish person 23 years older than her, it was pointed out that Kale got a residence and work permit in Sweden thanks to this marriage.

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