Security Sector Reform and Its Implications for Conflict Areas in Indonesia

Muhammad Ibnu Kamil, Dr. Anggi Aulina Harahap, Dipl. Soz, Dr. Benny Joza Mamoto, SH, M.Si

Abstract: The shift in security operations from the military to the police indicates restrictions on the use of force by the military. Under the new Indonesian security law, the police are responsible for security while the military is responsible for defending the country. In this paper, further analysis will be carried out on the implications of this shift in responsibility for conflict areas in Indonesia. From the results of the study it was found that security sector reform in Indonesia provides a comprehensive framework for resolution of security issues, such as law enforcement, protection of civil rights with the need to carry out institutional and internal reforms within the TNI, the National Police, intelligence agencies, and civilian institutions that are responsible for overseeing the security institutions. From these reforms in conflict areas it seems that many are still controlled by the TNI and there is a shift in the image between the Police and the TNI in the public eye.

Keywords: conflict areas, POLRI reform, security sector reform

I. INTRODUCTION

The fall of President Soeharto’s power in May 1998 brought a new democratic era in Indonesia. This era offers scope for public debate in reforming the military and police forces, or what is called security sector reform in other parts of the world. In general, globalization and democratization have had a serious impact on democratic civil-military relations. Old definitions and mechanisms on this issue can change work, functional relations between civilians and the military. Globalization in general has also broadened the scope of security issues, while bringing issues of human rights and clean governance into the security context. The survival of the state is no longer synonymous with the absence of physical and military threats. The economic crisis in the late 1990s and previous developments in both the Soviet Union and the Balkan Peninsula have proven that countries may collapse not because of external threats. The military throughout the world, including in advanced democracies such as the United States and several Western European countries, is defining their new role.1

Regarding the impact of these reforms on conflict areas in Indonesia, before the military (especially ABRI) responded to conflict conditions and border areas by carrying out three military operations: Border Safeguard Operations, Safeguard Operations for Vulnerable Areas, and National Vital Object Safeguard Operations. The shift to the use of police force to carry out security operations generally intersects with developments in the political movements of these regions. As a result, since 2009 conflict areas have been characterized by two important features: mass protests and periodic shootings targeting security personnel or ordinary citizens, which are usually carried out by ‘unknown persons’ or OTK.2

From these observations, it seems that a shift in security operations from the military to the police indicates restrictions on the use of force by the military. Under the new Indonesian security law, the police are responsible for security while the military is responsible for defending the country. In this paper, further analysis will be carried out on the implications of this shift in responsibility for conflict areas in Indonesia.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform is a concept stemming from debates within the development community about the link between security and sustainable development that originated in the 1980s. However, it was only at the end of the Cold War that the concept of security sector reform could develop well. The reality of the cold war means that military or police assistance tends to be provided by the state to advance foreign policy and security objectives rather than based on needs or applicability. However, since the end of the Cold War it has become possible to change the concept of security away from regime security but as a positive public good or an important element for development.

The OECD-DAC embraces security sector reform as a way in which the security forces can concurrently increase their efficiency at the same time so that accountability and transparency issues can be fixed at the same time. However, it needs to be recognized that security sector reform has not yet been accepted in the mainstream development community.

Ignorance of security sector reform and hostility towards its goals and methods continues to exist among several prominent elements in the development community. Therefore, this needs to be addressed by every country that is considering the involvement of security sector reform. It is very important that the objectives, targets and methodology of security sector reform be prioritized within the implementing agency and not be treated as a separate unit or entity. Recent changes in the DAC eligibility criteria for official development assistance (ODA) to include a large number of


security sector reform activities must help bridge this gap. The concept of the security sector is a deliberate transverse section of individuals involved in providing security. This concept is intended to include direct security providers including military forces, police and intelligence services. However, security sector reform also includes the justice system and criminal law as well as oversight actors including members of parliament and civil society.¹

Conflict and Conflict Area

Conflict is defined as a struggle over values and claims in order to secure status, power and resources, a struggle in which the main objective of the opposing party is to reduce, hurt or eliminate competitors. Conflict with violence is limited to all incidents of conflict between individuals and groups that involve some form of physical action that has a violent impact, such as a death toll, injuries and damage to property, or take the form of violence, such as a fight, although there is no mention of the impact of violence. Other effects, such as psychological effects that cannot be observed physically, are not indicator.

In the National Violence Monitoring System, conflict type is defined as an issue that is disputed by the parties involved in the conflict. Next, the type of incident taken into account consists of: ²

- Resource, that is, acts of violence triggered by disputes over resources (land, mining, access to work, salaries, pollution, etc.)
- Election and Position, i.e., acts of violence triggered by competition between two parties related to the election or position
- Governance, which is acts of violence triggered by government policies or programs (public services, corruption, subsidies, division and others)
- Identity, which is an act of violence that is triggered by group identity (religion, ethnicity, ethnicity and others)
- Separatism, which is an act of violence triggered by efforts to separate from the Republic of Indonesia
- Vigilantism i.e. acts of violence triggered by the issue of revenge (offense, theft, debt, accident and others)
- Apparatus Violence on Duty, namely acts of violence committed by formal security forces in responding to criminal acts including violence deemed appropriate or exceeding their authority
- Crime, acts of violence that occur in the absence of disputes previously disputed and certain targets.

A conflict area is the sum of all subnational units affected by the violent conflict. The region-year intensity is basically the same as the maximum area-month intensity in a certain region-year. In addition, the region-year intensity is matched by looking at the years and types of victims and refugees as two main indicators of conflict assessment. The crisis of violence can be escalated to a limited level of war if there are more than 360 victims or more than 18,000 refugees throughout the year in conflict areas. A limited war can be upgraded to war level if there are more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000 refugees. Conversely, a limited war can be reduced to a crisis of violence if there are less than 120 fatalities and less than 6,000 refugees. Likewise, war can be reduced to a limited level of war if there are less than 360 fatalities and less than 120,000 refugees.³

III. DISCUSSION

Indonesia’s Conflict Area Data

In 2014 North Sulawesi Province was the region that had the highest IIK (Violence Intensity Index) value (19.72). The high number of IIK contributed the most among other incidents of Crime, Identity, and Vigilantism. Based on location, the region that contributed the most to the index value was the City of Manado. The most intensive violence related to resource issue occurred in Maluku province with an IIK score of 5.43 with the most incidents being land conflicts. West Papua Province has a level of violence in the Medium category for Governance problems (21.12). There were 18 incidents related to this issue, and did not result in casualties, only 6 people were injured and 24 buildings were damaged. This province achieves the highest IIK because West Papua’s population is lower than other provinces, so after being normalized based on population, the data on the number of incidents and their impact gives a high IIK value for West Papua. Regarding Election and Position, the province with the highest IIK is Aceh Province (26.79) which is included in the High category. Of the 89 incidents that occurred during 2014, which caused one death. The impact was in the form of 4 people killed 33 people injured and 30 buildings damaged. Another explanation related to the type of Identity, in 2014 the province of South Sulawesi had an intensity level in the Medium category. During 2014, there were 120 violent incidents related to identity issues. In the 120 incidents, resulting in 9 deaths, 141 injuries, and 78 damaged buildings. Meanwhile, incidents related to vigilante, the most intensive took place in DKI Jakarta Province with an IIK score of 23.84 and included in the Medium category. During 2014 there were 303 incidents and the most occurred in Central Jakarta, 100 incidents. Of this number resulted in 1 person killed and 137 injured.⁴


In the type of apparatus violence on duty, the province that has the highest IIK is South Sumatra (5.36) and places South Sumatra in the High category for this type of conflict. The last type of violence is separatism. SNPK (National Violence Monitoring System) data shows that during 2014 incidents of violence related to separatism only occurred in the provinces of Aceh, Papua and West Papua. Incidents occurred in Papua 42 times, resulting in 34 fatalities, and 37 injuries. Furthermore, the area with the most incidents was Puncak Jaya Regency. There were 14 incidents that did not result in an impact. The condition makes Puncak Jaya has the highest separatism IIK (6.04) while giving Papua Province the value of separatism IIK of 2.21.7

Security Sector Reform in Indonesia

Police reform is an integral part of security sector reform. The main objective of security sector reform is to create good governance in the security sector and create a safe and orderly environment, so that it can sustain the country’s goal of welfare and prospering the community. Security sector reform is a practice of institutional and operational change programs covering the national security sector (driven by regional efforts) to prepare an environment that makes citizens always feel safe and comfortable.8

Police reform in Indonesia is part of the work agenda for security sector reform in Indonesia. Security sector reform is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to overcoming a country’s socio-political instability. To develop this approach, it is necessary to explore new perspectives on security concepts, including the security dimension. In its development, the security dimension may include non-military dimensions including non-state activities. The expansion of the security dimension also emphasizes the importance of systematic efforts to prevent the separation between state security and people’s civil rights. In addition, the implementation of security sector reforms to provide a comprehensive framework for resolution of security issues, such as law enforcement, protection of civil rights with the need to carry out institutional and internal reforms within the TNI, the National Police, intelligence agencies, and civil institutions responsible for conducting oversight of these security institutions. The security sector can be interpreted as all organizations that have the authority to mobilize, use armed force, or threat the use of armed force, and civil institutions are authorized to manage and supervise the use of armed violence. And the security sector here includes the TNI, Polri, intelligence agencies, the justice system, the Ministry of Defense, and the Parliament (DPR).

Implications for Conflict Areas

After the New Order the political situation and system underwent a fundamental change. The demand for democracy to be applied in Indonesia is increasingly widespread and this has implications for the shift in security management policies. Regulations in the security sector are reorganized and have caused a change in the conception of defense and security in Indonesia.

This was seen when on April 1 1999 ABRI Commander General TNI Wiranto made the decision to separate Polri from ABRI. The decision was followed by making a legal umbrella through TAP MPR No. VI concerning the Separation of the TNI and Polri and TAP MPR VII of 2000 concerning the Role of the TNI and the Role of the Polri. This TAPMPR was used as the basis for the implementation of political policies in the field of security and defense, namely Law No. 3/2002 concerning National Defense, Law No. 2/2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, TNI Law No. 34/2004, and the 2003 Defense White Paper.

All of the above regulations eventually also created a security management model that regulates the authority between the TNI and the Police in carrying out security handling, especially in conflict areas. On the other hand the various regulations above turned out to cause new problems in the field, especially regarding the regulation of duties and authority between the Police and the TNI when handling security in conflict areas.

On the one hand the conflict is considered to threaten and disturb the stability of the government so that the TNI needs to be involved to handle the conflict. While on the other hand the conflict also concerns the issue of public security and disturbs public order so that the National Police also needs to be involved in it considering the police function is a security function. As a result, new problems arise related to security management such as gray areas of overlapping authority, misperceptions about their respective duties and authorities, miscoordination, and so on.

One example is when the TNI handled an area that are in the conflict. The view emerged that the TNI was not authorized to conduct security handling over the conflict because the TNI’s professional function was only dealing with national defense. Security should be carried out by the National Police. On the other hand, the TNI feels that it has duties other than war, namely the internal security task which is also regulated in the Defense White Paper. This has resulted in unclear definitions regarding the tasks of the TNI and Polri.

As a result, there was a conflict of interests between them. This conflict of interest has led to disarray in relations between TNI and Polri. Issues of interest between the TNI and Polri can be seen through the implementation of security management policies in conflict areas in dealing with

---


separatist conflicts and communal horizontal conflicts in several areas, especially in Aceh, Papua and Ambon.\(^9\)

The case of conflict in Aceh, for example, security management to handle conflicts between GAM and the Indonesian Government always uses military force through various types of operations, from military operations to Kopkamtib operations to establishing Aceh’s status as Martial Law and Civil Emergency. In these operations the security forces deployed included TNI and Police personnel with certain authority according to the type of danger determined by Martial Law and Civil Emergency. Determination of the type of operation, authority of the authorities and the type of conditions applied in Aceh is very similar to the elaboration of security management contained in Law No. 23 Prp 1959. This shows that even after post-New Order Indonesia has a security management model that is formulated in the Defense White Paper but in its operational description is relatively the same with Law No. 23 Prp 1959. In addition, from evaluations based on reality on the field there was a miscoordination between the authorities of the TNI and Polri which also had implications for the community such as large displacement, trauma of fear of the people and the number of civilian casualties. In addition, in the long run it turns out that the operations that have been carried out are unable to resolve the root of the conflict.

In the case of Papua, the conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and the central government has been going on since 1965. The workings of the OPM organization are sporadic, such as attacking military posts or police, sabotaging strategic vital objects such as Freeport. The New Order government handled this organization through a number of policies, starting with persuasive and repressive policies. Repressive policies were carried out in the form of military operations to stop sporadic movements, killing those who resisted persecution or set fire to villages or camps which were the hideouts of the OPM. This pattern was continued by the post-New Order government and eventually created new problems in the management of security in Papua. For example, it is difficult to regulate the various unit structures that exist in Papua because the coordination authority that can bridge various interests such as the organic and non-organic TNI Police in Papua is still weak.

The Ambon conflict shows that the potential threat of conflict in Maluku was not anticipated quickly, especially in terms of security management. At the beginning of the conflict in 1999 the government only deployed 5,300 security personnel from both the police and the TNI. This amount is considered insufficient to handle the two million people in Ambon, who are scattered around 100 islands. As a result, the conflict does not end, it is even more widespread. The security forces failed to intervene in the conflict, especially in the initial stages of conflict escalation. In fact, rapid intervention is needed to reduce the current violence and prevent new conflicts from occurring. Because of these failures there arises the potential for wider conflict and new types of confrontations that are more complex, resulting in an increasing number of victims and a prolonged crisis.

In the discourse of reform, it is generally accepted that the police now play a greater role than the military in handling political and separatist movements, especially in Papua. This perceived shift towards a greater police role has provided a much needed boost to the military’s image. The military can claim that they are not involved in internal security and maintain neutrality in local politics. The public image of the police, on the other hand, has fallen to its lowest level. The police are now famous for being brutal and generally unprofessional. For example, in 2012 twenty-two KNPB (West Papua National Committee) activists were shot dead by police forces, including KNPB leader MakoTabuni. Anti-insurgency operations by the police in 2011 ended with increased violence in areas which later became the target of further police operations.

But a closer look at how the TNI and police operate in West Papua shows a different picture from the depiction obtained from comparing the involvement of military personnel and police forces in domestic security. The TNI, especially the army, is still the largest security force, especially in the West Papua region, and maintains its supremacy among Indonesian security forces in West Papua. There are twice the number of army personnel because there are police. In addition, the army is also supported by an extensive intelligence network. On the surface, the police appear to be responsible for domestic security, but a careful examination revealed that the army was still intervening in domestic security. This situation is similar to what happened in Aceh in 2003, at the height of the Aceh war, when the TNI managed to maintain a fairly good reputation, and the police were known as criminals.\(^10\)

Although TNI counter-insurgency actions are permitted under the Defense Law and TNI Law, the TNI chose not to show the public that it was involved in such operations. Instead, the TNI relies on intelligence operations while warning troops in Pamtas and Pamrahwan operations. Collecting intelligence involves covert operations to infiltrate, divide, and confuse “enemies”. This kind of covert operation is very political, rarely transparent, and impossible to control. The worst possibility, an operation like this can greatly damage the braided of society. From these observations it can be concluded that reforms in the Indonesian military have stalled. Evidence from conflict/troubled areas such as West Papua reveals that little has changed in the Indonesian military, which keeps its territorial structure intact. The operation is still carried out in a style similar to operations in East Timor and in Aceh. More importantly, the behavior of officers is still largely the same. Many officers invested heavily in winning


military careers, and now they are also eyeing future political positions or profitable business opportunities. Such officers need substantial financial support to advance their military careers, which in the future will determine how much role they play on the political or business stage. This condition, which places officers in the “rent-seeking trap,” is not new in the Indonesian military, and reforms have clearly failed to eradicate this culture. While Indonesian political leaders were accused of corruption in public, only a few military officers were involved in the targeted corrupt behavior.

IV. CONCLUSION

Police reform in Indonesia is part of the work agenda for security sector reform in Indonesia. Security sector reform is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to overcoming a country’s socio-political instability.

In addition, the implementation of security sector reforms to provide a comprehensive framework for resolution of security issues, such as law enforcement, protection of civil rights with the need to carry out institutional and internal reforms within the TNI, the National Police, intelligence agencies, and civil institutions responsible for conducting oversight of these security institutions.

In the discourse of reform, it is generally accepted that the police now play a greater role than the military in handling political and separatist movements, especially in Papua. This perceived shift towards a greater police role has provided a much needed boost to the military’s image. The military can claim that they are not involved in internal security and maintain neutrality in local politics. The public image of the police, on the other hand, has fallen to its lowest level. From this observation it can be concluded that reforms in the Indonesian military have stalled. Evidence from conflict/troubled areas such as West Papua reveals that little has changed in the Indonesian military, which keeps its territorial structure intact. The operation is still carried out in a style similar to operations in East Timor and in Aceh.

REFERENCES