

The Nigerian State and the Dialectics of Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria (1999-2017)

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Abstract: - Over the years Corruption has been identified by many as a major cankerworm bedevilling the Nigerian polity. This study interrogates the Nigerian state and its institutional attempts at curbing corruption over the years. Despite the creation of new institutionally specialized apparatus particularly the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) during the Obasanjo's administration, there is little or no indication that corruption and corrupt practices are on the decline in Nigeria. In fact, there is an increased tempo of corrupt activities. Why is this case? To tackle this, the study hypothesizes, first, that the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria is not new and largely predicted on the wealth-mine character of the state in Nigeria. Secondly, the predatory texture of subsisting anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria has a dysfunctional instrument and analyzed using the case study analytic technique. Among others, the study found that while the 'brazen attempts' and use of anti-corruption jingle continue, corrupt practices have not only persisted but has grown enormously in variety and magnitude. We also found out that within the period under study, the principal anti-graft agencies in Nigeria appear eminently ad-hoc as well as suffer a crisis of legitimacy and institutional instability. Taking cognizance of these, the study recommends a total overhaul of the entire anti-corruption architecture in Nigeria. Very importantly, two regular government agencies – the police and tax authorities – need to be purpose re-engineered for the capacity and capability to deal with anti-corruption matters in a more civil, systematic and functional manner.

Keywords: Anti-Graft Agencies, Corruption, Democracy, Overdeveloped State in Nigeria, Wealth-Mine.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian States ever since the fourth republic has been engaging in anti-corruption crusades. The reason for such a campaign is that the issue of corruption is a recurring decimal in Nigeria. Besides corruption impedes socio-economic development and robs the citizenry of the benefit of a good life. It became pertinent that the best way to tackle the menace of corruption has gotten many wondering the place of the Nigerian state in the fight against corruption. On this, Laski (in Appadorai, 1975), argues that the state, being an organization that enables the mass of men to realize social good on the largest possible scale; makes the whole essence of the state not to be exempted in the fight to ensure such realization. However, the case of the Nigerian state as regards the essence of good life for its citizens or for largest possible scale has been hampered by cases of corruption that has made the state project of good life a mirage. This is worrisome

bearing in mind that the extant crusade over the years, including finance and energy channelled to anti-corruption crusade efforts, seems a wild goose chase.

The import is that despite billions of Naira spent on campaigns, institutional and personnel turn-over by successive government and present, corruption practices have grown in leaps and bounds in all facets of the Nigerian society. This is evidently from the recent happening within the corridors of the fight against corruption where Nigerians have to watch the watcher. This is disheartening as the recent report by the National Bureau of Statistics, (NBS) (2017), x-rays that the magnitude of public sector bribes in Nigeria over the last ten years with a focus on 2015-2017 is alarming. The report indicated that public sector corrupt practices become even more palpable when factoring in the frequency of the payments, adding that the majority of those who paid bribes to public officials did so more than once over the course of the year. In fact, it posits that the period between June 2015 and May 2016 also showed that almost a third of Nigerian adults (32.3 per cent) who had contact with public officials between the same period had to pay, or were requested to pay a bribe to such public officials. According to Ekiyor (2005), corruption is unlawful to use of power or influence by an official or a government either to enrich himself or further his course at the expense of the public. It is important to argue that corruption is not attached to a particular system of government or a period in history but rather an endemic phenomenon that is repetitive and an integral part of any political system (Gould and Kolb, 1964; Scott, 1972).

To be sure, the degree and impacts of corruption that has permeated the Nigerian state made Achehe (1975), argue that anyone who can say that corruption in Nigeria has not yet become alarming is either a fool or a crook, or else does not live in the country. Ayittey (1962), observes that there was colonial exploitation in the past, but today the main exploiters and oppressors of African peasants are the African elites. The point is that public and private office holders entrusted to defend and promote the public goods have dubiously engaged in stashing and syphoning the commonwealth. Unfortunately, successive governments in Nigeria embarked on various anti-corruption programmes consistently to educate the society at large on the adverse effect of corruption on the economy of the nation and the image of the country in the international scene. However, corruption is now a sub-culture that flows in the blood of public and private office holders. On closer look

on the crusade on corruption, Unaimkogbo (2007) believes that corruption has multiplied, intensified, systemized and eventually institutionalized itself. The danger is that it has the capacity and potency of slowly and eroding the societal benefits of the largest possible life. As such, it becomes a tendency to deviate from the formal rules of conduct governing the action of someone in a position of public authority because of private motives (khan, 1996). That is why; the World Bank (1997) considered corruption as the abuse of public power for private benefits.

Therefore, in an effort to tackle corruption, the war against corruption started with General Murtala Mohammed in 1976 that purged corruption practices in the public and private sectors; the Jaji declaration in 1977 by Olusegun Obasanjo; the ethnic revolution of Shagari from 1981 to 1983; War Against Indiscipline by Buhari-Idiagbonin 1984; the National Orientation Movement in 1986; the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice by Babangida in 1987 and Abacha War Against Indiscipline and Corruption in 1996 (Duruji and Azuh, 2014). In 1999, the Fourth Republic witnessed the establishment of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC). In addition to these two institutions, other related anti-corruption offences commission includes the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), the Public Procurement Act, the Fiscal Responsibility Act and Due Process Office.

However, over the years, development scholars have agreed that one pertinent challenge of the agenda for good governance and sustainable development is corrupt practice and as such, corruption as a complex issue is not only a recurring happening in Nigeria but also a nuisance. It is worrisome and painstaking those years after the establishment of institutions and agencies to tackle corrupt practices in Nigeria, the practice shows no sign of abating. In fact, the debate and problematic nature of corruption are so complex that the effect may, in effect, also perhaps constitute the causes. Coldham cited in Amaraegbu (2008), since political independence by the African States, the level of corruption have markedly increased regardless of official ideology or economic methods. Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005), argued specifically that Nigerian quest for governance and economic growth have been hobbled by economic mismanagement and widespread corruption. For, Ikejiani-Clark (1995), the cause of corruption is essential based on non-existence of social services and as such, it is an easy method to receive large unearned profit in order to be secure in case of any eventuality such as ill-health, job retrenchment or death.

At the heart of these problems and challenges, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1999), maintained that corrupt practices in Nigeria is not only a problem but also an inherent constant challenge for all facets of government. This is because, while the campaign by government institutions and agencies continue to curb corrupt practices, many dollar-rich big men

traverse the Nigeria space like war-time heroes celebrating the fall of their conquered territories. Thus, corruption is largely a product of weak accountability of public office holders, greed, and systematic failure. The implication of all this is that despite agencies and "political will" created to fight corruption, there is significant empirical evidence that corruption crusade in Nigeria have failed and rather taken a multiple dimension in Nigeria in recent years amidst the campaign for the fight against corruption practices. In order to unrivalled this; the study investigates the character of the Nigerian state and Anti-corruption Crusade in the Fourth Republic. It examines why despite a huge effort by the government at the centre and institutional agencies, the crusade on corruption appears stagnant.

Therefore, the main focus of this paper is to interrogate the Nigerian State and the dialectics of Anti-corruption crusade despite the previous effort of the past administration in Nigeria. In doing this, firstly, the study traces the anti-corruption crusade by the government since 1976 with more emphasis on the problematic. Secondly, the study examines the relevant literature on anti-corruption and institutional apparatus in Nigeria. Thirdly, it adopts a framework for the analytical approach. Fourthly, the study indicates the propositional and methodological consideration that is best suitable for the study. The fifth deals with the analysis of the Nigerian state and anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Through this, the manifestation and effect of corrupt practices in Nigeria will be investigated. The sixth focus on the conclusive analysis on the Anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. All these points are not only critical but also necessary while bearing in mind that since 1999 much has been said about the anti-corruption crusade and the impact on the Nigerian polity. Through this, the study will ascertain the rationale behind the internal dynamics of why the anti-corruption crusade seems but a mirage in Nigeria.

II. LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

The African Development Bank, (ADB, 1988) see corruption as the abuse of public or private office for personal gain. Thus, the general character of corruption is that the corrupt practices do not only occur in the private and public domain, but occur within the individual, family, and communal settings. Accordingly, Okeyim, Ejue, and Ekanem (2013:26), broadly provide the spectrum of corruption as a systemic and unethical conduct which can be categorized as a political corruption, judicial, rigging, contract inflation and kickbacks, bribery, fraud of diverse kinds, embezzlement, misappropriation, nepotism and cronyism. Furthermore, Sharma and Sadana in Eme, Martins and Okeke (2014:4), defined corruption as a deliberate or international exploitation of one's status or resources, done directly or indirectly, for personal gain be it material or enhancement, violating legitimate or accepted norms and done against the interest of other persons or community.

Ngwakwe (2009), posited from the economic perspective when he sees corruption as the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with objectives of earning wealth illogically through an individual or groups that violate entirely the perceived norms and principles of governance. The term corruption can be defined within the ambit of that act of pervasion of public rules and misuse of official power for selfish motive (Agbaje, 2004). In a similar but more encompassing manner, El-Rufia (2013), posits that when we talk about corruption, we imply a wide range of social misconducts such as extortion, embezzlement, and nepotism that include favours to a friend, abuse of public property goods and spare parts to the public. The point is that when we talk of corruption and the different forms that accompany it, we must understand that the practice differs in length and breath as each level have various degree of implications and consequences.

Explaining the meaning of corruption and forms, Mathew et al (2013), opined that in order to understand the rationale for the spread of corruption in Nigeria, we must as a matter of interest understand these diverse forms of corruption which effect are solely dependent on a given society or country. In agreement to this view, Williams (2000), averred that corruption varies in nature, degree, and strength in different activity domains that take a variety of forms, but specific forms may be the product of more or less uncommon combination of factors. For World Bank (2016), corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office for private gain through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets to the division of state revenue. In acknowledging the controversies arising from the conceptualizing and the classification of definitions of corruption from the point of private and public realm Morris (2008), believe that corruption is a behaviour that deviates from serving the common good both at the micro and macro level. On the controversies entangling the term public interest, Theobald (1990), added another controversy when he insists that when we talk of public interest, he maintained that complex societies have a wide range of public, each with their own interests just as the political class in Nigeria; have been able to turn the country's multi-ethnic divides to their favour by promoting their regional and ethnic interest.

On the other hand, the establishment in 1999 of the Independent Corrupt Practice and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) we seen as laudable steps by the Nigerian state to fight the war on corrupt practices in Nigeria. Ezenwaji (2003) traced the origin of the fight against corruption practice when he avers that the pre-colonial institutions had in place institutions or policies that were pre-set to fight corrupt practices. In response to this view, Nwaodu (2012) posit that the existing Sharia Laws were existing policies to checkmate and punish corrupt acts and therefore, there existed traditional anti-corruption bodies like the police and the courts (Falola cited in Mbaku, 1998). In

fact, Nwaodu, Adam, and Okereke (2014) completely traced pre-colonial state fight against corruption to the post-state era and then 1999.

However, in the pre-colonial and post-independence era, the fights against corrupt practices have not achieved the required result. Eze (2010), argues that successive governments in Nigeria have set up various institutions designed to fight corruption but that the processes almost turned Nigeria into a pariah nation because Nigerians were treated with suspicion and embarrassment. He further maintained that several legislations and multiple institutions put in place to curb the corrupt practices achieved little success. Okenette(2003) examines the key factors responsible for the challenging status of these institutions. He insisted that anti-corruption was is a waste of time and resources so long the capitalist thrives in Nigeria. Consequent upon this postulation, Deddley (1988), Reley (1973) and Ukwaba (2002) jointly agreed that the superficial presences of the agencies fighting corruption in Nigeria are lackadaisical infighting corruption. Sincerely, Otive (2008), avers that anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria has received a lot of criticism due to the insincerity of the president who knows quite a number of corrupt members of the society but rather than prosecutes them, he is using the dossier collected on them to blackmail them to support his government.

In view of this, Enweremadu, (2010), posits that the war against corruption under Obasanjo failed because the institution such as ICPC and EFCC could not solve Nigeria's corruption problem. This is attributed to the perception of the public that the agencies were overwhelmed by the problem of corruption itself and that ICPC was seen as a toothless bulldog while the EFCC was an Alsatian readily turned loose on political opponents. Eme et al (2014), assert that with the exception of the Murtala and the Buhari-Idiagbon under military junta who defile the odds to fight corruption, no Nigerian leader has been able to "walk the talk" in the fight against corruption. Both scholars maintained that the anti-graft agencies set up by the state are operating in the interest of the rich and influential members of the Nigerian society. This is because the bourgeoisie class (the influential groups) is the dominant classes of the Nigerian society who benefit from dependent capitalism, and have also conspired to make the anti-corruption agencies operation in the society to reflect their interest. This conspiracy of the dominant class thrives not by accident but on the grounds that the character of the post-colonial state in Africa and Nigeria is overdeveloped.

III. THEORETICAL FRAME OF ANALYSIS

We anchored the analysis on the proposition emanating from the theory of the overdeveloped state as the framework of analysis. The theory is developed by Hamza Alavi (1972) and popularized by Claude Ake (1985); Elekwe (1985); and Ibeanu (1988). The most distinguishing feature of the theory is its assumption that the post-colonial state is not only a creation of imperialism but also that the Third World social

formations have excessive enlargement of powers of control and regulations that the state has accumulated and elaborated which extend far beyond the logic of what may be necessary for the orderly functioning of the social institutions of the society over which the society presides. According to Elekwe (1985), the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state, which in turn had incorporated some important elements of the pre-colonial rudimentary state structures. As Ibeanu (1998) noted, in spite of anti-colonial struggles, the post-colonial state altered very little in the arbitrariness of the predecessor. The implication is that the quest for independence was negotiated with the colonialist. By "negotiated independence", Ibeanu implied that the state structure of the colony called Nigeria was not changed fundamentally, rather what was changed was personnel. On a similar vein, Ake (1985A), argue that one of the fundamental characters of the post-colonial state is that it has very limited autonomy. By this, he contended that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is immersed in the classic struggle that goes on in the society.

To be sure, Olashore (1994), vividly captured the role of the post-colonial state when he poised that the state is evidently involved in the provision of infrastructure, training salaries, equipment, personnel, technical knowledge and political bureaucracy so that it is saddled with enormous responsibilities often beyond its competence. Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2009), averred that the main line of the theory is that the Nigerian state which emerged without regard to the inherent social forces or consideration of what the people wanted or wished has remained largely inorganic. On a broad spectrum, the central proposition of the overdeveloped state theory which captures the internal dynamics of an anti-corruption crusade over the years in Nigeria.

The state in the post-colonial society is not the instrument of a single class. The state is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three propertied classes (the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the landed classes while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded (Alavi, 1972:98).

The consequences of all these are that the metropolitan state in Nigeria is overdeveloped and dysfunctional inorganic and as such, created institutional apparatus such as EFCC and ICPC and other extant laws and regulations through which it exercised dominion over all the indigenous citizenry. As an inorganic structure, every creation by the peripheral state represent and replicate the interest of the ascendant bourgeoisie class and their instrument in power, by so doing, the institutional apparatus created to fight corruption is by nature inherently attached, structurally connected and

equipped to exercise routine operations which are by default super-ordinate to the people and subordinate to the peripheral bourgeoisie class in Nigeria. The application is that the people are largely disconnected from the institution by default basically because its structure and functions serve other interests if a group, this is possible because the post-colonial society such as Nigeria inherited that overdeveloped state apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the activities and operations of the agencies fighting corruption are regulated and controlled by the same dominant class. Though this, it can be contended that the internal dynamics for the current crisis of legitimacy is basically a result of the spillover effect of the overdeveloped character of the postcolonial state on such institutional apparatus to fight corruption.

Another consequence is that because of the inorganic structure giving rise to inorganic institutions created to fight corruption, the ECC, and ICOC and other extant laws and regulations bodies assume semi-autonomous roles, which is paralleled with its original creation. In fact, the close affinities ICPC and EFCC have with the presidency that created them in the first place, have indicated that the two institutions and others established to fight corruption are mere state coercion instrument and victimization apparatus. For this reason, Reno (1998) commented that corruption in Nigeria is widely linked to a close association of elite networks and official use of office for private gain. Therefore, the overt politicization of the anti-corruption crusade has made the fight against corruption a means to witch-hunt people. All these, are evidently the disconnection between the Nigeria state and the state structure from the people in Nigeria. On the issue of overdeveloped state character and influence in the creation of EFCC and ICPC and other extant laws in Nigeria following years of independence, Alavi (1972), argues that specificity in post-colonial societies arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes, and by the superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context.

IV. PROPOSITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study proposed that the texture of the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is predatory. This is substantially on account of the wealth-mine character of the state in Nigeria. This texture has dysfunctional effects on the polity in Nigeria. Investigating the study, data for interrogation were generated through documentary instruments and sourced secondarily from existing records such as textbooks, journals, seminars papers, and government reports. Accordingly, the study was analyzed using the case study analytic technique which gave rise to a thorough and well-ordered examination of the status of the issue at stake and the interaction of various elements within.

V. THE CHARACTER OF THE STATE IN NIGERIA AND ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

The history of all hitherto existing structure, institutions, and framework created in post-independent Nigeria are the history inorganic structure, institutions, and framework. Be it the constitution, the National Assembly, the arms of government, the extant laws and regulations are to the benefits of the embedded interest of the bourgeoisie's class. The 1999 constitution arguably defectively formed and framed the legal basis for the application and exercise from which other institutions such as the EFCC and ICPC was created by the dominant class in Nigeria. The National Assembly since its inception in 1999 is also a product of this dominant class institution. It is important to assert that though the constitution is the bedrock of any democratic experience, it must, however, emanate from the people. But the case is different from the 1999 constitution. What the dominant class did was to stage-manage and create the constitution upon which all other institutions derive their backing. Duruji and Azub (2016), maintained that the evolution of the Nigeria state runs contrary to the Aristotelian natural evolution of society which promotes the interests of the general collectives who lay claim to it as members. This implies that the Nigerian state was not created to serve the interests of Nigerian citizens but to moderate the interest of the ruling elites.

Therefore, in 1999, what the dominant class did was to establish the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practice and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and other extant laws and regulations on graft to not only protect itself, but also serve as instrument of coercion against the enemy of the ruling class. This has been evident through a series of campaigns and crusade that have not yielded any fruit. The reason for this is that there are a huge legitimacy crisis and institutional instability associated with the establishment of these agencies and their graft war in Nigeria over the years. This is made more possible because the Nigerian state as Hay (1999) posits exist as the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, as the instrument of the ruling class, as ideal collective capitalist and factor cohesion within the social formation. That is why; the perceived exposed members of the bourgeoisie phenomenon are a class who failed to employ the table manner in corruption processes. All these agencies established by the Nigerian state to aid in anti-corruption crusade have worsened the fight against corruption. This is made possible due to the fact that the Nigerian state has created institutions to regulate inherent class activities.

Ekanem, Ejue, and Okeyim (2013:31) contend that anti-corruption crusades and the so-called reforms have been the fulcrum of the economic and social policies over a decade of the democratic journey and that these policies have failed due to deceptive mechanisms behind their conception and formation. These mechanisms, therefore, are methods employed by the ruling class to achieve their collective

interests and aspirations. It is of interest to note that the creation of ICPC and EFCC is not in existence before the Code of Conduct Bureau that was the only constitutionally established anti-corruption agency in Nigeria. As a result, the present dysfunctional and incapacitated character of the Code of Conduct Bureau thereby making it an ineffective and dysfunctional institution. The implication is that ICPC and EFCC assume investigative roles in the fight against corruption thereby leading to a legitimacy crisis and institutional instability of the Code of Conduct Bureau.

Therefore, at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, Enweremadu (2010) averred that the ICPC inauguration in September 2000 and the EFCC operations in April 2003 were given relatively broad powers and mandates to fight corruption and related offences. This fight against corruption is necessary as Ngwakwe (2009) posited. He insisted that corruption is the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with objectives of earning wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration. The point is that since the first Republic to the present fourth Republic, allegations and massive corrupt practices are existing and the anti-corruption crusade and fight against corrupt practice have formed a deep and important policy issue of government over the years.

However, what was and is stricken is that despite these efforts, the antidote of corruption has not been discovered. What we have witnessed is a skyrocket of corrupt practices with accompanied impunity by the dominants class in Nigeria. The resultant implication is that why the masses wallow in poverty, the dominants class dine and wine with taxpayers' money in the glare of the institutions enshrined to fight corruption. The major reason for such failure to achieve successes in the fight against corruption and the handicap on the part of the agencies to win the battle of corruption is a by-product of legitimacy crisis of these institutions that give rise to institutional instability of the agencies concerned. Colombatto, (2012:16), contends that the loss of legitimacy brings about tensions and institutional instability which arises as a result of the ruling class ploy to create an institutional gap that magnifies inadequate performance. At the heart of these inadequate performances by institutions and agencies, and the maladies inherent in it lies progress and victory on the part of the dominants class in Nigeria. In order words, the ruling class benefits from the dysfunctional and deficiencies witnessed in the fight against corruption. That is why at any point in time the ruling class are at war with each other. The Court serves the interest of the ruling class will maintain the status quo and by so doing, conflicting aspects of the delegated legislature will spring up to quench and slow the suffix verdict.

It is the interest of this paper to expand the debate on what actually constitutes legitimacy of institutions both at the global and local parlance. We believe strongly that the determinants of assessing legitimacy should not be reduced to

claims about self-interest but rather a set of desiderata that institutions created must as a core value see accountability as a desideratum. By this, core demonstration, objectives, value judgments that originate from the citizenry assessment of these institutions become a panacea for the legitimacy of any agency. This is because in the eyes of Nigerians the fight against corruption is exclusively lost by the ordinary masses but inclusively won by the ruling elites. Accordingly, Buchanan (2006), believe that the key to this assertions and elements lies in the relationship between such institutions and their socio-political environment. The beauty of legitimacy is that they create norms and information that enable member states and other actors to coordinate their behaviour in mutually beneficial ways.

However, Keohane (1984), asserts that institutions can only perform valuable functions if those to whom it addresses its rules regard them as binding and if others within the institution's domain of operation support or at least do not interfere with its functioning. This is not the case with the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria established to fight corruption. Hitherto, the overdeveloped state nature and character of the Nigerian state has not helped matters in the fight against the monster called corruption. Because of this set up by the ruling class, these institutions and agencies are battling with political dramatis personae that have through their earlier dominance in the state affairs personalized and usurped state apparatus to the detriment of democratic practice and sustenance. Moreover, it is what the overdeveloped state character does when political personae through their activities handicap the institutions and agencies to function below expectation. The implication is that legitimacy of those institutions that give participatory spirit, common goal, and uniform mandate becomes debatable among the citizens. By so doing, the fight against corruption enthrone ethnicity, nepotism, favouritism, and classes are divided. They dethrone the force and unity of purpose because, where exclusion is total, the excluded have no voice, no hope, and no future but rather the grab for a share of the national cake.

In view of this, legitimacy crisis and institutional instability mean that the agencies created by the dominants class such as the ICPC and EFCC and other extant laws and regulations are products of the overdeveloped state apparatus that are dysfunctional and detached from the people just as the post-independence character of the Nigerian state. Therefore, the creation of an agency is not only weak but also defective in discharging its responsibilities. Due to this weak vertical and horizontal integration of the institutions to the interest of the dominants class, agencies created to fight corruption are disconnected from the reality of purpose in the eyes of the citizens. The implication and effect of this according to Lewis (2001), is the low-level accountability and responsiveness on the part of the agencies, which are majorly an attitude of the post-independence Africa states, with the dominant class appropriating the state as their personal property. He further

maintained that these low state capacities to disassociate itself from the dominant class interest facilitated various rent-seeking and corrupt practices.

To demonstrate the ever presence of overdeveloped state structure that is inorganic to the citizenry, Onuigbo (2015), insists that the three traditional arms of Government that are the executive, legislative and judiciary constitute the three propertied classes. According to Odinkalu (2010), Corruption is such a problem in Nigeria because the institutions that exist to fight corruption are weakened without which it is impossible to run a state. As such, the public call for a strong anti-corruption stance is fuelled by the caution by the dominants bourgeoisie class in Nigeria. Furthermore, the dominant class immune themselves with immunity clause to guide against any prosecution. It was lampooned and not disappointing when Ribadu, the then EFCC chairman while making varied cases of a grave act of corruption against 31 serving state governors at the floor of the National Assembly challenged them to waive their immunity so that his agency could be enabled to prosecute the dominants class

Enweremadu (2010), asserts that why a high profile anti-corruption crusade will always generate popular acclaim in Nigeria, it does not provoke anger and frustration among Nigeria's political class with stakes interest in the status quo. In fact, any attempt to punish targeted corrupt individuals in the society are seen as means to procure political legitimacy, while at the same time avoiding any potential political backlash that may result from a wider anti-corruption crusade. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commissions, Progress Report (2006) indicates that the number of successful prosecutions of the total number of 309 cases from September 2000 to June 2006 was only two. The implication of this is that, their huge absence of desire by the dominant class to compromise their inorganic state structure that is beneficial to them to guarantee and bridge institutional stability and gap perceived by fairness.

More worrisome is the fact that the ICPC Monitor (2008) made a staggering report that the number increased to 20 in 2007, none of whom was a prominent figure. By implication, the agency could not translate all its efforts into tangible success. On the part of the EFCC, the "unprecedented achievements" of the EFCC brought the organization and its leadership a lot of "public support" but at the same time caused considerable discontent among members of the political elite (Ribadu, 2006). It is important to state categorically that the plausible explanations for the "unprecedented achievements" is that at the inception of EFCC, most dominant bourgeoisie class did not consider EFCC as a threat bearing in mind that it was established as a weapon against fraudsters in the banking industry or persons specializing in money laundry popularly called 419. It is on record that part if not most of the dominant class who were brought to book were enemies of the ruling party and cables who are not in the good book of the Obasanjo government. Therefore, it is only when the dominant class is not only

prosecuted in the pages of newspaper or media trial, but jailed beyond ethnicity, favouritism, and sentiments that the citizenry will recognize the legitimacy of the institutions; peacefully cooperate and pursue their attempts to flourish (Douglas, 2005)

Therefore, due to the legitimacy crisis and institutional instability associated with the agencies established to fight corruption in Nigeria, recently, the ruling dominant bourgeoisie class attempt to address these gaps by introducing the whistle-blowers as an effort to legitimizing the anti-corruption institutions and crusade. The idea surrounding the whistle-blowers is geared towards legitimizing the illegitimate. According to the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF, 2017), a whistle-blower is entitled to a reward of about 2.5% - 5% of the amount recovered if he provided the government with information that directly led to the voluntary return of stolen or concealed public fund or asserts; provided the information is one that the Government does not already have and which it could not have obtained from any other publicly available source. This idea initiated by the Ministry of Finance since then has made Nigerians take the bait. It should not be thought that the whistleblowing initiative will contribute to solving the illegitimacy crisis and institutional instability of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria. This is because the programme is suffering from illegitimacy because it lies in the fact that it is not backed by any law, a fact which could create problems.

We must emphasize here that a small fraction of Nigerians have access to these group of dominant bourgeoisie class before thinking of whistleblowers. The bankers who are part and parcel of these new recruits and "useful" instruments of the dominants class are but a minor group. In fact, the mechanism adopted by the dominants class to legitimize the illegitimate, are dicey and unconstitutional bearing in mind that there is no law in place to legally define the framework of whistle blowing policy and no law to provide adequate protection of whistleblowers and vets them with a right to redress in the event of any victimization. At the micro level of re-examination of this policy, it was discovered that no law to compel the Nigerian State to pay a stipulated amount of whistleblowers or refusal to pay to have no consequences on the part of the dominant class. It is actually unthinkable that the dominant class do not know the true owners of the recovered fund discovered by EFCC till date and that Nigerians are not aware of the selective measure of an anti-corruption crusade. This scenario is evident that the interest of the dominant class is a paramount factor when members of its cronies are the looters. This is the irony of the anti-corruption crusade of the Nigerian State and the dilemma of the fight against corruption. Agbakoba (2017), argues that immediately there is a selective application of anti-corruption parameters, the whole thing goes to pieces. This is because we don't see the outcome of the suspended Secretary to the Government of the Federation Babachir Lawal accused of fiddling with the contract monies for North East.

By and large, it is apparent that the dominant class are not geared at fighting the root cause of corruption in Nigeria but rather seek more international support to stem the outflow of embezzled funds from rivalries of other dominant class. Williams in Folarin (2009) argues that this is so because they don't believe in it, but aim to look good before the international community to earn support and respect. Maclean (2016), argues that when President Buhari was asked if he agreed with David Cameroon's assertion that Nigeria was fantastically corrupt, the austere president thought for a moment and then said softly yes without being embarrassed and seeking no apology. The United States demonstrated its faith in Nigeria's anti-corruption crusade by donating 1 million dollars in technical assistance to EFCC and trained over 800 ICPC and EFCC prosecutors (US Department of State, 2006).

VI. MANIFESTATIONS AND EFFECTS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

It has been documented that ever since the crusade against corrupt practices in Nigeria began, Nigerians are yet to feel the positive impact of the anti-corruption crusade. There is still widespread corruption that could provoke resentment and promote the chances of revolution. According to the Report of Political Bureau (1987), the manifestation of corruption involves the inflation of government contracts in return for kickbacks... the taking of bribes and perversion of justice, and various judiciary and other organs for administrating justice. The implication of this is that corruption has a lot of negative impact on every sphere of societal development be it social, economic and political. Largely, corruption generally is a global phenomenon with its attendant negative impact has a great effect both on individuals, institutions, and countries (Ikabaje, 2004). Therefore, there are indications that the danger of corruption and its impact to societal development ranges from relations to poverty and unemployment. The correlation between poverty and corruption made Eberlei and Fuhrmann (2004), posit that there exists a mutual relationship between poverty and corruption. He further argued that the two are inter-linked and as such corruption is one cause of poverty and poverty is one cause of corruption. This assertion is prevalent knowing that one of the fundamental challenges facing African Countries chief among them is poverty mainly caused by mismanagement. This is evident bearing in mind that the African Countries are afflicted by structural poverty and systematic corruption.

The import of this according to Eze (2010), is negative consequences of corruption is that it increases operational costs, creates distrust of bureaucrats, weakens the government and constitutes an obstacle to the execution of development projects. John (2016), believed that the idea of dispensing with public enterprise was partly due to corruption and inefficiency that led to dwindling resources. This position comes to mind when analyzing the degree of decay in infrastructure development in Nigeria. These are basically by-

products of unproductive investments in the inefficiency of government establishments. Commenting further on the manifestation of corrupt practice to the Nigeria society at both micro and macro level, Marshall (2006) and Gabriel (2015) argued that corruption distort economic wages of a huge part of the population because it results in coefficient inequality between the rich and the poor and at-large destroys the work ethics of citizens. The implication of all these is that corruption generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects and increases budgetary pressure on the government.

VII. CONCLUSION ANALYSIS

In sum, the crusade on corruption may begin to gain credence when legitimate and strong institutions are put in place in Nigeria. The understanding is that these strong institutions would be a condition for proposal for any standard form of legitimacy that might garner sufficient support for an effective anti-corruption crusade. This is more possible when the crusade is not connected with the criminalization of other dominant class rivalries. Unless ideological change occurs, pressure for institutional change is going to be weak. This is why there is an urgent need for mobilization of the citizenry for social re-orientation and integration that will be crucial to build on and to address the legitimacy crisis and institutional instability on the part of the anti-corruption agencies. All these will aid in achieving transparency and accountability in all facets of national life and draw in the role of other independent institutions especially human rights and civil societies. By so doing, the two regular government agencies- the police and tax authorities will be re-engineered toward a progressive capacity building.

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