

State and Conflict Management: Evaluating Nigeria's Response to Boko Haram Insurgency

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Abstract: - Adopting a historical and content analytical method of inquiry, this study interrogates the evolution and geneses of the Boko-Haram (BH) insurgency. It claims Nigeria's inability to comprehend and accurately define the nature and precepts of the insurgency coupled with hybrid tactics of warfare employed by the sect, de-motivated security outlets. It also identifies the challenges of inequitable fire power as a major hindrance to curbing the set activities. In furtherance the study classified the insurgency into three major phases and is of the opinion that while Nigeria may have recorded certain propensity of triumph in addressing the insurgency, the inability to unravel the sponsors of the group in terms of manpower training in guerrilla warfare tactics, supply of moderns and sophisticated weapons, access to healthcare in Sambisa and other logistics. May have dire consequences on the war against insurgency in the North East, conclusively the study opines the need to address the inherent instabilities brought about by ethnic and religious antagonism, if the war against insurgency is to be put to bed.

Keywords: Insurgency, Boko-Haram, Conflict, Nigeria and warfare.

I. INTRODUCTION

While it is neither an anomaly to experience conflicts nor a definitive attribute of a particular region, the frequency at which they occur are more likely to be higher in pluralistic and heterogeneous societies where freedom of expression is not suppressed, resulting from disputes and inability to arrive at concessions on germane issues which includes but not necessarily limited to; what language should be spoken, which ethnic group should produce the president, should religions be allowed in public places, what is the basis for revenue allocation, who should be appointed minister of what and from which region or ethnicity, what is the regional or ethnic quota for employment in civil service amongst other contradictions or disputes arising from differences to how the society should be structured. Owing to the relatively weak nature of its state capacity, Nigeria has for the better part failed in its attempt to monopolize the use of legitimate force, thus creating a vacuum and enabling an environment that breeds grievances, hate and intolerance across the diverse ethnicity, the subsequent inability to address these grievances and differences, may create an avenue for warring factions or groups to resort to the adoption of unconventional measures to resort preferences. Thus, the paper contends the twin incidence of weak state capacity and exploitation of fundamental human rights as embedded in liberal democracy,

resulting in hate speeches and other illegitimate channels to actualize group objectives, has arguably positioned conflict as an alternative means of addressing differences or policy preferences. Upon the establishment of the fourth republic in Nigeria, considerable milestones have been reached as regards to freedom of speech, individualism, liberty and freedom of association as enshrined in the core of liberal democracies, however a series of resourced based conflicts in the oil producing Niger Delta, ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna, Jos, Kano, clashes between herdsman and farmers resulting in multiple loss of life and wanton destruction of properties in Benue and Taraba and the advent of Boko-Haram sect (BH) in the North-Eastern states (NE) of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Kebbi at some point Bauchi, Jos, Kano and across other states has not only threatened the relative stability of Nigeria, but has also reaffirmed the absence of tolerance and inability of the divers nations and ethnicities that make up contemporary Nigeria to live together harmoniously.

The evolution and subsequent spread of BH, has resulted in countless loss of lives and property and forced hundreds of thousands from their homes resulting in the displacement of persons and the establishment of make shift camps and displacement centres, amounting to the highest numbers of displaced persons in Nigeria since the civil war. The incessant attacks carried out by the dreaded BH sect leading to the decision by the Nigerian government to engage the sect militarily, constitution a Joint Task Force made up of Nigeria, Cameroon and Chadian forces and also the incorporation of a civilian taskforce, made up mainly of indigenes of the NE. By applying a content analytical and descriptive methods of inquiry, this study interrogates the evolution and geneses of the BH insurgency, its socio-economic and political implication and the efforts both state and non-state actors towards curbing activities of the sect to a barest minimum level.

The rationale behind the choice of BH, as opposed to Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) or the activities of the Izala sect with its strong hold in Zaria or even the Neo-Biafran agitators led by Nnamdi Kanu, is that while these groups have in different times reigned terror on their respective communities, vandalized civil and personal properties and loss of lives resulting from their engagement with various security outfits which are all considered mitigants to the stability of Nigerian political landscape, however BH on the other had between 2014 to sometime in

2016 successfully hoisted their flag in certain communities and established parallel structures within the defined borders of Nigeria as the trends of suicide bombing as a means of carrying out attacks and kidnapping of hundreds of school girls can be largely credited to sect respectively.

II. CONCEPTUAL PROLOGUE

By way of completing the introductory section of this paper, this section takes into cognisance the fluid nature of concepts in social sciences and the absence of universal consensus as to the meaning and tenets of most concepts; hence it is paramount to clarify meaning and reach of certain concepts that are germane to this study namely; insurgency, and conflict.

Though they largely vary propensities, significance and strategy, insurgency has persisted over time, while the probability of conventional wars between states has waned and less likely to occur. A growing displeasure however arising from the inability of states to carry out a handful of its statutory obligations due to weak or almost non-existence nature of formal state institutions, particularly in Africa and other less developed countries (LDC) combined with the relative ease at which arms and other detonative devices are acquired, insurgency which is coined by Byman (2005) to entail protracted asymmetric, violence, ambiguity, the appropriation of complex terrains (mountains, jungles and villages) psychology warfare and political mobilization geared towards protecting insurgents and subsequent alteration of power to their advantage and that insurgents may attempt to seize power through unconventional means, or narrow their objectives in the case of secession, autonomy and in other time alteration and disintegration of a political community. According to Young and Gray (2011), insurgencies occupy central roles in nation building process since earliest histories. O Neil (2005:1) contends insurgency as the most probable and prevalent form of armed conflict since the establishment of organized political communities. Young and Gary clarified it to encompass O Neil (2011) a general overreaching concepts that entails a conflict between a government and or out group or opponent in which the latter utilizes both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of the four key aspects of politics, which according to Terrorism Research (2009) includes; integrity of borders and compositions of nation states, the political system, the authorities in power and policies that determined who gets what in a society. Conclusively O Neil (2005:4) attests the political objectives of insurgencies prevails in instances where societal divisions were cumulative and were combined with economic and political disparities. Young and Gray (2011) claim exoteric appeals, more specifically economic and political disparages are paramount in comprehending social unrest manifested in form of insurgencies. They claim soaring unemployment, uneven distribution of wealth, insufficient distribution of essential

goods, elitist control and corrupt leadership are of a notable determinants of insurgencies.

Against this backdrop, this study defines insurgency as unconventional methods of guerrilla warfare appropriated by groups whom are unable to actualize their political amongst other relative objectives of; regime change, separation, self actualization and or restructuring of existing political communities. With respect to BH who's justification for taking up arms against Nigeria and its border states of Cameroon and Chad is to oust the government and install a caliphate, abolish Western values, democratic regression and Islamization of Nigeria. This study argues, while various literary and policy oriented research as, S. O. Anyanwu and I Nwanuju's "*Boko Haram: Religious Conflicts and Dialogue in Nigeria*", Adeolu Adewunmi's, "*The Battle for the Mind: The Insurgency and Counter Insurgency*" 2004, and Samuel E. Lolio's, "*Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram*, 2013 amongst other notable studies have proffered varying explanation and propositions as to the aims and objective of the sect; this study claims the objectives and motivation driving the BH sects falls within the confines of the four causal factors as preferred by the Terrorism Report of 2009 and listed above. However it dismisses the argument on mainstream works on BH who define the activities of the sect as an offshoot of religion or motivated by religion, while the sect as many other fundamentalist and extremist groups exploit Islam, by misinterpreting and manipulatively applying religious rhetoric to carry out their nefarious and incessant attacks, the Muslim's have arguably felt the most the effects of the activities of the sect. In buttressing this assertion the Independent (21 November, 2017) with reference to bombing of a Mosque in Adamawa on November 20th 2017;

while terrorist may use religious rhetoric they neither follow Islam nor represent the 1.5 billion Muslims across the world. And that an irony of modern terrorism lies in the fact that is have claimed the lives of more Muslims than people of any other faith, yet Muslims are still considered by some *en masse*, as terrorists. According to Global Terrorism index data of the top 10 countries with the biggest threat of terrorism, eight are Muslims majority countries, with Nigeria occupying third place in the world for countries with terrorism threats and has an almost-equal spread of Islam and Christianity respectively.

Hence, the study argues the activities of the sect as mainly political motivated by but not necessarily limited to; desire for and access to control and appropriate state resources and their inability to legitimately attain such, has resulted in their use of unconventional method of warfare to breed civil unrest with a view of disintegrating the sovereignty Nigeria and challenge its continuous existence.

While conflict abstractly entails clash of interest that can manifest either in an armed or unarmed manner, it erupts peace and stability. Lugga (2007) defined conflict as a group, community or individual; negative or destructive relationship

resulting from a clash of interests or values. Social conflicts amongst units are not per se limited to actualization of defined objectives and values but according to Coser (1968) entails neutralizing, injuring or elimination of rivals, while conflict management according to Lugga (2007) connotes the art of controlling and/or making decisions in a conflict situation with a view to resolving it positively. While conflicts could be managed by a combination of various approaches, adopted means are however largely relative and contextual, thus is it imperative to study closely conflicts within the context in which they persist, should an effective and efficient means of management conflicts be attained. Some of the strategies proffered by Derr (1978), Patterson (1966), and Stoner (1987) includes; bringing in outsiders, accommodation, collaboration, compromise and dominance. The rise of BH brought to the lime-light the weak nature of Nigeria as a state, in terms of information and intelligence gathering, weaponry, soft power, emergency response services to mention but a few units that are considered crucial in managing and resolution of conflicts. Intelligence gathering on the activities and movements of the sect preceding 2015 was highly flawed as the sect carried out attacks in major cities, raided military and police armoury, so was the application of soft power during the Jonathan led government which largely failed to yield any positive results in buttressing the argument Akinbi (2015:42) claims Jonathan's administration explored dialogue with leaders of the sect and promising them amnesty should they lay down their arms, due mainly to the fact that members of the sect are anonymous without any known address, further reinstating the argument of this study as to the poor or almost non-existence intelligence gathering capacity.

Having failed to accommodate the demands of the sect through dialogue, the sect was proscribed a terrorist organization and military expedition was intensified; a civilian taskforce was also incorporated to work with security outlets given their relative understanding of the terrain in which the assault against the sect was carried out, state of emergency was declared in the region, internal assistance in the form of mercenaries were brought in from South Africa and appeal was made to the international community as well. Summarily, the efforts of the then President Jonathan in managing the BH conflict was commendable owing to the shortage of fire power and de-motivated man power on the side of the security outfits, attack and retreat tactics of the sect and the politicization of the crisis amongst other contextual mitigants, the steps taken towards curtailing the sect remained largely unsuccessful. However, the incumbent President Buhari led administration upon attaining the mandate to govern, reshuffled top leadership of the Nigerian army, air-force and navy, followed by the relocation of the military command centre to Maiduguri, incorporation of a Multi-National Joint Taskforce comprising Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon respectively, has brought about momentary stability to the NE, and the frequency of attacks has declined overtime.

III. THEORIZING SOCIAL CONFLICT

Conflict is a rather complex phenomenon to comprehend as it involves human behaviour which is fluid and largely relative. However, the task of theorification is to in its least elucidate what can be understood as the essential dimensions of a certain phenomenon and directions and perspectives of their possible variations. However, it purposively selects a few which appear to aid a better understanding of the phenomenon under study from a theoretical perspective. The study does distinguish three major approaches namely; structural conflict theory, frustration and aggressive theory respectively.

According to Ademola (1997:35) the structural conflict theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organized. The theory looks at social problem like political and economic exclusion, domination, exploitation, poverty amongst other socio-economic challenges. While for Collier (2000:2) incompatible interest based on competition for resources, assumed to be scarce as being responsible for social conflicts, and for Ross (1993) he argued, in situations where economic and political discriminations and weak kinship ties are defining attributes, the chances of negative conflicts will result are higher than in situations where conditions are exact opposite. Conclusively Brown (1996:577) contends structural theory is remarkably strong on the immediate and underlying factors that lead to conflicts, as it presents an array of factors that make the emergence and escalation of internal conflicts.

While the structural theory, may account for the emergence and spread of the BH, in the sense that the mashing up of various ethnicities, nations and tribes to make up Nigeria by the colonialist, set the tone for conflicts in Nigeria as in most colonies in Africa. Secondly, the continuous domination of the political landscape by the more or less permanent political class is likely to breed a sense of exclusion, resulting possibly in unconventional means of resolving difference. This theory does not only account for the emergence of BH but also that of MEND a resource based conflict. However, the emphasis on material needs as the drive behind conflicts, limits the reach of the theory, as it is possible that economic and political exclusion and deprivation may trigger a conflict, but may not necessarily sustain it, as group objectives are likely to be situational and relative.

Second is frustration and aggression theory developed mainly by Dollard John in 1939 and modified by the likes of Aubrey Yates 1962 and Leonard Berjowitz 1962 respectively. According to Anifowose (1982) theorist who rely on this account, use psychological theories of motivation and behaviour as well as frustration and aggression. As postulated by Gurr (1970) where expectations do not meet attainment, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their goals. While for Best (2009) aggression is not just a natural reaction or instinct, but an outcome of frustration, and a feeling of disappointment may

lead to the expression of anger or dissatisfaction through violence that will be directed at those responsible.

Should an empirical study be carried out in Nigeria, the likelihood of a greater percentage of the citizens been frustrated will arguably be higher than those whom r not frustrated. The frustration and aggression theory may likely suffice in explaining the emergence of conflicts in modern societies, it largely fails to incorporate the geneses of the BH sect but explains satisfactorily the emergence of MEND whom peacefully agitated for the need to revise allocation formula before resorting to vandalization of oil facilities, oil bunkering, kidnapping of expatriate, by doing so they are creating problems for the government whom they hold responsible.

Not without their the underscored theories of conflict applied in this study to account for the emergence and subsequent spread of BH, by offering diverse but useful insights in an attempt to comprehend the phenomenon under studies.

IV. EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF THE BOKO-HARAM WARFARE

The upheaval of the BH in NE part of Nigeria took a different dimension, when the members of the Nigerian Police Force brutally killed Mohammed Yusuf founder of the group in July, 2009, the subconsciously became prominent and took up arms and maimed and killed some innocent people in Maiduguri. The absence of a consensus as to the definite date the group was formed remains elusive; hence this study would focus on the modus operandi of the sect. Before 2010 the sect had no defined strategy as it occasionally employed guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run, and their weapons were largely rudimentary, this however been to change with the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on strategic locations. Within the context of this study is it argued the BH after 2010 employed a variety of methods and modus operandi that put the sect on the world map, before resulting listing some of the deadliest attacks carried out on strategic persons and on innocent civilians it is paramount to narrow their mode of attack, with a view of conceptualizing it.

Hoffman (2012), define hybrid wars to involve a range of different models of warfare that includes conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations and terrorism in various manifestations (such as beheading, kidnapping and suicide bombings) and criminal activities, while to Mattis and Hoffman (2003) it entails multi-modal activities that can be perpetrated by separate units or even the same units, but are strategically directed, connected and coordinated within the contested zones to achieve synergistic effects. Hybrid wars differs from conventional warfare, due to its combination of tactics, methods, weaponry, strategies, making it operationally decisive, expensive and difficult to contain on the side of the defenders.

The BH sect, can be argued to have in other times employed a hybrid form of warfare against the state and other defenders,

making it almost impossible to predict the next line of action by the group as while the contested zone remained the NE, different units of the group carry out simultaneous attacks in different locations and employ a tactics ranging from kidnapping for ransom to forceful abduction of school girls and other children whom are either shared amongst their ranks and exploited sexually or used as suicide bombers to beheading, use of IED in densely populated public places.

Having attempted to define the nature of the war, the study further classified the insurgency into three phases, with the first encompassing perceiving of the group by the Nigerian government to be a form of civil unrest when it reared its head and manifested sometime between the late 1990's and early 2000, subsequently it was later viewed as a form of religious uprising 2002 – 2009 and no viable engagement was put in place on the side of the government, the kidnapping of over two hundred school girls in Chibok put the sect on the world map, the final phase of the insurgency largely covers 2010-2015 and to date, on the one side the state alongside the Civilian Task-Force, Multi-National Joint Task-Force amongst other stakeholders were waging a war on full home grown terrorism. A chronology of selected incidents by the BH sect, published by European Centre for Research Training and Development UK, includes amongst others; (www.eajournals.org)

Date	Incidents	Effects
July 26 -29, 2009	Beginning of BH uprising in NE, Nigerian	Approximately 1,000 lives were lost in clashes between Boko-Haram and Nigerian Soldiers
July 30, 2009	Execution of Mohammed Yusuf by security operatives.	Abubakar Shekau, named leader of the sect.
September 27, 2010	Bauchi Prison Break	5 deaths, 721 inmates freed.
January 12, 2012	Kano multiple bomb blast	185 people killed.
April 16, 2013	Baga massacre	187 people killed.
February 14, 2014	Borno massacre in Konduga	121 Christian villagers killed
January 3-7, 2015	Baga massacre and raze	The entire town of Baga was raised, resulting in at least 2,000 death and the control of a predominant part of Borno State by the sect.

Source, European Centre for Research Training and Development UK, includes (www.eajournals.org)

The under listed dates, events and effects gives an insight into the nature and modus operandi of the dreaded BH sect, however the incumbent administration in collaboration with other stake holders have intensified the assault in the contested zones, and has successfully regained control of the parts of Borno state in which the sect hoisted their flags, returned relative normalcy to the state and incapacitated the sect, this however came with a prize, thousands of lives were lost, personnel of Nigerian security forces killed in the line of

duty, villages razed, school girls kidnapped and abused amongst other destructive acts carried out by the sect.

V. RESPONSE TO BOKO-HARAM

Having attempted to conceptualize and ascertain the geneses and modus operandi of BH, this section the paper is aimed at evaluating the response of the and non-state actors geared towards eradicating or containing the activities of the sect. In the initial stages of its emergence, the BH sect employed basic rudimentary tactics, with limited and accommodative effects within the axis of Borno state. The Nigerian government responded by using the Nigerian Police force (NPF) to checkmate the activities of the sect, consisting mainly of acts of disobedience to wrongful or extreme interpretation of the teachings of Islam, which has overtime served as a facade for the BH as well as other extremist group such as Al-Shabab. Extensive roadblocks stop and search and mass arrests were intensified with a view of curbing the menace constituted by the sect in the name of religion. As buttressed by Irinnews (January 20, 2012) the inability of the NPF to checkmate the activities of the sect, led to the incorporation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003. The JTF was commissioned in line with the change in warfare tactics employed by the sect, including the burning down of police barracks and carrying out attacks on civil and personal properties in densely populated places in and outside Borno.

The circumstances that led to the arrest and subsequent execution of Mohammed Yusuf the leader of the sect, generated a lot of uproar both within and outside the shores of Nigeria as concurred by Williams (2015) Yusuf was captured alive and held in police custody, without formal charges before he mysteriously died. It is widely thought that the unaccountable circumstances surrounding the death of Yusuf that compelled BH to embrace a more violent and combative approach under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau.

Preceding Shekau's ascension to leadership, the sect remains largely ineffective, in what can be termed as a phase, which they used to arguably res-strategize, reorganized and recoup. Their returned marked one of the most violent periods in the history of contemporary Nigeria, as they did not only take responsibility for thousands of deaths, they employed alien measures in the form of suicide bombing, kidnapping for sexual exploitation or for the purpose of filling their ranks of a well motivated and tactically competent followers. This in turn like a chain reaction, led to enactment of a Special Unit as buttressed in Vanguard Newspaper (17 June, 2012) Nigerian government establishes Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011, consisting of personnel from NPF, Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) respectively. The development saw the deployment of 100,000 personnel from the aforementioned security outfits and also lead to declaration of State of Emergency (SOE) in the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. As captured in Premium Times Newspaper (15 May, 2013) Nigeria has declared state

of emergency twice prior to its third in response to the escalated nature of the conflict with BH, it is also noteworthy that the then President Olusegun Obasanjo (OBJ) declared the second SOE in plateau in 2004 also as a response to ethno-religious crisis that has ravaged the state, which saw the suspension of the then Governor Joshua Dariye and the State House of Assembly respectively. As the conflict zones and stronghold of the BH sect, a declaration of SOE in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa is a commendable effort on the side of the Jonathan led administration.

In line with the objective of defeating BH, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was also commissioned to compliment the efforts of the security outfits. The CJTF signals a turn in events and a new dimension of conflict management in the ongoing onslaught against BH. The outfit consisted predominantly of hunters, vigilantes, farmers, indigenous youths and those whom have been affected by the insurgency. As much as CJTF was an added advantage taking into cognisance their familiarity of the crisis zone, it may have been accompanied with unintended negative effects, such as infiltration, intelligence information and pre-empted assault on the sect could be compromised and amongst other possible implications direct involved of un-commissioned and tactically incompetent civilians directly engaging in the art of warfare. The speedy passage of Anti-Terrorism Act also signalled a strong desire and will on the side of the state to defeat BH. As stated in Ndahi (2013) the Act stipulates, among other provisions death penalty sentence for terrorists and insurgents and the destruction of terrorist enclaves.

Thus, it is of the opinion of this study, that while commendable efforts were made by the governments aimed at curtailing the BH sect, up until post 2015 presidential elections that saw Action People's Congress (APC) ascension to the Aso presidential villa, little success were recorded, as the BH sect did not only get stronger, it allegedly rebuffed attempts by the state to initiate a dialogue. Contextual factors such as unrivalled fire-power of BH, hybrid warfare tactics, and the inability of the state to clearly define what BH is and not and inability to identify the three phases of the insurgency as earlier stated, may have resulted in the unsuccessful attempts by the state to address the situation. However, the relocation of the military leadership to Borno upon the request of the APC led government and intensified assault, purchase of much needed arms, coupled with the efforts of neighbouring countries of Chad and Cameroon may have collectively addressed the insurgency and recaptured communities in Borno state where the insurgents have previously hoisted their flags signalling control over the territory.

Lastly it is of the view of this study that while BH have been relatively grounded, the state has not won the war, judging from history the Maitastine riots which ravaged kano through to Kaduna state in 1980 degenerated into a full blown war between the sect under the leadership of Muslim Scholar, Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, renowned his unorthodox

teachings which we largely unislamic. According to Agi (1998) at the end of the war over 4,177 people including Maitatsine himself, policemen amongst other civilians have been killed and a total of 8,712 were injured, while Zaharadeen (1988) indicated that over 6,000 lives were lost. While there exist a dispute as to the actual figure of casualty, it should be noted that these events occurred in 1980-81, also borne out of controversial interpretation and misrepresentation of Islam, similar to that of BH. Conclusively, Lugga (2007:53) claims since the Kano episode in 1980, the following conflicts connected to the Maitatsine sect have been recorded; 1982 Maitatsine riots in Bulunkutu area of Maiduguri, 1984 Maitatsine clashes in Yola, known then as Gongola state and 1985 Maitatsine uprising in Gombe, and Bauchi respectively.

While the government succeeded in neutralizing the Maitatsine group, off-shots of the sect perpetrated attacks in other parts of the country even after the death of their leadership, as the controversial killing of Muhammad Yusuf did not stop BH, rather it became more deadly. Thus, the likelihood of exterminating the BH group by possibly capturing or killing the leader of the sect or dismantling their structures and chasing them out of communities that were once there stronghold seems less likely, owing to the argument that such groups are driven by ideological indoctrination, which thrives on vacuums which are relatively contextual. From the stand point of Human Needs Theory and Frustration and Aggression theory, which abstractly entails; all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfil, and possible denial and frustration of these needs by other bodies could have a possible effect on them, be it immediate or long term, thereby increasing the probability of conflicts. For Nigeria the state and other actors may have succeeded in disintegrating BH, without seeking the root cause of the frustration that lead to aggression and their sources of resources, the likelihood of re-emergence of BH or a similar groups with similar objectives cannot be overruled.

VI. CONCLUSION

To bring an end to any armed conflict, it is of great importance to comprehend the nature of the war. The inability of Nigeria to clearly define the nature of the conflict with BH ranging from insurgency, religious war and terrorism has highlighted the poor capacity of the state to gather intelligence and also communicate with the populace on actions taken. The Nigerian Army on the other side may have failed to arrest the situation owing to de-motivation and lack of equitable fire power with the enemy, more than often the army were pushed back and even had their bases raided by the sect, the same army that succeeded in peace keeping missions abroad. While Nigeria may have triumphed as it stands against home grown insurgency, it is of the opinion of this study, that extensive work be carried out as to unravelling those whom sponsored, trained the BH in warfare and tactics, and the mechanism through which they were able to access weapons and

intelligence information, until this aspect of the insurgency is put to bed the likelihood of re-emergence of the sect remains likely as amongst other shortcomings the state has addressed the sect not the issues or situations that brought about the sect.

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