

The democratic republic of Vietnam delegation with Geneva conference in 1954

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Abstract: Geneva Conference discussed re-establishing peace in Indochina at the official opening on May 08, 1954. On July 21, 1954 the agreement on stopping war in Vietnam was signed, and the countries attending the Conference ratified the Final Declaration. This is a large multipartite international convention The Democratic Republic of Vietnam joining for the first time. Passed 68 years, but there are still different perceptions and assessments of researchers about the Conference. The following study concentrates on exchanging some of the current opinions and arguments about Vietnam's participation in the Conference and the results that Vietnam achieved at the Geneva Conference in 1954.

Keywords: Geneva, Vietnam, Geneva Conference, Peace of Indochina

I. INTRODUCE

For a major and important international event lasting 75 days, with 9 participants, including many big countries with different benefits and goals, such as Geneva, it is necessary to have different judgments. On related issues are normal, evaluations depend on subjective analysis, writer's point of view, and the source material accessed

Regarding the results Vietnam achieved at the Geneva Conference, there are also different opinions such as: 1- Confirming the results of the Geneva is a great victory, correctly reflect the force correlation comparison on the battlefield and the conference table. The Central Committee of the Vietnam Labour Party "Achieving the above-mentioned agreement is a great victory for our people and army... It is also the victory of the people who love world peace, Vietnam's friend countries, of the people of France... is the defeat of colonialism aggression... defeat of the American imperialists) ..." (Complete Party Documents, 2001, p.233-234). Head of Chinese Delegation attended the Geneva Conference, Prime minister, and foreign minister – Zhou Enlai confirms: "...I deeply believe that the agreements we have reached won't only end 8 years the Indochina war brought peace to the people of Indochina and the France people, but also to further ease the tense situation in Asia and the world. No doubt about it, the success of our conference was huge" (Tien Giang, 2005, p.428). 2- Affirming that besides the victories, the Geneva conference also has many limitations. Although the Geneva agreement hasn't fully reflected the victory of the Vietnamese people on the battlefield and the trend of the struggle between Vietnam and France, the signing of the Agreement is still a great of the

Vietnamese people as well as the people of the 3 Indochinese countries in the cause of national liberation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.44). Agreeing with the statement, there are studies by Ha Van Lau, Nguyen Phuc Luan ... (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.135).

Besides, there are opinions that Vietnam's participation in Geneva likes a mistake. In 1954. The assignment of the Conference is a serious mistake. After Dien Bien Phu's victory, let's need to hit, we can completely liberate the south of the country, doesn't take 21 years of resistance anymore. The agreement left serious consequences, especially in the war against the US, to save the country with great loss of life and property because of the long time and the enemy's many times stronger compared to French colonialists... (Diplomatic History Research Room, 2004, p.48-49). There are current opinions, but also need exchanges, research, and evidence if Vietnam participates in Geneva like a mistake?

In addition, the question of why Vietnam doesn't negotiate directly with France, as President Ho Chi Minh said in an interview with *Expressen* (26-11-1953): "...The armistice negotiation is mainly a matter between the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the government of France (Ho Chi Minh, 2011, p.341) is also raised and clarified in this study. From there, provide basic data to have more specific and in-depth assessments about Vietnam and the Geneva Conference.

Before a significant event, affecting the international and regional as important as The Geneva Conference on Indochina, it is inevitable that there will be different judgments about The Geneva Conference, generally, related to problems in Vietnam in particular, especially when more and more archival sources are being published and exploited. The results of this study hope to contribute an additional reference on issues related to Vietnam and Geneva to move closer to general awareness.

Research Questions

The article focuses on clarifying research questions, which is also the orientation in which the report conducts research:

1. What did Vietnam achieve at The Geneva Conference?

2. Was it a mistake for Vietnam to attend The Geneva Conference?
3. Why did Vietnam not negotiate directly with France at The Geneva Conference?

About Vietnam's results at the Geneva Conference

In my opinion, before discussing different opinions about the results Vietnam achieved at the Geneva Conference, to fully, comprehensively, and objectively evaluate a historical event.

Firstly, it is necessary to have a historical perspective approaching and evaluating an event, which means to set the event and its resolution results in the historical perspective at that time. The same point of view, historical researcher Duong Trung Quoc believes that "... It is impossible to evaluate the Geneva of 1954 half a century ago with today's consciousness" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.188-189) and Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh Cam's opinion "... we consider a history problem. We can't current conditions with the growth of us in present to apply in the condition at the time..." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.253). So, what was the context of Vietnam's history and the world like when the Geneva conference took place? In Vietnam, the resistance is gaining a clear advantage in the decisive battle in Dien Bien Phu. The right to take initiative on the battlefield of the Vietnamese People's Army, especially on the main battlefield in the North, has been maintained and consolidated. Before the Geneva Conference to discuss the cessation of hostilities in Indochina, Vietnam won a glorious victory at Dien Bien Phu, creating a big advantage for the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam when entering a parley. On the contrary, the expeditionary forces of the French were dealt a deadly blow, losing the strength of fighting. The spirit continues to a war of the French Government was almost broken. This strongly influenced the attitude of the French negotiating delegation in Geneva.

Meanwhile, in general, the international situation is still dominated by the stress confrontation between the two factions in the context of the Cold war, although Minister of foreign affairs of the 4 major countries, Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, and France have was meeting in Berlin (Germany) on January 25, 1954, to discuss the organization of an international conference to consider and propose measures to reduce tensions in Europe and the Far East, including the Korean War and Indochina War. The fact that major countries agree to hold an international conference is a positive signal that these countries can reach agreements on suspending conflicts and restoring peace in the hot spots of the world.

Secondly, it is necessary to rely on the goals of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation set at the conference to assess whether the conference results are successful or unsuccessful. On April 10, 1954, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Van Dong reported to the National Assembly on Vietnam's policy and plan of struggle at the Geneva

Conference, which emphasized Vietnam's position as: "Peace, independence, unity, and democracy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976, p.105) this position continued to be confirmed at the second plenary session on May 10, 1954 of the Conference (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2014, p.395). Earlier, at the meeting on May 1 and 2, 1954, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Labour Party commented: "We don't over estimate the Geneva, but we shouldn't miss an opportunity, must take advantage of it, make it possible for the Geneva to start to go to the following encounters" (Academy of International Relations 1997, p.55).

Based on that principle, the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was present a petition 8 points, in which there are basic points such as:

1. The French recognize the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam within the territory of Vietnam, as well as the sovereignty and independence of Khmer and Pathet Laos.
2. Signing an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Laos within the terms mutually agreed upon by the two sides.
3. Hold free general elections in Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Laos to form a unified government in each country. Convene a consultation conference with representatives of the governments of the two sides in Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Laos to prepare and organize free general elections (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2014, p.390-391).

The proposals have three main purposes: The end of the war, restoration of peace. Ensure to secure peace based on recognition of the national rights of the Indochina people. Building a relationship between the people of Indochina countries and France.

On May 27, 1954, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Labour Party informed the delegation about the issues discussed at the Geneva Conference, it is necessary to master a few principles: a) The issue of restoring peace in Indochina must include both military and political issues. These two types of problems are closely related and cannot be separated. Without the political issue to solve the military problem, the military problem will not be able to be solved properly. On the contrary, if the military issue is not properly resolved, the political issue will also be difficult to resolve as desired...; b) The issue of restoring peace in Indochina must include Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Laos. When discussing the issue of ceasefire and armistice, it is necessary to take advantage of the ceasefire and armistice in all three countries...; c) In Geneva, only general principles should be discussed with the opponent, while specific military and political issues should be discussed in Vietnam (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2014, p.456-457) to defeat the French plot and the Vietnamese side to promote its

direct support from the battlefield and the people in the country.

Based on the stance, goals, and principles set forth by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation in the negotiation, compared with the agreements and commitments at the end of the conference, the Vietnamese delegation has generally achieved the proposed requirements. In the Final Statement of the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, on the issue of restoring peace in Indochina, the participating parties stated that: the basic purpose of the Agreement on Vietnam is to settle military issues to stop war; Military demarcation line is only temporary and cannot be considered a political or territorial boundary at all (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2014, p.612-613).

Based on the historical situation and goals of the DRV Delegation, looking for opinions on Vietnam's results achieved at the Geneva Conference, we would like to have the following exchanges:

Regarding the opinion that Vietnam's results at the Geneva Conference were a huge and fundamental victory, a glorious end to the long war against the French colonialists and American intervention. I generally agree with this opinion with the following reasons:

First, the text of the armistice agreement only in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was signed and the Final Declaration of the Conference acknowledged the goals set forth by Vietnam. The French Government and the countries participating in the Conference must commit to respecting the independence, sovereignty, unification, and whole territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; withdraw the French army from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam at the request of the relevant governments within the period agreed by the parties. The general election to unify the whole country will be held in July 1956, by popular vote and secret ballot, under the control of an international committee... Those were the core issues of the talk DRV delegation was raised and achieved.

Secondly, President Ho Chi Minh's appeal after the success of the Geneva Conference on July 22, 1954, also emphasized: "The Geneva Conference has ended. Our diplomacy has won... From now on, we must fight to consolidate peace, implement a unified country, and achieve independence and democracy in the whole country" (People's Newspaper, 1954).

Third, in October 1954, the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of Vietnam commented on the results of the Geneva Conference: "The Geneva Conference is just a step to pause the war for national liberation so that we can consolidate our victory, preparing to enter a new phase, the stage against the US imperialists, saving the country, liberating the South, and reunifying the Fatherland. We signed such an agreement at the right time, ending the resistance war against the French like

that was appropriate, reflecting the comparison of our enemy's forces on the battlefield and the international situation at that time. Because at this time, on the enemy's side, the French colonialists suffered a great defeat, but there were still forces and behind France, the American empire was plotting to directly intervene in the Indochina war. At that time, the French army was big loses but they still strong and the US imperialists wants to directly intervene to Indochina war. We won big, but we also had new difficulties, not enough conditions to continue the war to liberate the whole country. In the international arena, fraternal countries, including the Soviet Union and China, all want peace to build their country, and all want the war in Indochina to come to a solution (Vu Duong Huan, 2019, p.83).

The opinions of President Ho Chi Minh and the conclusions of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission mentioned above are based on the policy that participation in the Geneva Conference is the implementation of the comprehensive resistance line in all fields of military, political, economic, diplomatic, ideological, cultural... At the end of the war, when the strategic offensive and power of the war grew, some factors appear which could guide the end the war has lasted for many years, it is appropriate and correct to implement the policy of combining military struggle with diplomatic struggle.

The evidence mentioned above also contributes to protest the opinion that this is a failure, unsuccessful in diplomatic struggle, lack of coordination between the military front and the foreign front in order to ended the war.

Regarding the opinion that Vietnam's victory at the Geneva Conference was a limited diplomatic victory, it did not accurately reflect the military victory of the Vietnamese army and people, directly the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and did not accurately reflect the correlation of forces on the battlefield. I disagree with this opinion because:

Firstly, it is necessary to mention the attendance of the DRV delegation at the Geneva Conference. While the three governments of the French-affiliated countries in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were invited by the major countries, the Government of the DRV was not invited to participate. It was only when the Geneva conference opened to discuss the settlement of the Korean War (starting on April 26, 1954), at the request of the Soviet Union, China, and the rest participating countries accept the invitation to DRV delegation (April 27). The DRV delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, arrived in Geneva very early, on May 3, 1954. The DRV delegation together with the consortium of French national affiliated organizations was also considered as participants only as affiliates, while the main components of the Conference were still the 5 major countries. Therefore, despite discussing the war in Vietnam, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's delegation could not talk directly or bilaterally with the French delegation for more than half of the time of the conference, but mainly the Chinese delegation discussed with the French on issues

related to Vietnam and Indochina, in the foreground, the interests of the country always dominate. This is a doing any profit for DVR and is an in the following reasoning because there are limits to conference results.

This was also updated by President Ho Chi Minh at the 3rd Diplomatic Conference (January 14, 1964) as follows: "After the resistance war, came to the Geneva Conference, then our diplomacy became international. We had the Soviet Union, China, and other fraternal countries to help us. At that time, our country won, so we also won abroad, which affects each other. But the difficulty is that the US wants to jump in to replace France and wants us to take the 17th parallel. The situation at that time was only a draw or a fight. If we don't get along, we'll have to fight it anymore, it has to. We demand French accept from 15th parallel, 16th parallel to 17th parallel. At the 17th parallel, we determined to did not to make concessions any more, the French delegation had to accept. Therefore, now we have the North completely liberated and building socialism. Few people know about this point. Back then, if we didn't get a draw, it will fall in to America's scheme. Of course, the most important issue was we won at Dien Bien Phu, in addition to the help of our brother countries" (Academy of International Relations, 1994, p.11).

Earlier, at a meeting in Liuzhou, Guangxi (July 3-5, 1954), with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, head of the Chinese delegation at the Geneva Conference, President Ho Chi Minh assessed the prospects for the situation in Vietnam, as follows: "If we continue the war now, we can still do it, but it will take three more years before we can completely liberate the South, without the intervention of the US. But this intervention was clearly. I think that's an undesirable military solution and we have to negotiate. And if to hold talk, there must be this opinion, other idea" (Department of Diplomatic History Research, 2004, p.31).

In my opinion (the author of the article), in the talk, except forced to unconditionally surrender and accept all the other's requests and requirements of the opponent, there are two common problems, that is: the parties have a maximum possible project and minimum acceptable requirements when raising issues for quality assessment; The parties can only have what is on the table when there is effect and favorable outcome on the battlefield. Applying to the reality of the conversation in Geneva, in addition to the DRV's advantages: big victory at Dien Bien Phu and in several other matches; the will of the French colonialists to continue fighting to win profits before the bargaining was dissolved; With the support of the Soviet Union, China to a certain extent, the world public opinion, and France raised the senseless war... then the DRV side also has limitations. Which is:

Regarding the comparison of military forces on the battlefield, the French army and Bao Dai's government troops who died, were wounded, were captured in Dien Bien Phu only accounted for about 3.5% of the total available force, so the comparison is still inclined about the enemy, although the highest defense measure of the French army – group of

positions – was defeated. That is, the French army and army of Bao Dai government keep important areas in the countryside, plains, cities, traffic, airports, ports...

Regarding the strength of Vietnam after the Dien Bien Phu campaign, although the spirit of resistance was very high, in reality, the military force was no longer strong enough to decisively win a complete victory, because most of the elite units participated in the campaign suffered seriously injuries; damaged or unsuitable weapons, equipment, ammunition, and privation; the material resources of the rear provinces have been mobilized maximum, and takes time to offset.

The position of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Geneva is modest level because it must cope with major countries that have had a lot of experience and have prepared for conferences; due to the lack of time required, and experience in diplomatic negotiations, participating in a large international conference for the first time, should reveal the passive, awkward before new situations that appear.

The Vietnamese delegation's understanding of the entire calculation of the major countries participating in the conference, especially China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, was limited. Therefore, Vietnam didn't fully calculate the complexity of the linkages operated by national interests, so although to gain the victory in the battlefield, Vietnam cannot to win in politics on the conference table as desired, are also explanatory.

With the basis of the achieved results at the Geneva Conference, I think that this is a victory, a necessary stop, and lays the foundation for the struggle to liberate the South and the national unity later.

Was it a mistake for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to attend the Geneva Conference?

The issue of attending the Geneva Conference appeared opinions that the DRV shouldn't and shouldn't take part in the Geneva Conference or that Vietnam participated in the Conference was a mistake. In my opinion, this is an opinion based on a comparative assessment of forces on the battlefield. This opinions argues after the victory of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam should excess to win, continue to fight, and use military measures to achieve complete victory. Because according to them, the Vietnamese resistance war is in an offensive position, especially when Vietnam has just won a great victory at Dien Bien Phu, the will of the French colonialists to continue the war has collapsed. The French expeditionary army had just suffered great losses, was unable to attack, was sinking deeper and deeper into passive defense, in danger of being annihilated, no reinforcements were available... At the same time, the above opinion also cited the Central Intelligence Agency's assessment that the French military and political situation in Indochina was dire or "If that momentum (meaning the defeat of Dien Bien Phu - the

author's note) is not stopped, it will lead to the collapse of the French military in the second half of 1954" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.113) or that the US has no intention and no ability to directly intervene militarily in Indochina, etc.

I don't agree with the opinion because outside of the reasons as I have analyzed and agree with the opinion that the results that Vietnam got at the Geneva Conference is the basis for a true reflection of the force correlation relations on the battlefield as well as at the discussion table, besides that, the DRV's policies and views on the work of participation, goals, and fighting mottos at the Geneva Conference are now very clear and consistent. Speaking at the 6th Central Conference of the Vietnam Labour Party (July 17, 1954), just 4 days before the Geneva Agreement was signed, President Ho Chi Minh analyzed: "We must distinguish interests first and future benefits, partial benefits, and total benefits... Some people feel that they are always winning, want to fight indiscriminately, and fight to the end; they see only the trees, not all the forest, only see the retreat of France, but do not see their plot; see only France, not the US, in favor of combat, despise diplomacy. They set the conditions too high. They want to do everything quickly; they don't know that fighting for peace is arduous and complicated" (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001, p.170).

Vietnam's participation in the conference, one side shows the policy of combining military progress with the Communist Party's diplomacy struggle and President Ho Chi Minh (through President Ho Chi Minh's interview with *Expressen* newspaper of Sweden in November 1953 and prepared for the Dien Bien Phu stronghold group), on the other hand, was due to the intention of conciliation of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, wanting to solve the Indochina war according to the model of Korean Armistice Agreement (July 1953).

Unable to say that because Vietnam was inflated by China about the risk of US intervention, so had to join the Conference and sign the Geneva Agreement. The fact that the Chinese representative said that he would not be able to give aid to Vietnam like before if the war continued for forcing Vietnam to attend the Conference, maybe a calculation by China to divide Vietnam, taking North Vietnam as a safe buffer zone with the US if the US sends troops in. China's role before and during the Geneva Conference is clear and important. However, a question that needs to be answered is why, while China began to drag the DRV to participate in the conference and wanted Vietnam to sign the Agreement according to China's calculation, Foreign Minister Tran Nghi, President Mao Zedong, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai ... then think that signing the agreement is a mistake, and blamed on the will of the Soviet Union (Vu Duong Huan, 2019, p.83)? Another issue that needs to be discussed is why the US opposes signing the agreement in which the agreement is still being signed, but China considers signing the agreement to be wrong and a failure? So who benefits here and what was China's failure at the Geneva Conference, or was it the failure

of the DRV? I don't believe that China failed at the Geneva Conference and the participation of DRV in the Conference wasn't coerced and wasn't a miscalculation.

Because of the Soviet Union, China wanted a peaceful solution to the wars in Vietnam and Indochina. In the years 1945-1949, Vietnam conducts a resistance in situation its was under siege, without international support or help. Since 1950, after being recognized by China, the Soviet Union, and several democratic countries and establishing diplomatic relations, Vietnam has received tremendous spiritual and material support. However, since then, the Indochina war has been internationalized by the US, United Kingdom and several countries recognized and aided Bao Dai's government. At the same time, the Korean War broke out, the fierce military clash between American troops and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, lasted three years, ending with an armistice signed between the parties relevant (July 27, 1953). At this time, the Soviet Union policy of non-confrontation with the US, especially after the death of Soviet leader Stalin (March 3, 1953), Khrushchev took over.

The Soviet Union and China at this time were helping Vietnam fight the French colonialists, which had a great influence on the Vietnamese leadership, so they wanted Vietnam to talk to France to find a peaceful solution. Naturally, they have their interests in mind for the nation. After many discussions and controversy among the delegations of major countries: the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, and then China, the DRV delegation was invited to attend the Geneva Conference at the last minute.

It was suggested that at the time of the Geneva Conference, the US had no intention and couldn't directly military intervene in Indochina. In this regard, please allow me to affirm that the Vietnamese leadership has a certain understanding of the conspiracy and tricks of the US, the possibility of the US sending or not bringing troops into Vietnam and Indochina when the French are bogged down and then defeated at Dien Bien Phu. I think that opinion has certain grounds. The fact that since 1950 the United States has intervened directly in the Indochina war through increasing military aid to the French crusaders and national troops of Bao Dai. France's total war costs, of which the United States accounts for 78%, up to before the battle of Dien Bien Phu, is a figure that demonstrates how directly the United States entered the war. The US wanted through aid to use France and the army, Bao Dai's government to prevent the influence of China and the Soviet Union in this area and maintain its role and influence in Indochina. In fact, after replacing France in Vietnam after the Geneva Agreement, it was not until mid-1965 that the US troops officially launched a direct war in the local war strategy. Vietnam fought against France, but in fact, it also fought with the US.

If Vietnam continues the resistance by military means, it will fall into the US imperialist's scheme because the Americans want France to continue the war, so it spared no

money for aid to France. The US wants France to fight Vietnam with US money to weaken Vietnam, prevent China's direct influence on Vietnam and countries in Indochina, Southeast Asia. Therefore, America seeks to sabotage the Conference, the head of the American delegation, Foreign Minister Dulles, didn't attend, but assigned the Deputy Delegation, Bedell Smith, to directly lead the American delegation at the Conference to discuss the Indochina war. At the end of the conference, the United States delegation did not participate in the Final Declaration of the Conference. The DRV participating in the Conference failed the American plot to prolong and expand the war.

Therefore, the DRV participates in the Geneva conference and signed the agreement, although there are limitations on the preparation process for participation and about the specific results of the signed Agreement, this is a correct and necessary policy.

Regarding Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam did not negotiate directly with France at the proposal of President Ho Chi Minh at the end of 1953. I have a few comments below.

In an interview with *Expressen* (November 26, 1953), President Ho Chi Minh emphasized: If the French Government has learned lessons in the war... and wants to come to an armistice in Vietnam by negotiating and peacefully solving the Vietnamese problem, then the Vietnamese people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is ready to accept that wish... the negotiation and armistice is mainly a matter between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government of France (Ho Chi Minh, 2011, p.340-341).

This is the official viewpoints and shows goodwill for the peace of Vietnam. However, the negotiations that took place were not like that. In this regard, in my opinion, there are several reasons:

Firstly, the position of the DRV at the conference. DRV and affiliated countries (pro-France) are associated parties invited to attend conferences of major countries. Not only that but the French Foreign Minister Bidault also expressed his opinion that although the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation was accepted to attend, the regulations were even lower than that of Bao Dai's National Government of Vietnam delegation.

Secondly, from such a point and pragmatic calculation, France wants to show as a big country, as an official member of the conference, does not accept to "lower oneself" to negotiate directly with the Viet Minh (DRV). The French government also wants to take advantage of the negotiation mechanism between major countries, to find a way to deal with the US, the United Kingdom, especially the Soviet Union and China, which France thinks can dominate Vietnam in the negotiation contents to achieve the maximum possible goal.

Third, the French also realized that if they negotiated directly with the DRV, it would be disadvantageous because the French army had been losing on the battlefield, Vietnam would use the upper hand in negotiations and France will have to accept more losses than the mechanism multilateral negotiation.

Fourth, the Soviet Union, China, especially China, didn't want the DRV to talk directly with France. China considers its strategic interests, takes Vietnam as a bargaining chip with France, and at the same time improves China's position in the international arena - which the Geneva Conference is a rare opportunity and extremely favorable, at the same time contain Vietnam in the Chinese's influence.

The fact that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam doesn't directly talk to France is both the basic working mechanism of the Conference and the calculation work of major countries. This is the reason to further explain the limited results of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

II. CONCLUSION

After 75 days of resolute and flexible diplomatic struggle, on July 20, 1954, the Geneva Agreement on restoring peace in Indochina was signed. The participating countries pledged to respect Vietnam's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. The text of the Conference reads: Recognizing that the basic purpose of the Agreement on Vietnam is to settle the military issue for an armistice and that the military demarcation is only temporary. The reunification of the two South - North Vietnam will be done through the national general election in July 1956. This is a great victory for Vietnam.

An event with great influence on the international, regional, and relations between major countries such as the Geneva Conference will continue to exchange opinions more clarification of related issues. The above study only mentioned, given several different opinions, various assessments, and author's views on the most fundamental issues related to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam participation and achievement in the Geneva Conference; contribute additional small reference sources to further research and clarify the contents of the Geneva Conference.

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