

# The United States “War on Terror” Strategy: Classic and Contemporary Concepts of War

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**Abstract:** This study sought to explore the classical and contemporary conceptualization of war and terrorism and to discuss the derivation of US “War on Terror” strategy within the related literature. Notwithstanding to the high number of terrorism-related studies, the major part of those defines terrorism considering the assumptions on the clash of ethics, ideologies, identities and ideas, and see “war on terror” as the security or defense response against nihilist insurgency movements. On another hand, a literature on terrorism was developed, which is disclaiming terrorism and “war on terror” as the objective geopolitical instruments used for the US hegemony and in accordance with the US demands. Therefore, this paper is an attempt to look at the “War on Terror” strategy through the lenses of classical and contemporary concepts of war and terrorism. The research method is descriptive and qualitative through using the secondary sources. This study will show how the US “war on terror” was legitimized by the terrorism industry and finds its place within classic war paradigm.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, Terrorism Industry, Warfare, “New Terrorism”, “War on Terror”

## I. INTRODUCTION

It is obvious that 9/11 events have generated the new, more intensive wave of terrorism research. Comparing to the pre-9/11 period, now about six books are published in a week with terrorism in the title (Dunne, 2011). Terrorism became a subject that is discussed, conceptualized, written about, published, uploaded and downloaded all the time. It was developed into a so-called “terrorism industry”, a term which was used by John Mueller in his book “Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them”. For him, “terrorism industry” is presented by politicians, bureaucrats, media, experts, academics and risk entrepreneurs who profit by cultivating the fear of the threat international terrorism presents (Mueller, 2006).

According to E. Herman and G. O’Sullivan’ international “terrorism industry” is formed by American and British (with Israeli contribution) academicians, governmental institutions, national and international think tanks, research centers, specialists and special security companies which develop comprehensive research concepts, models and theories related to the terrorism (Herman and O’Sullivan, in George (eds.), 1991).

This industry, notwithstanding to possessing a chaotic image drawn by the combination of various research and expertise

topics, in fact, has a coherent internal structure. Primarily, as Ole Weaver has put forward in his “neo-neo” synthesis: starting from 1980s, neoliberalism, advocating ultra-liberal economic programs, and neorealism, prioritizing military security, began to resemble each other and pro-liberal writers (Altuntas, 2009). The agenda of neoliberals was to expand their ideas beyond blurring borders and make those a reality in those non-liberalized countries by using soft power, which has shown itself in a process named “neoliberal globalization wave”. Hence, this task was seen as impossible without applying hard power; however, it could not be done openly by “liberal democracy” regimes advocates. Thus, to veil their actual intentions and by declaring “war on terror”, putting “failed state”, “terrorist state” and “terrorism-supporting state” labels, that hard power usage was justified and legitimized. Therefore, common assessments of “neo-neo” and “hard-soft power” synthesis group towards terrorism have formed the “backbone” of terrorism industry. Thereby, in order to realize this “neo-neo” project, the production of the “academics” from the field should be increased. The main aim of the terrorism industry was to create terrorism, “war on terror” discourse and a ground for legitimizing those, which is possible only with emergence of related terrorism literature which this discourse will be constructed on.

Another reason of the terrorism industry internal coherence is the existence of elite terrorism specialists cadre formed by majorly American and British former government staff or academicians who are consistently making attribution to surveys on terrorism, participating in various conferences, leading research centers and think tanks, taking part in the editorial board of the journals related to the terrorism and proceeding with the academic works.

While analyzing terrorism industry literature two prominent studies have drawn attention: the research made by Herman and O’Sullivan and Fred Halliday. Their studies can be regarded as quantitative and qualitative researches respectively. Herman and O’Sullivan’ performed the research over the references of 135 most influential articles and news on the terrorism published in national and international media in the period of 1978-1985 and observed that sixteen names, mostly holders of American and British citizenship, were confirmed to be the most frequent and stable reference source (Herman and O’Sullivan, in George (eds.), 1991). Another research made over the data of Scientific Information Institute, Social Sciences Index on the terrorism-related articles, books,

journals, reports, conferences and Internet research portals published in the period 1965-2003, has confirmed results of Herman and O'Sullivan research. The results of aforementioned survey confirmed that from terrorism related national and international materials published in 13 different countries 131 name is used as reference from which 18 are British origin, 7 Israeli, 5 French and 84 American. With the progress of the research, it was observed that published works of 88 academician and scientist were read and downloaded from the Internet more than others and 42 of those were the same names extracted by Herman and O'Sullivan' during their survey. As the outcome of these two researches we can see that within last several decades terrorism studies were left under the influence of small group of elite terror specialists mostly of American and British origin (Ibid.).

Another reason determining coherent internal structure of the terrorism industry is the existence of influential governmental and non-governmental think tanks with strong capital resources, which: define the terrorism related agenda through various informative tools, publish terrorism studies books, academic journals and newspapers, conduct high number of research projects, provide scholarships. Those institutions are led by elite terror specialists holding different positions like administration, member of Board of Trustees, researchers, editorial boards, etc. According to E. O. F. Reid's survey, 32 % of research over terrorism is performed by American government directly, 41% by government, CIA, military and other state institutions supported research centers, and only 12% are performed under universities' umbrella (Reid, 1997).

Moreover, some of the works published after 9/11, have even provided the language with plenty of neologisms both those having actuality and reflecting the realities as well as those absurd. The book of Fred Halliday "Shocked and awed: how the War on Terror and Jihad have changed the English language" was published in 2010 and provides us terminology of the War on Terror organized thematically. Here are some examples of neologisms provided: "terroronomics", "Total Information Awareness", "terror and terrorism experts", "Arab Street" and many others. "Shocked and Awed" by analyzing terms used in US foreign policy, Islamic vocabulary, language of Al Qaeda leaders and adherents, stereotypes, colloquialisms and etc. became a dictionary of War on Terror (Halliday, 2010).

Another important reflection of the "War on Terror" on the academics is the countless use of "since 9/11" or "after 9/11" phrases in the names of publications, that is in fact dividing the issues on pre- and post- 9/11 periods, thus emphasizing that if not all, but something has changed (Dunne, 2011).

Thus, these changes in the terrorism literature and language have formed a solid background for institutionalizing the "war on terror" strategy and increased its functionality in discourse and practice in line with the American interests.

Notwithstanding to the fact that a clear and exact definition on terrorism was not developed by specialists of the terrorism industry, it is obvious that they have established a set of

assessments, by reaching similar results. In general, these common assessments drawing the boundaries of terrorism can be summarized as follows: modern terrorism thinking had been influenced by Marxist Leninist ideology and writers like Jean Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon, and tactics were developed under the impression from Bakunin, Nechayev, Mao, Che Guevara or Fidel Castro; international terrorism is developing under the three tendencies: anarchy and nihilism; Third World countries awakening (seen as the self-determination awakening) and New Leftist ideologies justifying violence; states are not making terror, however, non-democratic states are supporting terrorism as such. It has been observed that Western democracies or capitalist-liberal-democratic states do not make terror, but are the targets. For this reason, military operations performed by Western countries in order to preserve their security are not seen outside of UN system hence the objective of terrorists is to deteriorate Western democracy, stability and economy and to undermine its power. This could be better understood by Democratic Peace Theory and McDonald's theory developed and popularized by Michael Doyle and Thomas Friedman respectively. The former one makes an assumption that "democracies do not fight", thus in order to have a peaceful environment, democratic rule should be established throughout the world. Thomas Friedman continues the logic of DPT by stating that countries where McDonald's restaurants are presented do not fight each other, since McDonalds is a symbol of capitalism, and where is capitalism there is a democracy and democracies do not go to wars, thus on the wave of neoliberal ideas the options were either doors should be opened to McDonald's franchise or the war is inevitable.

All these analyses and transformations, especially in the literature of terror industry, have resulted in the new look over the issue of terrorism in general and generated a series of research, which brought out the phenomenon of "new terrorism" on the stage and focus on terror studies.

## II. METHODOLOGY

This paper sought to explore the classical and contemporary conceptualization of war and terrorism and to discuss the place of US "War on Terror" strategy within these concepts and shed a light on how the war and terrorism literature has been developed to legalize it. Therefore, qualitative and descriptive research method has been applied by using secondary sources, such as books, academic articles, web sources.

## III. TRANSITION FROM "OLD" TO "NEW TERRORISM"

Starting from mid-1980s, changes have occurred in the terrorism related assessments and "there has been a radical transformation, if not revolution, in the character of terrorism and new definition and new terms may have to be developed for new realities" (Laqueur, 1996). Thus, the term of "new terrorism" has entered terrorism literature with the end of the Cold War and started to be used widely after 9/11 attacks. According to the cosmopolitan neo-liberals, "new terrorism" came out as the reaction to the political, economic and cultural chaos caused by the collapse of old world order by in 1990s

and as the result of state loss legitimacy over its territory and population (Albrecht alt. 1998). With reference to this statement, imaginary and Fordist wars of the Cold War era were replaced by global civilian-oriented violence movements of non-state organizations deployed in the weak states (Kaldor, 2003). In fact, these transnational networks being the remains of the Cold War have become interconnected through the references of religion and ethnicity. There are various view and definitions provided by analysts and academicians on the concept of “new terrorism”. Thus, for Bruce Hoffman claims that new terrorism “represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the more familiar traditional terrorist groups” and destroys the basic assumptions about terrorism (Copeland, 2001). On the other side, as Martha Crenshaw states “today’s terrorism is not a fundamentally or qualitatively “new” phenomenon but grounded in an evolving historical context” (Crenshaw, in Karawan et al, 2008).

The dichotomy of “old” and “new” terrorism was discussed intensively among academics. According to the proponents of the idea of radical transformation in the character of terrorism, there are obvious distinctions between two versions of terrorisms in terms of organization, structure, nature, target, localization, motivation, level of destruction (Gofas, 2012).

There are three main subjects, which affected the use of “new terrorism” concept: technological progress and changes in the organizational model; terrorism transformation from being an instrument into an objective and its interrelation with clash of civilizations; understanding of the fight against terrorism started to be widely accepted.

In the context of changes in technology and organizational models, the content of “new terrorism” has developed in two streams. First of all, the developments in electronic-computer and weapons and bombing technologies, and technological innovations like the increase in the number of means of communication and easy access to the information have increased terrorism’s power and level of destructions. Speaking on the organizational model changes: state supported terrorist organizations characterized by high level interconnectedness and hierarchy within the group and professionalism of its members were replaced by international terror network characterized by lack of any national identity, low number of amateur members with yielding links between each other and consisting of states declared by U.S. as being “bandit” and “collapsed” ones.

The second important claim related to the use of “new terrorism” concept states that “new terrorism” is no longer an instrument, but an objective, “politics” itself. “New terrorism” is beyond being a strategy; it is an enemy on its own (Laqueur, 2004). In other words, while “old terrorism” is regarded to be a strategic tool used in order to reach political and military objectives, “new terrorism” is explained through the conflict of worldviews and thoughts related to ethnicity or religion based psychological reasons and having its pivot in the thesis of clash of civilizations (Ellingsen, 2005). Hereunder, as claimed in Huntington’s thesis on clash of civilizations, “new

terrorism” grows out of civilization and cultural values differences and, in order to analyze the content of “new terrorism”, there is necessity to take into consideration the identity of the terrorist, not objectives of the terror (Taylor and Horgan, 2001). The primary source of “new terrorism” is tendency of certain believes and cultures, particularly Islamic culture, towards terrorism (Hoffman, 1995; Rapoport, Stewart (eds.), 1989). Thus, “new terrorism” originates from process of awakening of radical Islamic ideology against modern Western values, life-style and secularist order within the world entering into cultural transition era (Ganor, 2006; Tibi, 2006). Therefore, military activities performed within the framework of U.S. “war on terror” emerged from the necessity of defense against anti-Western civilization awakening rather than from American imperialistic inspirations.

The third claim has come out as a pragmatic outcome of the development of the “new terrorism” concept and it reflects the idea that the struggle against the new form of terror has also gained the new opportunities. Thus, the fight against the worldwide expanded network of “new terrorism”, which increased the level of its destruction power and directed its religious references supported reaction towards Western civilization, has gained more flexibility in terms of space, target and method as well as gradually became acceptable beyond the legal limitations established. Within this understanding and notwithstanding to being incompatible with international law, anti-terroristic preventive interventions performed for the sake of national security in any corner of the world are to find the theoretic support (Livingstone, in Kegley, 1990; Shultz, 2003). Thus, the main differences between “new” and “old” terrorism can be summarized as widespread networks vs organizational hierarchy, transnational rather than localized, civilian targets vs regime as a target, religious vs political/ideological motivations, maximum destruction as an aim (Gofas, 2012).

US “War on Terror” strategy and terrorism industry’s views on the “new terrorism” coincide and integrate with each other. First and foremost, as it was obvious from George Bush’s West Point Military Academy remarks made on 1st of June 2002 alongside with the 2002 National Security Strategy, known as “Bush Doctrine”, US has declared the entry to the era of new terrorism, and within the conditions of new war it claimed to move with a preventive and preemptive approach. In this document, terrorism is defined as the enemy that the United States must combat on the first place. In particular, autocratic regimes, radical groups, those who provide aid and support to radical groups, those who prevent girls from getting education, and those who use technology for threatening have also been considered and/or perceived as enemies. Among the reasons of terrorism, generally, clash of civilizations and nihilism are prioritized, however, particularly, the emphasis is made on the hatred of the terrorists towards Western values and life-style (Byman, 2003; Serafim, 2005).

To conclude, terrorism industry has formed a research field of the terrorism studies going in parallel with U.S. interests and played an important and influential role in expansion of this

field worldwide.

In order to understand and explain the actual meaning and purpose of “war on terror” phenomenon, where the word “war” generates the duality of concepts, there is a necessity to look into the historical understanding, theorizing and explanation of concept of war, which was extraordinary provided by Carl von Clausewitz two centuries ago.

#### IV. CLAUSEWITZ UNDERSTANDS OF WAR: DOES IT HAVE AN EXPIRY DATE?

One of the most prominent war theorists who had outlined the moral, political and strategic principles of war was Prussian General and political thinker Carl von Clausewitz. In his work *On War*, Clausewitz analyzed, discussed and explained “the essential nature of war, how it endures through time and circumstance, even as its character is ever changing. He emphasized the effective, logical unity between politics and war, and he laid stress upon war’s moral dimension” (Gray, 2007).

The most essential assumption within Clausewitz’s Theory of War is that war itself is not merely an act moving in accordance to its own rules, but is a part of the whole and this whole is “politics”. Politics is an objective, a goal; war is an instrument and as an instrument it cannot be separated from an objective. A war, from its start to the end, is oriented in conformity with purposes of “politics”, and even if sometimes, depending on the available tools, “politics” is changing, the position of foreground is preserved. According to Clausewitz, “strategy” is the theory related to the use of conflict aimed to realize the objectives of the war (Clausewitz, in Paret (trans.), 2008).

Clausewitz introduces the concept of “absolute war” as the situation, when all probabilities, based on the real world datum, are counted and the whole potential is used in order to reach a pure violence. Similar definition can be applied to the absolute “politics” aimed to reach all desired objectives in total. In other respects, absolute “politics” is a subjective concept, where interests have place within the conflict area and being in constantly moving condition are not reachable. Absolute “politics” as well as absolute war are subjective concept, which once applied to the reality, bring into open imperfect real “politics” and real war (Clausewitz, in Paret (trans.), 2008). The war, being a “realpolitik” tool, shows itself in various relative and limited modes. In its turn, real war, being composed by the features like violence and desire (believe in “politics” and hatred towards enemy); incidence and probabilities, and dominated by the real “politics”, never reaches over the absolute and ultimate war (Paret, 1976). According to Clausewitz, aforementioned features are related to society, army and government respectively and conjunction of these three forces determines the destiny of the war. Clausewitz’s concept of war is one of the most discussed contemporary issues and three different tendencies were developed within this polemic: proponents of the effectiveness of Clausewitz’s concept of war; defenders of necessity to reform the theory, while preserving main concepts; and

proponents of theory’s inapplicability to the contemporary reality (Altuntas, 2009).

In brief, the main focus of proponents of the effectiveness of Clausewitz’s concept of war is the continuity of theory’s logic or philosophy, rather than technical aspects (Honig, 1997). According to those who opt for theory reformation, while preserving key concepts, the issues like technological innovations and war’s economic and ethical dimensions should be included into the theory of war (Handel, 1996; Handel, 1986). Opposition to Clausewitz’s theory is claiming that the theory is irrelevant within the modern conditions, where theory’s main concepts and three forces formula have lost its feasibility. Martin Van Creveld, being one of the proponent of oppositionist view and architects of postmodern 4th Generation Warfare concept, has stated that in the aftermath of the end of WWII a new type of warfare has emerged, where state model that lost its importance has been replaced by chaotic, sporadic, society-targeted non-state elements, which practice psychological war and asymmetric attacks and are aware and can make use of the latest technological developments and weapons (Creveld, 1999; Creveld, 1991).

According to Creveld, Clausewitz’s approach that “war is the continuation of politics” is not applicable to the conditions of 21st century and wars are now the continuation of religious and security ideologies like fundamentalism and humanitarian intervention respectively (Creveld, in Nooy, 1997). Thereby, within new 4th Generation Warfare, Clausewitz’s “instrument is continuation of goals” assumption was replaced by the type of warfare, in which instrument and goal is the same. Creveld argues that in the conditions of globalizing world, Clausewitz’s power trio of society, army and state had been deposed by social order compatible with non-state elements, individuals (like suicide bombers) and postmodern, free market relations (Siccama, in Nooy, 1997). According to the proponents of 4th Generation Warfare, war grows out of social conditions of its time and place; thus, nature of war has changed, because the sociology of war changed; war is not the modern type of war anymore, it likely to be considered as postmodern war, without any center of gravity. Postmodern war is a result of disintegration and collapse of modern state and formation of new organizing principles (Olson, 2007).

#### V. DECONSTRUCTION OF CLASSIC WAR THEORY AND NOVEL LOOK ON THE TERRORISM

Critical thinking school and postmodern approaches, such as post-Marxism, post-structuralism, biopolitics and cosmopolitanism, despite of disability to generate a homogeneous wholeness/integrity, have a strong critical stand towards terrorism industry’s approach to terror. In other respects, since these approaches are tending to analyze and criticize terrorism within superstructures like knowledge-power, religion, culture, identity purified from politics and economy, the real debate comes to the end even before getting a move on.

These approaches antagonize Clausewitz’s theory of war in

three arguments. First of all, according to these approaches, nation-state centered political, cultural and security conceptualization has lost its feasibility and was replaced by various non-state political elements, communities and individuals, possessing rational mentality. Thus, political and economic gains and territory acquisition are no longer considered as aims; identity-based and nihilist by its nature “new terrorism” as an insurgency movement is not an instrument anymore, instead, it is goal as such (Booth, 1991; Booth and Dunne, 2002; Buzan et al., 1998; Kaldor, 2005; Kaldor, 2003). Secondly, the wars are no longer occurred between the states; the wars are now experienced within the spaces, where multicultural, religious or gender identities are brought closer together and multidimensional ecological and sociological security is threatened by globalization risks. States are no longer having a function of support-providers to the terrorism; “new terrorism” is “fed” by communities and Clausewitz’s power trio is left only to society (Beck, 2003; Heng, 2006). Finally, Clausewitz’ war and political goals dichotomies like internal/external, female/male, value/fact, act within hierarchic and alienating opposite dichotomies perception; hence, there are no internal/external, domestic/global, defense/offense, civil/military schisms left in the “new terrorism” (Kaldor, 2005).

Besides rejection of the Clausewitz’s concept of war, these approaches have common views on the causes of terrorism with the industry of terrorism. On the issue of causes of terrorism these approaches put forward major factor such as nihilism and clash of civilizations. For example, according to Jurgen Habermas, who is one of the main proponents of critical theory, 9/11 terror attacks being an incomplete project yet are the cause of modernity nihilist by character (Alweiss, 2005). In other words, Habermas claims that gap formed upon separation of religion and state is filled out by fundamentalism or nihilism. Therefore, “new terrorism” is a reaction to the deficit of the legitimacy appeared within process of modernity. Habermas suggests that in order to cover up this deficit cosmopolitan law, which will turn individuals instead of state into right and responsibilities holders, should be put into practice and UNSC should be provided a more active role in the fight against terrorism. In accordance to this, the fight against terrorism will be legitimate from the perspective of cosmopolitan law “universal morality” values and imperialist interest will no longer be a subject of concern. According to Habermas, for many years US administrations, especially Clinton’s one, have made attempts to become a guarantor of international law in order to promote cosmopolitan law; however, under Bush’s administration it had forgone it. Therefore, Habermas’ critique on the mentality of US “war on terror” is limited to Bush’s government administrative weakness (Habermas, 2003).

Nowadays, “biopolitics”, being a buzzword, and its approach led by well-known multidirectional leftists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and “Empire” thesis that takes roots out of this approach provides an understanding of war that differs from the old type of Westphalia nation-state model wars; as

Foucault noted “biopolitics arrived with the transformation of in waging war from the defense of sovereign to securing the existence of population, decision to fight and kill were made in term of collective survival and preserving life” (Campbell in Elizabeth Dauphinee, 2007); biopower regime has become a form of administration that not only control population, but produces and aiming to reproduce all aspects of social life (Hardt and Negri, 2001). According to Andres Perezalonso, the practice of biopolitics was also seen during George Bush administration in “war on terror” discourse and 2006 Military Commissions Act can be an example of that, providing a legal framework for trying non-US citizens labeled “unlawful enemy combatants” (Perezalonso, 2010). Within this regime “new terrorism”, which emerged in 1990s as a reaction to the structural changes in the world, can be regarded as nihilist rebellion movement and either US fight against terror or invasion of Iraq can be seen as a domestic issue. Therefore, US post-Cold War interventions, like those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are no longer driven by individual imperialist interests, but police operations on the name of universal values (Reid, 2005).

In summary, postmodernism approach critics related to the “war on terror” issue, terrorism industry in general and terrorism, in particular, suggest the dialogue among civilizations and multilateral interventions instead of “alienation” of “others” and US concentration of unilateral actions. Besides that, both sides are in search of causes of terrorism within religion and ethnicity problematic away of political and economic one and embrace US “war on terror” as a defensive war. Additionally, the possibility to be like-minded on the issue of postmodern 4th Generation Warfare performed against widespread non-state networks and define “new terrorism” in a large scale, flexible way matching US interests, is acknowledged. As matter of fact, “new terrorism” has turned terrorism into a vibrant enemy; terrorist into a world spread organism; terror actions into purposeless civilization or ideological struggle. Consequently, the concept of terrorism has widened at the same time enlarging the framework of fight against terrorism. Thus, the concept of “war on terror” will include all the actions/movements, which are seen as being against global hegemony of capitalism and, thus, will create the world as maneuver space.

## VI. IS “NEW TERRORISM” A NEW PHENOMENON

Terrorism being a non-system tool is neither a nihilism-based method nor civilization issue, instead, is a strategy that is providing the integrity to the objectives of parties within political, economic or social structure of the system. Although it is used as a method model in each historical period, inherently, it is not the renewed terrorism, but the changes in the system’s infrastructure.

It will be true to say that with the development of weaponry industry and technological innovations the destructive power of terrorism increases. Alongside this, as seen throughout the history, technological innovation have always reflected in the weaponry industry, and inventions like dynamite and nuclear

bomb have brought damage to civilians at most. Additionally, none of non-state terrorist organizations have used biological or chemical weapons in their terrorist activities, beside case of “Aum Shinrikyo” sect, which has used irritant gas in their attack on Tokyo underground in 1995, act that caused death of 12 civilians.

The claim that “new terrorism” is the anti-globalization nihilist rebellion movement is even much accepted after 9/11 attacks. Although, 9/11 attacks symbolically targeted economic (World Trade Center), military (US Department of Defense) and political power (White House) incarnations of globalization, both terrorist organization which performed the attacks and structuralist character of globalization are outcomes of deep historical processes. Globalization is not only a process that evolved in the post- Cold War period and became a reason behind political and social changes as well as a tool of US foreign policy; instead, is a continuation of an ongoing process started in 15-16th centuries and taking roots structural emerge of capitalism. For this reason, the formation of sociological basis of Al Qaeda is not independent from the pre-globalization, colonization period (even earlier) and increasing crisis in capitalist infrastructure and its socio-political impact in 1970s.

US “war on terror” is hardly to be explained through individual political agenda of neo-conservative administration or by being a preemptive action resulted from security concerns; it is more related to infrastructure. A real security concern has never been seen throughout American history, thus power balance policies were not pursued. Alongside this, from the time of US formation, first on the continent, then in Europe, Middle East- Eurasia and Asia Pacific, has adopted a hegemony “politics” based on the impassable tendencies of capitalism on the global level. For this reason, US militarism was not an outcome of the Cold War competition; instead there was an increase in American bases in the Cold War period (Foster, 2003). Hence, under the say-so to confront USSR – supported guerillas, “Special Forces” were formed according to the “National Security Action Memorandum 2” and “Development of Counter-Guerilla Forces” documents ratified by President John Kennedy on 3rd February 1961. In fact, these forces majorly did not confront any opposition group, but conducted operations against independent nationalist regimes repudiating liberal economy politics and in countries of high strategically important regions for US (McClintock, 1991).

The “war on terror” is seen as the strategy that was put into force in the framework of American ongoing “politics” continuation legibility. Hence, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Report issued after 9/11 reflects “war on terror” as imperialism manifesto, serving broader spectrum of political activities, rather than anti-terrorism fight aimed document (Gold, 2002). Moreover, report includes the statement on the preventive attacks not only against terrorist cells, but any formation which is in opposition or is regarded as a threat to the system. It also states that no geographical region will be an exception; anti-Western and anti-capitalistic regimes will be

changed; the rise of any power threatening US will be prevented; natural resources global market and outer space will be left opened and accessed for US, etc. Furthermore, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 was found coherent with the “Project for New American Century” (1997), “Statement of Principles” (1997), “Current Threats Report” (2000), which have been developed by neo-conservatives of Bush’s administration since 1990s rather than simply a product of post-9/11 period.

Quadrennial Defense Review 2005 continued the QDR 2001 idea on a capabilities-based approach toward forces rather than a threat-based model (Noonan, 2006); the boundaries of “war on terror” were expanded that extended the scope of war and comprehended all threats towards itself and allies as well as Western-centered system as a whole (Henry, 2006).

#### VII. “WAR ON TERROR” AND CLAUSEWITZ’S WAR: WHERE IS THE INTERSECTION?

We could speak on the end of Clausewitz’s paradigm in case if the “war on terror” strategy carried out by US was against a terrorism threat in its real sense. However, once having a panoramic view on the operations held within the context of “war on terror”, those operations are seen as corresponding to the American “politics”, yet they are in two sizes larger than real terror threat. Getting into details of this view, it becomes obvious that the objective of US “war on terror” is not terror networks, but potential hegemonic candidates which become stronger while US hegemony is weakening. As matter of fact, there are many examples that prove “war on terror” being a useful strategy systemically planned to be continuation of “politics”.

If to speak on the examples, the most obvious one is the deployment of permanent bases, as justification of US “war on terror”, in the strategically important Central Asia region countries like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (closed later on), and Kyrgyzstan, following 9/11 events. In the same manner, series of actions were performed under the plea of “war on terror” with the aim of forming political and military spaces in Philippines and Indonesia, areas close to Malacca Strait, a \$1.3 trillion annual profit commercial route of US petroleum; Spratley and Parcel islands, which are located in the proximity to natural gas fields in the South Chinese Sea and East Timor petroleum and natural gas reservoirs (Yildizoglu, 2003). As set forth by Jim Glassman, due to “war on terror” strategy US has entered South Eastern Asia region, which was not accessible since Vietnam War (Glassman, 2005). An interesting side of the matter is that even reports produced by RAND in 2000 and Council on Foreign Affairs in the mid-2001 have stated that military deployment in the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar would become a huge strategic achievement on the background of economically and militarily rising China in the region and the attempt to realize this suggestion was made by the “war on terror” strategy after 9/11 (Glassman, 2005). Hence, the investigations that have been made in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand over the Al Qaeda connections there were held not in vain.

The area of US “war on terror” strategy is not limited to Central Asia, Far East and Africa and extends from Georgia to Colombia and from Pakistan to Iraq or even Black Sea (Klare, 2002). One of examples of this is US attempt to enter strategically important Black Sea and shifting Fight Against Terrorism Operation from Mediterranean to Black Sea. Secondly, signing the Status of Forces Agreement between US and Iraq provided the opportunity to establish control over Iraqi, perform military operations of any scale on the territory of Iraq under the necessity of “war on terror”, and deploy any number of military forces on the territory of Iraq (Mason, 2012). Moreover, we need to point out that United States has established a solid basement for the active partnership development in the Far East and Pacific region. United States had strengthened its positions in the Pacific by basing 2, 500 US Marine Corps in Australia, and continued to move towards its objectives in Myanmar, placing chasing of China as an objective (Sharghi, 2017).

The number of examples of how “war on terror” strategy has contributed to US tangible achievements could be even increased. Alongside this, “war on terror” strategy should not be seen only being only on political and military levels. As an example, in the post-9/11 period all banks operating internationally had to provide US reports on all international financial operations performed in order to prevent financing terrorism; thus, US had attained the possibility to chase world funds flow.

As prescribed by “Patriotic Act Part III”, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network under the US Department of Treasury have been given authority to block any financial operations which are believed to be used in financing terrorism and those banks, which were not willing to be expelled from the financial market operation network, have to acknowledge this authority. As matter of fact, a small size Chinese bank “Bank Delta Asia” with no evidence had been accused by FinCEN in financing terrorism through its North Korean clients that has resulted in bank bankruptcy. Following this event, many banks which found themselves under the same risk have cut service relations with their North Korean customers and North Korea in a moment became isolated from the global financial market (McGlynn, 2008).

### VIII. CONCLUSION

In the light of all data provided it would be possible to state that military interventions and regime changes held in the context of “war on terror” are variables that came out as the continuation of political objectives rather than being natural outcomes of clashing thoughts, identities, ideologies and life philosophies. In this regard, “war on terror” being integrated into US “politics” as a strategy, is positioned within Clausewitz’s paradigm. Though, as Clausewitz underlines, non-absolute “politics” and “wars” emerge while applying to reality. Hence, notwithstanding to all advantages, “war on terror” strategy was not successful one; and while speeding up the global competition process and formation of alliances against US, it disclosed the imperialist essence of more than a

century long American hegemony project.

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