

# Factors Militating Against the Performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria, 2003-2020.

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**Abstract:** The EFCC was established by the Obasanjo civilian administration in 2003 to tackle the wide spread corruption in the system. Since its inception, the Commission has been in the trench, taking on the monster call corruption. But as the saying goes;” Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown”. The commission is faced with myriad of challenges some are internal while others are external. The aim of this article is to highlight some of the challenges that the EFCC faces as it carries out the arduous task of riding the nation of corruption. The paper made use of secondary data and uses the Institutional Corruption Theory as the theoretical framework for its analyses. It was discovered in course of our investigation that the EFCC is not resting on its oars in spite of the stupendous challenges that it faces. We have listed some of the challenges of the commission and have also made some vital recommendations that if implemented, would help the Commission to overcome those challenges. After all said and done, the political will to implement the recommendations still rest with the government of the day.

**Key Words:** Corruption, EFCC, Challenges, Investigation, Politics, Government.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The EFCC was established in December, 2002, but actually started its operation on the 13<sup>th</sup> of April, 2003. The EFCC Act of 2002 was repealed to give way to the 2004 Act. The establishment of the EFCC was a culmination of internal and external factors. The EFCC was established due to the plan by the Obasanjo administration to eliminate graft and other fraudulent activities like mismanagement of public funds, lack of accountability and transparency by public officials. The creation of the EFCC was spurred by the need to combat corruption and to make a paradigm shift from the traditional weaker anti-corruption rhetoric and creating a robust, no-nonsense, no-holds-barred and exhaustive legislative institutional approach to anti-corruption. The regime also wanted to make a statement that it was not a lame duck administration, bereft of ideas on how to fight corruption and other malfeasance.

It was partly due to the pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering, which listed Nigeria among the 23 non-cooperative countries and territories of the world in the effort to fight money laundering globally. One of the recommendations of the FATF was the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) that will

function as a financial intelligence unit that possessed sufficient statutory enforcement powers (Obuah, 2010). Furthermore, the emergence of the EFCC came in the wake of the new era of terrorism that dawned on September 11, 2001 in the United States of America (USA). The attack led to increased pressure from the USA and United Nations on countries, (particularly developing countries) to put in place measures to combat financing terrorism (EFCC, 2017).

The establishment of the EFCC also shows the fervor with which the Obasanjo administration wanted to stamp out corruption. It was against this backdrop that the regime adopted its multi-pronged anti-corruption campaign with the creation of the EFCC, Due Process Office in the Presidency and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) (Hope, 2017).

The Commission is charged with the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the EFCC Act 2004, which includes investigating all financial crimes, including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal cash transfer, credit card fraud, contract scam, e.tc. Suffice is to say that the EFCC has a very strong legal backing to enable it perform maximally, but the drawbacks of the commission is what this paper intends to focus on.

The paper is divided into 4 sections: Section one focuses on the introduction; section two looks at the theoretical framework; section three enumerates the challenges of the Commission and section four deals with the conclusion and recommendations.

## II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*Institutional Corruption Theory:*

Proponents of institutional corruption theory are: Seumas Miller, Dennis Frank Thompson, Lawrence Lessig and Mark E. Warren. They believe that an institution of government is corrupted by extraneous influences or manipulations which contributes or aids in distorting its decision – making process and thereby impair or vitiates its capacity to function according to prescribed roles. They also agree that institutional corruption differs from personal corruption.

In the view of Lessig, 'Institutional corruption is made manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal or even currently ethical that undermines the institution's effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose' (Lessig, 2013 P. 553). Lessig's definition is intended to apply to almost any kind of institution, be it in government or the private sector

Seumass Miller provides the most philosophically grounded conception of institutional corruption. For Miller, social institutions should serve collective ends that in turn protect individual autonomy, specifically, contain basic needs and fundamental rights (Miller 2010). An act or practice counts as institutional corruption if and only if (a) it tends to undermine the collective purpose or the shared process of the institution, or despoils the character of an occupant, of a role in the institution or both, and (b) the occupant either intended or foresaw these effects, or could have avoided contributing to them (Miller, 2010, PP-19-20.2017, P 82).

The major difference in Miller's view from Thomson and most other institutionalist is that he holds the view that institutional corruption typically requires corrupt individual agent. The agent must either know or should know that their actions are corrupt, or at the very least are in position to avoid the effects of the corrupt action (Miller, 2010, PP 19–20)

The EFCC is an agency established by government to fight a specific form of corruption. According to Lessig, corruption occurs when officials of the commission have to depend on the nod from the executive arm of government in order to carry out its operation; as opposed to those whom they owe exclusive allegiance-the masses. Members of the commission are favourably disposed to taking orders from the executive. This is mostly due to the fact that the chairman of the commission is appointed by the president and confirmation is not sought from the senate as enshrined in section 2(3) of the EFCC Act 2004; which provides that "the chairman and members of the commission other than ex – officio members shall be appointed by the president and appointment shall be subject to confirmation of the Senate" 'He who pays the Piper', they say 'dictates the tune'

In conclusion, institutional corruption theory explains that influence from the powers that be undermines the effectiveness of government institutions. Undue interference from the executive in the performance of the EFCC has contributed to weakening the commission. That is the origin of the corruption in the agency and by implication; the bane of the commission.

#### *Challenges of the EFCC*

There are myriad of factors militating against the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

**Legal Environment:** The EFCC Acts grants jurisdiction to both federal and state courts to try EFCC cases -EFCC, Act. 2004 Sec., 9(1). According to the Act, special judges or courts

should be designated to try corruption cases -EFCC, Act. 2004, Sec. 19(3), and these proceedings should be "conducted with dispatch and given accelerated hearing". Despite these provisions, many of the Commission's cases have made little progress in the courts. Of the numerous cases ongoing in the courts concerning State governors, eight have already been dragged for more than three years. Some have gone more than four years without a single witness being called at trial.

When former Kogi State Governor, Abubakar Audu sought a court order restraining the EFCC from prosecuting him in 2006, Federal High Court Judge, Mohammed Liman denied the application, noting that "I cannot be but horrified by the level of debauchery that was alleged to have been committed;" and he questioned the propriety of the former governor's attempt to "use the instrumentality of the law to prevent his coming face to face with justice" (HRW, 2006). In 2011, after nearly five years of appeals and other stoppages, the trial was finally expected to commence-only to be adjourned again when Audu was granted a delay for medical reasons. Critics doubted how ill Audu truly was; having declared to contest for governorship of Kogi State. He was seen vigorously campaigning in spite of his purported ill health (Nigerian Tribune, 2011).

Ricky Tarfa, a prominent lawyer who has defended many former governors accused of corruption by the EFCC and was himself once the subject of investigation by the EFCC, put it this way, "A defense counsel has to take advantage of anything that might benefit his client", if faced with an unfavourable case he said; "I will advise my client not to rush to judgment...The laws are skewed in favour of the accused person...once he is granted bail, he can drag his trial forever". This is compounded by the fact that judges are bombarded with work, have no modern facilities and no good assistance (HRW, 2011). These and other factors conspire to create extraordinary delays. Over-worked judges want the opportunity to put off their work, so you get adjournments for the asking and it then takes about one to three months at least (to return to court) because the courts calendar is always full (HRW, 2011).

But the most extreme delays come from the court system's backlog of appeal cases. Many judges have trials while interlocution appeals are decided by higher courts, and skilled lawyers can exploit this to generate months or even years of delays in any given case. In September, 2004, British authorities in London arrested Plateau State Governor, Joshua Dariye on allegations of money laundering and seized about £90,000 in cash. Dariye skipped (jumped) bail and fled to Nigeria, and resumed office. All thanks to the immunity clause (THISDAY, 2004). An English court in April 2007, however convicted and sentenced Dariye's associate to three years in prison for laundering more than £1.4M of public funds found to have been stolen by the governor (Reuters, 2007). The EFCC quickly moved to charge Dariye on 14 count charges of money laundering once his tenure ended in 2007(Guardian 2007). Soon after he was charged, the Federal

High Court granted him bail even though he had fled prosecution in the UK (HRW, 2007).

In November, 2007, Dariye's lawyer filed a motion asking that all of the charges against him be dismissed. Justice Adebukola Banjoko denied the motion, but Dariye's lawyers appealed the ruling. Banjoko halted the proceedings until his appeal could be heard (HRW, 2008), but by the time that ruling was handed down in June, 2010, nearly three years had passed since his first appearance in court. Some of the bottle necks causing these avoidable delays are not all inevitable. Section 40 of the EFCC Act of 2004 purports to foster speedier trials in EFCC cases by banning judges from stopping trials to wait for appeals to be decided (EFCC, Act, 2004, Sec.40). In theory, this provision is one of the most powerful procedural weapons the EFCC has at its disposal. But officials of the EFCC say that many judges have simply refused to adhere to section 40, viewing their wide discretion to decide such matters as a constitutional guarantee that cannot be curtailed by legislation (HRW, 2011).

The Act also grants trial judges broad powers to take appropriate measures to ensure speedy trials and avoid delays in EFCC cases, but with some exceptions, the courts have not made any apparent use of those powers (EFCC, Act 2004, Sec. 19(2) (b) and (c)). In March 2007, former governor of Rivers State, Dr. Peter Odili obtained a remarkable and novel court decision from the Federal High Court; forbidding the EFCC from investigating the finances of his government. After Dr. Peter Odili left office, he managed again to secure a "perpetual injunction", that was widely condemned as a mockery of the judicial process that permanently restrained the EFCC from "arresting, detaining and arraigning Odili on the basis of his tenure as governor of Rivers State" (Reuters, 2008).

The decision was widely denounced as being without any legal basis, and its author, Justice Ibrahim Buba, became a widely reviled figure in the Nigerian Press. The reputation of Nigeria's court system took a further bashing in February, 2011 when Justice Ayo Salami, the president of the Federal Court of Appeal, publicly accused Supreme Court Chief Justice Aloysius Katsina-Alu of trying to pressure him to decide a key electoral petition in favour of the ruling party (Vanguard, 2011). The EFCC has filed more than 25 complaints against judges for various delays in corruption cases, granting "frivolous injunctions to halt trials and investigations", and "partisanship" including the National Judicial Council (NJC), and indiscipline of members of the bench – but according to the EFCC, little has been done other than, in few cases reassign the case to a new judge (HRW, 2011).

With respect to the transition from petitions received to petition investigated, the EFCC regulation 2010 does not provide indicative criteria for the rejection or investigation of petitions and as such it would appear that the decision to investigate or to reject a petition is at the discretion of the EFCC chairman. Whilst a definitive list could prove too

restrictive for the EFCC, it could also be argued that the absence of any criteria also leaves room for political and or external interference in the processes of the Commission and could contribute to the ever-widening gap between petition investigation and rejection.

The courts in Nigeria have been quick to point out the political nature of some investigations. In the case of Ihenacho V NPF, the Court of Appeal held that a few elements of the NPF and the EFCC had a tendency to look into every inconsequential case with inefficient outcomes. The Court further stated that the spate of lawlessness in the polity could not be condoned, be it the handwork of private individuals or State government executives whose top officials are expected to know better than to choose their adversaries with the help of State sponsored Law Enforcement Agents (LEAs). In the heydays of the EFCC, allegations of investigations based on the directives of the then president, Olusegun Obasanjo were not uncommon (Lawson, 2009).

There are other occasions where essentially civil matters have been brought before the EFCC because petitioners and their legal advisers gave the complaint a criminal interpretation so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the EFCC. This is due to a lack of trust in the civil justice system. Complainants willingly rely on the EFCC as a means of recovering civil debts, a practice that has resulted in a plethora of judicial reprimands, as averred to by the Supreme Court in the case of Diamond Bank PLC V. Opara. "The FECC is not a debt recovery agency and should not be used as such". The Supreme Court went on to counsel the EFCC to scrutinize all complaints that it receives carefully, no matter how carefully crafted by the complainant and should be bold enough to counsel such complainants to seek the appropriate and lawful means to resolve their disputes

*Financial and Infrastructural Challenges:* In his 2019 budget defense, the former acting chairman of the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu expressed worry over the Budget Office's drastic reduction of the Commission's capital expenditure proposal from ₦15.2billion to ₦4billion, representing a 74.82% reduction from the approved estimate of ₦10.07billion in 2018 (NTA News, 2019). He also said that the commission was challenged in the areas of huge maintenance cost of the new head office building, inadequate resources to manage a huge and growing establishment, fixed asset forfeiture base and inadequate ICT infrastructure (NTA News, 2019).

Other challenges according to the anti-corruption czar are poor detention facilities, particularly in the zones, inadequate office equipment, the absence of health and fitness facilities in the head office and zones, lack of equipment in the clinics and inadequate office accommodation in the zones. The commission's zonal offices in Ilorin, Makurdi, Uyo and Benin, he said, are all rented apartments. There is also the pressing need for operational vehicles in the head office and across the zonal offices (NTA News, 2019).

**Court Congestion:** The issue of court congestion and slow pace of court proceedings occasioned by insufficient number of courts and judges and antiquated manual recording system constitute a snag in the judicial system. Of equal importance is the nature of cybercrime. This has created a judicial challenge and increased the costs of investigation and prosecution. The digital revolution has collapsed traditional physical boundaries and therefore altered the traditional jurisdiction for prosecution of cybercrimes. Associated with this jurisdictional problem is the challenge posed by the increasing cost of prosecuting the cases which amount to millions of naira (Ribadu, 2004). The Commission also faces the challenge of the inadequacy of existing procedural laws in Nigeria that question the evidential status and admissibility of computer and electronically generated documents (Ribadu, 2004). The absence of a special court for the trial of cases of corruption and financial crimes is also a major problem. Also, outdated laws have not been helpful in the fight against graft. For example, Nigeria's evidence act was enacted in 1945 and is out of touch with modern day commercial realities (Waziri, 2011).

**Lack of Assets Forfeiture Law:** There is also the need for the National Assembly to enact the non-conviction based assets forfeiture law. The case for the law becomes stronger in view of the unnecessary delays in trials. Most Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) have political immunity and also have the means to evade or delay trials. However, where their assets are sequestered within the bounds of the law, it will be in their interest, therefore to either not loot public funds or to avoid delaying trials in order to get off the hook (Waziri, 2011).

**Training of Staff:** EFCC's effectiveness is also predicated on its internal organization and continued training of staff to be professionally qualified personnel. In the 2013 annual report of the commission, it was identified that one of the operational challenges is the dearth of consistent training of officers to meet the exigencies that are peculiar to the ever-changing nature of economic and financial crimes (EFCC, 2013:84). The 2015 annual report later stated that training is essential because it equips officers with the requisite skills and information on best practices in law enforcement. If we are to succeed in the fight against corruption, training must be adequately funded. (EFCC, 2015:130).

It should be noted that the commission has made considerable progress in terms of continuous training and education of its operatives. In 2013, its operatives participated in 17 training programmes (EFCC, 2013:40) and 84 officers travelled abroad for training (EFCC, 2013:57). In 2015, EFCC operatives participated in 28 local trainings and 10 international trainings (EFCC, 2015:111-113). Whilst such attempts at continuous training of operatives are to be commended, the commission has also stated that it has been largely dependent on the assistance of donor partners to train staff. Be that as it may, it is pertinent to note that the percentage of officers that are trained is quite low compared to the number of staff eligible for training.

**Uncooperative Foreign Countries:** The recovery of laundered money by the EFCC from foreign countries is difficult. Government should sign repatriation treaties with these foreign countries for quick return of money stolen by public officials (Info Guide, 2019).

**Immunity and Plea Bargain:** The immunity placed on all chief executives has handicapped the EFCC from prosecuting offenders. Others include the systemic disorder, issues from the Judiciary, lack of societal cooperation and the issue of plea bargain (Ibidolapo, 2016).

Political corruption in Nigeria was laid bare in the case involving Halliburton. The scandal involved a conglomerate company Siemens AG and Halliburton, where its former subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) entered a guilty plea and agreed to pay \$579m fine for payment of bribes to secure contracts in Nigeria and other countries. The employees of the foreign conglomerate were prosecuted expeditiously but the investigation of the senior government officials from Nigeria who were alleged to have received \$180m in bribes fell silent and possibly may have been abandoned (Albert and Okoli, 2016). Other examples include the former World Bank vice president, Dr. Obiageli Ezekwesili, announcing that an estimated ₦400bn of Nigeria's oil revenue had been stolen or misspent since independence. Information Minister, Lai Mohammed stated in 2016 that some government ministers and other officials had looted a sum of around 1.34 trillion naira (Hope, 2017). In the over 400 convictions the EFCC has secured in ten years, only about four members of the political class have been successfully prosecuted through dubious plea bargains (Falana, 2013).

The commission faces some major challenges in the fight against corruption. One is the claim of immunity from arrest and prosecution by the president, vice president and governors and their deputies. Many State governors and their legal defense lawyers have interpreted the provisions in section 308 (1) and 308 (2) of the immunity clause of the 1999 constitution (as amended) as giving absolute immunity from criminal prosecution while in office. However, claiming immunity under sec. 308 (1), governors can be prosecuted under civil law as provided by sec. 308 (2). The significant delays, frustrations, and waste of resources in the current prosecution regime constitute another challenge facing the EFCC. It has become an art for defense attorneys to ensure that financial crimes do not continue, and substantive cases are never tried on merit; especially, cases involving Politically Exposed Persons and their cronies. Defense attorneys can delay and prolong cases by a tactic of applying for stays on proceedings. Where such application is not granted, the defense attorneys accuse the judges of bias and therefore grounds for application to transfer their cases to other judges (Ribadu, 2004).

**Shortcomings of the Commission:** While the EFCC faces a plethora of external obstacles to its works, the commission has also shot itself on the foot by damaging some of its own

prosecutions through mistakes and sometimes gross incompetence. Under Ribadu, the Commission was sometimes criticized for its penchant for high profile arrests and public “invitations” of Politically Exposed Persons to come for questioning before criminal investigations were completed. The tactics earned headlines and could potentially instill fear into the hearts of some corrupt public officials; critics worry that it may also undermine the underlying investigations. As one judicial officer put it, “The day you make an announcement to the media should be the day you have filed a case otherwise, you are just saying ‘hide your tracks, we are coming’” (HRW, 2011).

**Poor Leadership:** Rightly or wrongly, Dr. Farida Mzamber Waziri, one time EFCC boss was widely considered ineffective. Leaked United States Department cable quoted the then House of Representative Speaker, Ola Dimeji Bankole, as telling US diplomats, that he had no confidence in Waziri’s leadership or integrity and that the EFCC was not worth “one penny” since she took over leadership of the Commission (Wikileaks, 2009). Rabe Nasir, until 2011, head of the House of Representatives Committee responsible for overseeing the EFCC, and himself a former EFCC official and Ribadu supporter, said the president must “do away with that woman (Waziri), if he doesn’t, forget about tackling corruption in this country” (HRW, 2011). In a related development, Ibrahim Magu (immediate past), EFCC acting chairman was alleged to have been unable to account for the interest generated from five hundred and fifty billion naira (₦550billion) recovered from 2015-2020 (NAN, 2020). He could not also give proper account of missing 332 out of the 836 recovered properties in March 2018 (NAN, 2020). The story of other former heads of the Commission is not too different from the ones above.

**Reward for Corruption:** Human Rights Watch interviewed a senior law enforcement officer who said that, if a law enforcement officer wants the work to be done, it will be done. But he may be denigrated, isolated, treated like a deviant. In Nigeria, crime does pay. Those doing the work are cut off from the system and are very unpopular (HRW, 2011). The biggest huddle to tackling corruption in Nigeria is that the political system is built to reward corruption, not punish it. The day-to-day functioning of Nigeria’s political system constantly and directly undermines the effective performance of the EFCC (HRW, 2011). Former chairman of Nigeria Ports Authority, Chief Olabode George was sentenced to two and half years in prison for contract-related offences in 2009. His conviction after a swift and efficient trial was in many ways a landmark success for the EFCC. Bode George, was released from prison in February, 2011. Instead of being treated as a pariah (that he was) because of his misdeeds, he was whisked from his jail cell to a lavish welcome ceremony attended by prominent ruling PDP members, including then President, Olusegun Obasanjo; then Ogun State governor Gbenga Daniel and then Defence Minister, Ademola Adetokunbo (Vanguard, 2011). According to media reports, a former transportation minister even declared that Bode George’s conviction had

been unfair because all government officials engage in the same illegal practices he had been convicted of (Vanguard, 2011). Meanwhile, the Lagos State judge who sent Bode George to prison was removed from criminal matters and sent to work in family court. There may be no proof that Bode George’s conviction may have triggered his transfer, but many Nigerian activist and commentators believed that it may not have been a mere coincidence (PM NEWS, 2010).

### III. CONCLUSION

The main task of this paper has been to highlight the enormous challenges that the EFCC face in its duty of riding the nation of economic and financial crimes and other related malfeasance. The EFCC has enabling laws to rid Nigeria of graft, but the managers of the Commission face challenges, prominent among them are: Political interference, legal inadequacies, bureaucratic bottle-necks, lack of trained and qualified personnel and financial dearth. The commission also has structural defects. Laws alone are not enough, the political will to arrest, arraign, prosecute and see to the conviction of erring Nigerians; no matter whose ox is gored is what the EFCC needs and that is what it lacks!

### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

For the EFCC to live by its slogan which says that nobody is above the law; here are some points that can overhaul the agency and make it a no-holds-barred anti-corruption agency in Nigeria.

1. There is need for a special anti-corruption court in the country. It should be noted that sec. 19(3) of the EFCC Act of 2004 makes provision for that, but it has remained on paper. To give bite to the 2004 Act; specialist anti-corruption courts that are isolated from the existing hierarchy of courts will insulate it from political interference and susceptibility to corruption. Also, the courts should have their own customized substantive and procedural legal principles guiding them. However, the selection of judges to handle such specialist courts should be done by the Chief Justice of the Federation and they should be judges with experience and proven integrity on and off the job.
2. In order to assuage the issue of political capture, the tenure of the EFCC chairman and secretary should bestride at least two tenures of a president and senate; that is between five and six years and not renewable. Such a measure will guard against the use of the EFCC as a tool in the hands of the government in power as any EFCC chairman would be required to serve two presidents from two political parties, barring continuity.
3. The confirmation of the chairman of the EFCC should be done by the Senate as enshrined in sec. 2(3) of the 2004 Act while the Executive President does the appointment. But the practice with most regimes, especially the Buhari government has being

to go all out alone drawing their strength from sec. 171 of the 1999 constitution.

4. In 2003, there was an amendment to the ICPC Act which resulted in changes to the appointment mechanism of the head of the ICPC. The amendment came as a result of public outcry that the ICPC was being used as a means of settling political scores. To placate the masses, in 2003, the National Assembly amended the ICPC Act such that the chairman was no longer appointed by the president but on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to the confirmation of the senate. The appointment of the EFCC chairman should follow the same procedure.
5. The whistle blowing policy should be re-invigorated. The policy has yielded some positive results so far and should be sustained. For example, the recovery of \$43.4m, #23.3m and 27,800 Euros at flat 7 Osborne Towers, Ikoyi Lagos State by the EFCC is a testament of the workability of the policy. Of late, people have lost faith in the policy because the agency has reneged on its promise of 5% compensation. One of the whistle blowers whose information led to the recovery of large cache of cash at flat 7 Osborne Towers, Abdulmunmini Musa has sued the EFCC for giving him #325m as against #860m which he said was 5% of the recovered loot (The Sun Nig., 2017).
6. The immunity clause should be amended or expunged from the 1999 constitution. Sec.308 (1) is one of the reasons why some presidents, governors and their deputies are not behind bars today.
7. Those convicted of serious financial crimes should be barred from holding any public office in the land for life.
8. The EFCC should have "Open Operational Stations" like the Nigeria Police, where people can walk in and make their complaints and submit their petitions. This will alleviate the suffering people go through now just to submit their petitions to the Commission. It will also help debunk the notion that the EFCC is a Secret Service.
9. The effectiveness of the EFCC is also determined by its internal organization and continued training of staff as professionally qualified personnel. The EFCC annual report for 2015 identified as one of its operational challenges the "Dearth of consistent training of officers to meet the exigencies that are peculiar to ever changing nature of economic and financial crimes" (EFCC, 2015: 84). The report also stated that "Training is essential because it equips officers with the requisite skills and information on best practices in law enforcement. If we are to succeed in the fight against corruption, training must be adequately funded" (EFCC, 2015:130).
10. The commission should be adequately funded in order to enable it perform maximally. An agency like

the EFCC should be properly funded in order not to be exposed to the whims and caprices of politically exposed persons.

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