

The Impact of Militancy, Insurgency and Forced Displacement on Nigerian Economy

Boris Happy Odalonu, Eberechukwu Faith Obani

Department of Political Science, Federal College of Education, Eha-Amufu Enugu, Nigeria

Abstract:-This study presents the analysis of the impacts of militancy, insurgency and forced displacement on Nigerian economy. The study covered two geo-political zones (South-South and North-East) of Nigeria. The objective of the study is to understand and analyze impacts of militancy, insurgency and forced displacement in Nigerian economy. Qualitative method of data collection was used and data were analyzed using descriptive method of data analysis. The study is anchored on relative deprivation and frustration-aggression as a theoretical framework of analysis. It reveals that, the persistent injustice, inequality, marginalization, poverty and radical ideology gave room to militancy, insurgency and forced displacement. It also shows that Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria is the greatest single cause of displacement in which over 2.5 million people are refugees or IDPs as a result of it. It further demonstrates that these have not only challenged the security of the Nigerian state but also threatened its unity, economic development, territoriality and sovereignty. The study therefore recommends that, government at all levels and its parastatals as well as the multinational oil companies, should pay special attention to those areas concerned by making provision for higher level of infrastructural development in order to boost the economy and ensure security both to local and foreign investors. Furthermore, government should look inwardly and uproot the cause of insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria in order to put an end to forced displacement in the country.

Key Words: Militancy, Insurgency, Displacement, Insecurity, Economy, Nigeria

I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, insurgency and militancy in Nigeria has been localized or regionally based. For instance, the current Boko Haram insurgency is localized in parts of the northern states, but they seem to have the potential of spreading to other parts of the sprawling territory of the north which would be a significant spread of that insurgency. Depending on the public policy response these groups, individually or collectively, have the potential to spread beyond their region or locale of operations (Muzan, 2014). On the other hand, militancy was originally localized in the Niger Delta region, however, there has been visible evidence of its operations in the Abuja area, Lagos and off-shore (Muzan, 2014).

Since the birth of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the Nigerian nation has continued to experience an upsurge of violent conflicts, which have taken terror dimensions, resulting in the killing of many people, large-scale internal population displacement, refugee production, wanton destruction of

property, capital flight and so on. For instance, in November 2007, Nigeria was included among the seventeen countries in Sub Saharan Africa, which were described as the world's most fragile states (Adesote, 2017).

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and one of its largest economies. However, the country has experienced high levels of insecurity and inequality since its return to civil rule in 1999. There are significant territorial, population-related and economic disparities between the country's 36 states. Endemic corruption, political instability and weak governance mean that many of its population do not benefit from the country's strong economic growth and its vast oil and mineral resources, resulting in low social and human development indicators.

These political, social, economic and environmental factors created fertile ground for the emergence of militant armed groups such as Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region and Militant groups in the oil producing states of the South-South where the wealth of the nation is derived from. The groups' indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including bombings, mass shootings, suicide attacks, kidnappings and property destruction, have prompted millions to flee within Nigeria or across its North-Eastern borders to the neighboring countries of Niger, Cameroon and Chad, which have also experienced insecurity and displacement by Militant groups and Boko Haram's activities within their own territories.

The destructive activities of both the Boko Haram insurgents and Niger Delta Militants affect the socio-economic and political sectors of the Nigerian society. These non-state actors, through their operations have retarded the development of not just the directly affected regions but the nation as a whole. The bombings of oil installations and gas pipelines, killings of human potentials necessary for sustainable development, kidnappings of expatriates and the destruction of private and government properties, and other sources of revenue to the state and federal governments have impacted negatively on the Nigerian economy (Awojobi Nathaniel, 2014). These terrorizing activities of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants affect both the present and future developments. These two groups, though have different objectives, are similar in nature. They are both destroyers of destiny.

In addition, there are thousands of civilians in the North-east who are alive but have been rendered incapacitated by Boko

Haram. Some are “special citizens” generally referred to as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These groups of people are in refugee camps being taken care of by the government and international community (The Study of International Committee on the Red Cross, 1999). The IDPs are restricted and prevented by their predicament from contributing to sustainable development. In fact, the federal government spends part of its limited resources on IDPs, which would have been channeled to already stipulated development projects. The establishment, maintenance and administration of refugee camps affect the financial resources of the government.

The terrorizing effect of these groups’ activities on Nigeria’s economy has become so devastating that some financial institutions and vibrant companies have closed down in some areas in the country, while the functional ones are operating in fear for possible attacks on their facilities. From the foregoing, it becomes difficult for economic development to thrive under the present security threats that have enveloped the nation. It is in view of the above described situation in the country that this paper seeks to find out the extent to which the militancy, insurgency and forced displacements in Nigeria, has affected the economic advancement of the nation.

II. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Militancy

Militancy simply means the use of confrontational or violent methods in support of a political or social cause. The concept is nebulous and devoid of consensus. Apart from the aggressiveness which is common to all militant acts, there are variants in terms of components and mode of the concept. It could involve terror attack, kidnapping, killing, maiming, attacks on economic and infrastructural installations and so on (Alabi, n.d). Militancy involves multi-pronged violent tendency and action. It involves taking violent and rebellious actions against the constituted authorities (Aminu, 2013). According to Abraham (2011), militancy and youth restiveness in Nigeria manifest in the forms of disruption of activities of multinational oil corporations, vandalization of oil pipelines, illegal bunkering and more recently, hostage taking of both expatriates and Nigerians alike, and destruction of oil installations.

Militancy in Niger-Delta region is not to be thought of as political vendetta un-leashed by individuals or a group; rather, it is genuinely a socioeconomic issue. In this respect, the indeterminate circle of immediate objects of militant acts and the use of violence in relation to an indeterminate group of innocent oil workers for the sake of achieving an ultimate objective – the satisfaction of economic and social demands – are the most relevant indicators. For, “of militancy one can speak only when the sense of an act is defined as the creation of fear and terror. This is the fundamental characteristic of Niger-Delta militancy” (BBC News Africa 2007).

The Niger Delta people have endured a long pain of economic, political, and social injustice over the oil resource in their community (oil-bearing communities) which they should ordinarily be getting royalty from the multinational corporations and subsequently paying tax to the federal government, based on a true federal composition of the country. Contrary to this, environmental damage from oil exploration as a result of oil spillage, unemployment, poverty, violation of fundamental human rights, destruction of farm land and many more are all that the Niger Delta people could get in return for God’s kindness that makes them oil-bearing communities (Abegunde, 2013). It is imperative to gain this acquaintance that what is happening in the Niger-Delta should be perceived as the accumulation of years of frustration. Let us accept the fact that gross negligence breeds frustration, and frustration breeds desperation. The incontrovertible fact is that both the federal government and the multinational oil companies were grossly negligent for too long about the welfare of the people and the communities of the oil bearing areas of the region (Efeturi, 2016).

Insurgency

Insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection (Inchi, 1996). Insurgency becomes a crime of terrorism when insurgents use arbitrary violence or threat of force deliberately aimed at causing fear, harm or kill by attacking defenseless civilians and their property or undermining peace by disrupting the social, political and economic life of a nation or any part thereof. A number of terms, such as rebellion, uprising and unlawful assembly or movements whose legitimacy is not recognized are used to describe the actions of insurgent groups particularly in non-revolutionary contexts such as civil revolts. Indeed insurgencies are not identical because they are guided by different objectives: political, economic, religious, ethnic, or a combination of them as well as weapons of operations, (Nweze, 2012).

Boko Haram is the major insurgent group in the North Eastern region of Nigeria. Boko Haram insurgency remains the greatest security threat to the country in recent years. There are divergent views on the causes of insurgency in the North Eastern region of Nigeria. According to Baba (2016), Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria is caused by remote reasons like the desire to establish Islamic state, impose sharia law and high rate of illiteracy among the youths of the region while the immediate causes of the insurgency are injustice on the part of the Nigerian authorities, alleged extra-judicial killings of the sect members and summary execution of its leader by the Nigerian Security Agents”

In some other cases, several arguments conceived low level of education and illiteracy as determinant factors that contributed to the rise of insurgency in the North East region. These cannot completely be doubted because illiteracy among the

youths in the region was used in deceiving them to fight for reasons many of them do not even know. But then, insurgency exacerbated low levels of education and literacy in Nigeria's North East region (Baba, 2016). On the contrary, Felbab-Brown (2016) posited that economic deprivation is hardly ever the sole factor stimulating militancy and insurgency. She asserted that:

“There are many poor places, even those in relative decline compared to other parts of the country, where an insurgency does not emerge. But relative economic deprivation often becomes an important rallying cause. And indeed, there are many reasons for focusing on the economic development of the north, including effectively suppressing militancy but it also goes beyond that. Improving agriculture, including by investing in infrastructure and eliminating problematic and distortive subsidies in other sectors, would help combat insurgency and prevent its reemergence”.

Forced displacement

Forced displacement refers to situations of persons who leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, and persecution and human rights violations. Forced displacement is the coerced movement of a person or persons away from their home or home region and it often connotes violent coercion. Someone who has experienced forced displacement is a "forced immigrant", a "displaced person" (DP), rarely also a "displacee", or if it is within the same country, an internally displaced person (IDP), (Wikipedia, 2017). The International Organization for Migration defines a forced migrant as any person who migrates to "escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or livelihood. Forced displacement could be attributed to different factors such as conflict, natural disasters (erosion, flooding, oil spillage etc.), droughts and others. But, Nigeria's case is different, forced displacement is linked to the activities of Boko Haram in North-East and Niger-Delta militancy in South-South region of the country.

According to a survey carried out by World Bank and UNHCR, (2016) seven major causes of forced displacement can be distinguished in the Lake Chad Region, the Boko Haram conflict is the most significant push factor among them, accounting for about 70 percent of the total displaced population in the four countries. There are 3.5 million forcibly displaced people in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger, including 2.5 million people who have been forcibly displaced by Boko Haram; 800,000 affected by other man-made crises, such as inter-community violence and cattle rustling; and 200,000 forcibly displaced by natural disasters—mainly floods—in the South-South and North-West Nigeria and Northern Cameroon. Forced displacement in the North East is

majorly caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. Ninety-two percent of people forcibly displaced by the Boko Haram conflict are internally displaced. Of the 2.5 million people forcibly displaced by the Boko Haram conflict, 1.9 million are displaced within Nigeria, making it 1 of 10 countries with highest population of IDPs in the world. As of May 2016, based on UNHCR and government records, neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger registered 427,000 IDPs and returnees and 210,00 Nigerian refugees due to this conflict. The country second-most affected by the crisis after Nigeria is Niger, which registered 177,000 IDPs and returnees and 138,000 refugees—equivalent to 7.6 percent of the total number of IDPs and 66 percent of the total number of refugees from this conflict (World Bank and UNHCR, 2016).

Theoretical Framework

The theory of relative deprivation was espoused by American scholars (Gurr, 1970) and has gained wide recognition in understanding and explaining agitation and mass uprisings among the populace. Relative deprivation is viewed as stakeholders' recognition of inconsistency between, their value desire and their environment manifest value potentialities. Value prospects are the goods and conditions of life to which people suppose they are fairly entitled. The determinants of value potentialities appear in the social and physical surroundings; they are the stipulation that decides people's known possibilities of obtaining or retaining the norms they justifiably desire to achieve. Gurr (1970) views deprivation as primarily psychological. Thus, if such sense of deprivation is confined to an individual, it invariably leads to crime. But when deprivation becomes a collective transformation of a region, community or as the case of Nigeria, it assumed the form of collective activities. The deprivation of basic human wants by the Nigerian government in Niger-Delta and North Eastern parts of Nigeria evidently, led to frustration, agitation, discontentment and disillusionment leading to militancy and insurgency in Nigeria.

Therefore, once there is negative increase in the socio-economic and political indicators such as unemployment, high level of illiteracy, high inflation, discontentment, political apathy, poor governance, lack of freedom and violation of human rights amongst others, there will be tendency for agitation leading to destruction of man and other resources which has unprecedented effect on the economy.

By application, this theory assists us to trace the historical antecedence of conflicts, agitations and frequent rise of individuals and groups against the Nigerian government.

From the standpoint of the assumptions of relative deprivation theory, we argue that the abysmal failure of the Nigerian government to address critical challenges to development in many parts of the country may be responsible for the internal insurrection by armed militia groups against the state. Furthermore, many factors could be attributed to the frustration, anger and aggression that the Niger Delta people

have towards the Federal Government and the multinational oil companies operating in the region. This include social disequilibrium in the society, occasioned by divide and rule tactics of the oil companies, economic deprivation, as a result of poisoned land and water sources, as well as political marginalization of their sons and daughters in government positions and the oil company's discriminatory employment policy, environmental pollution and despoliation in the Niger Delta, pervasive poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta, legislations of disempowerment and subjugation of the People of the Niger Delta, desire for resource control and self-determination by the People of the Niger Delta (Amaraegbu, 2011; Aminu, 2013; Ajayi and Adesote, 2013).

On the other hand, the North Eastern region of Nigeria has argued that relative poverty and inequality in the north which has resulted to underdevelopment is the main reason why extremist groups like Boko Haram rebel (Agbibo & Maiangwa 2014).

III. METHODOLOGY

The study adopted qualitative method in carrying out its investigation. The data employed for the study were gathered from secondary sources. As such, data used for this study were collected from public libraries as well as private libraries of a number of colleagues and associates within and outside the country. The study also made use of internet materials wherein relevant articles were carefully retrieved. The study utilized both content analysis and trend analytical techniques for the analysis of data. As such the information employed for analysis in the study were carefully extracted from logical chains of evidence presented in journal papers, conference papers, periodic papers, edited books, documentary materials, among others.

IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INSURGENCY AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY

How can economic development in Nigeria thrive when many business ventures and shops remained closed following the incessant spate of bombing and gun attacks in most parts of the country? This situation has severely devastated the economic life of people especially in the south-south and northern parts of Nigeria. For instance, in some areas, commercial banks have reviewed their operational hours to begin from 9:00am to 12:00 noon, as against the normal operational period of 8:00am to 4:00pm. This is a part of efforts by these banks to safeguard their business premises (Mohammed, 2012). Under this new operational arrangement, bank customers, especially traders, find it very difficult to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to the limited banking operational hours. Alternatively, these helpless traders have no choice than to hide their money in their shops. That is why there are rising cases of shop-breaking and burglary in the affected areas. The growing insurgency and militancy, which led to the massive relocation of businessmen to more peaceful environment, has had negative impact on the

country's economic development, as it is responsible for the current scarcity and upsurge in the prices of some commodities in the country. For instance, Boko Haram destructive attacks on churches, schools, houses, barracks, prisons, police stations and police headquarters and several other places are enormous and alarming.

Since 2009, more than thirteen churches have been bombed; more than five schools, including agriculture colleges have been bombed; and more than six army barracks, including Army Headquarters and more than five police stations, including police headquarters in Abuja have been bombed. In 2014, 2,000 homes have been destroyed in Konduga, Bornu. In addition, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), United Nations Office in Abuja, and several beer parlours and relaxation centres have not been spared by Boko Haram bombing activities (Bazza, 2014). These destructions have direct or indirect impact on the national and sustainable economic development, as individuals and the government spends millions to rebuild the destroyed structures.


Besides the killings of human potentials and bombing of infrastructure, Boko Haram terrorist activities have hampered business intercourse in the Northeast. Foreign investments have drastically dwindled, if not completely collapsed. Foreign companies and investors are no longer attracted to the North-eastern region. Available foreign investments in Nigeria dominate the Abuja and South West markets. According to Awojobi (2014) businessmen from Chad, Cameroon and Niger have been forcibly repatriated by the Nigerian government to their countries because some of them are said to be members of Boko Haram. This act undermines the economic development of the region (Yakubu, Aiguoarueghian & Orobator, 2016).

Boko Haram insurgency has in a way affected the education of young people (leaders of tomorrow) and on the other hand, through the abduction and forceful conscription of young people into foot-soldiers and suicide bombers, has produced a future generation of violent citizens inimical to development. The reconstruction of destroyed government infrastructure and other facilities, the general administration of the internally displaced persons camps affect government budget, as billions of naira are spent. Also, the cost of fighting Boko Haram has gulped a large chunk of the country's budget. For example, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) spends N475 million monthly to fuel its fighter jets and transport planes to fight Boko Haram (Daily Sun, August 31 2016) Yakubu, Aiguoarueghian & Orobator, 2016).

Report has it that Boko Haram insurgency has led to the migration of people to other parts of the nation. This is evident on the rate with which investors are fleeing this country to other countries. This is in addition to those who have been rendered hopeless in life following the loss of all their means of livelihood. Internal insurgency has displaced more than 2.4 million people in 14 African countries during 2015, making the continent second only to the Middle East for

violence as a cause of flight. Nigeria accounted for more than 30 per cent of the figure, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) a quarter. As figure 1 show, violence forced more than 736,000 people from their homes in Nigeria during the year, more than in any other African country.

Figure 1: Countries with most new displacement linked to conflict and insurgency in 2015




Source: RADAR: Africa’s Internal Displacement Crisis (2015)

It is indicative of the scale of the challenge national governments face that people newly displaced in 2015 represented a significant portion of the total population in some cases: more than four per cent in the Central African Republic (CAR) and almost two per cent in Libya and South Sudan.

Of the nearly 2.1 million people estimated as displaced in the Nigeria as of August 2016, almost 90 per cent were recorded as having fled the Boko Haram insurgency. That is only part of the picture, however. Poor understanding of the endemic underlying factors has resulted in a fragmented response and has the potential to undermine current and future efforts to support IDPs in achieving durable solutions. The source of long-standing instability in north-eastern Nigeria has been traced in large part to frustration among young people about a lack of education and livelihood opportunities. The surface area of Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 per cent over the last 45 years, putting livelihoods and access to water and grazing under strain. The disappearance of the vast majority of the lake is the combined result of human impacts – including the damming of tributaries, poor water management and overgrazing – and climate change.

Historically, problems of governance and corruption, and a lack of investment in transport, agricultural and energy infrastructure have left north-eastern Nigeria dependent on imported food despite having some of the wider region’s most fertile land. Food insecurity is high and made worse by the

absence of welfare programmes and currency fluctuations. Despite the economic growth Nigeria has experienced in the last decade, social indicators in the north-east are desperately poor. The ostensible trigger of displacement, Boko Haram’s attacks, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of understanding the phenomenon. In Nigeria private citizens are overwhelmingly targeted, most often with firearms resulting in very high levels of deaths per attack. In 2014 Boko Haram killed on average 15 people per attack whereas Fulani militants killed eight per attack. The rate at which displacement occurs in Nigeria is overwhelming in Africa, especially in Nigeria; see the diagram below:



Source: - Global terrorism index 2015

Evidently, Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in the loss of several lives and properties in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe as well as in other parts of northern Nigeria where suicide bombings in soft spots have taken place. Actual figure and statistics of casualties cannot be given considering the fact that the insurgency is still on in these states of the region in Nigeria. In addition to several losses of lives and properties, Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in the serious rise in number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) across the North East Region of Nigeria (Baba, 2016).

According to Olalekan (2017) the Acting President, Yemi Osinbajo, admitted that the cost of managing the humanitarian crisis caused by insurgency especially as it concerns about 2.4 million Internally Displaced Persons and extensive destruction of infrastructure is huge and enormous. The statement partly read;

“However, he (Osinbajo) observed that the humanitarian consequences of the insurgency are compounded by deep poverty, making the costs of dealing with the situation huge and enormous. He

recalled that there are for instance about 2.4 million displaced persons, extensive destruction of property, infrastructure, schools, homes and farmland. In some cases, he said, the situation required the rebuilding of whole societies”.

V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MILITANCY ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY

Niger Delta militants agitate, among other issues, for economic emancipation and development of the region. The inability of the Nigerian government to satisfactorily address issues of the Niger Delta people has led to the protracted crisis within the region. Unlike the Boko Haram insurgents who specialize in the killing of persons, irrespective of age, sex or tribe, the Niger Delta militants concentrate on the destruction/bombing of oil and gas facilities. Though cases of

kidnappings of foreign oil workers abound, they are being carried out with intent to halt or obstruct production and exportation of the products (Awojobi, 2014; Shiklam, 2012). Niger Delta militancy is as deadly as Boko Haram, because their activities are specifically directed towards the destruction of a vital source of revenue, oil and gas, and the subsequent collapse of the Nigerian economy.

The activities of different militant groups operating in the Niger Delta region have affected the Nigerian economy negatively. Militancy in the region has impacted the Nigerian economy in various ways. These include kidnapping and hostage taking, kidnapping of expatriate oil company workers, destruction of oil pipelines, oil theft, illegal bunkering, establishment of illegal refineries and other forms of criminality that seriously affected the total production of oil and the revenue the country realized from oil (Garuba, 2012). Some of the attacks in 2016 are shown below.

Table 1: Some Attacks on Oil Facilities in the Niger Delta (January –July, 2016)

DATE	LOCATION	OIL FACILITY
January 15, 2016	Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta state.	Militants blew-up major crude oil and gas pipelines to the Chevron Nigeria Limited
January 15, 2016	Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta state.	Militants blew up the Escravos-Warri-Lagos-Abuja gas pipeline and Escravos-Warri-Kaduna Chevrons pipelines
January 16, 2016	Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State.	Militant blew up the Abiteye flow station and Sagara to Chevron pipelines.
January 17, 2016	Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State	Gas pipelines from Olero to Escravos blown up by the militants
January 30, 2016.	Brass Local Government Area (LGA) of Bayelsa State.	Gunmen suspected to be ex-militants have attacked a pipeline carrying crude belonging to Italian Oil giant Eni, also known as Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC)
February 10, 2016	Gbaran, Delta State	NDA militants blew up the Bonny Soku Gas Line, which carries natural gas to the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas plant, and an independent power plant at Gbaran.
February 13, 2016	Delta State	NDA Militants attacked the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which transports oil, water, and associated gas from fields in the western Delta to the 400,000 bpd Forcados oil terminal.
May 4, 2016.	Warri and Abiteye in Delta state.	NDA militants blew up the Chevron Valve Platform located in Warri.
May 5, 2016.	Delta State	NDA militants carried out another attacks on the Chevron Well D25 in Abiteye and gas lines feeding the Warri and Kaduna refineries, belonging to the NNPC.
May 27, 2016	Ciera creek, near Abiteye community, Warri South-West Local Government Area of Delta State	Niger Delta Avengers, NDA, attacked two separate gas and crude oil pipelines belonging to Chevron (Escravos Tank Farm - an underground crude oil trunk line and a major electricity gas line)
May 29, 2016	Nembe and Southern Ijaw Local Government Areas of Bayelsa State.	The NDA militants bombed oil pipeline belonging to the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) and another oil firm Aiteo
June 2, 2016	Dibi, Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State.	The NDA attacked Chevron’s oil wells.
June 9, 2016	Obi Brass, Bayelsa State	NDA militants blew up a major trunk line, Obi Brass, belonging to Agip ENI
July 6, 2016	Makarava and other parts of Delta State	Niger Delta Avengers blew up crude oil pipeline, wellhead and manifold belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC and Chevron Nigeria Limited
July 6, 2016	Batan community, Warri South-West Local Government Area of Delta State.	Niger Delta Avengers blew up NPDC Manifold close to Banta and two PPMC/NNPC crude oil trunk Lines
July 6, 2016	Otunana, Delta State	Niger Delta Avengers blew up Chevron Well 10, close to Otunana flow station

Source: Author’s compilation from different media

Bombed Gas Pipelines in Warri South-West Local Government Area of Delta State (January, 2016)



Source: Amaize (2016, January 18)

The implications of Niger Delta militancy are more perturbing. The country's economic quagmire is a corollary of the premeditated and coordinated attacks on foreign and government oil facilities. The attacks had a devastating effect on the country's oil revenue projection in her budgets since 2006. Oil production of bpd has been affected drastically.

The re-emergence of NDA in 2016 brought Nigerian economy to her knees 2016. It hampered the cash flow from oil revenue to sustain the national budget. The budgeted revenue on oil production of 2.2 million bpd became a farce. The attacks dragged the country down the benchmark of 2.2m bpd, as the country now produce less than 1.5m bpd, less than Angola's production. Production slump resulted in a revenue loss to the tune of about 22.8 million dollars per day, while the total loss from date; February 2016 to year end on annualized budgetary provisions were 7.16 million dollars or about 1.4 trillion naira, if oil price fails to rebound.(Saturday Sun, August 18 2016). By implication, the N1.4 trillion revenue shortfall would wipe out about 1.8 trillion naira earmarked for capital expenditure.

The government could not carry out all its stipulated projects due to shortage of cash. The repairs and reconstructions of oil facilities further affected the limited cash since billions of dollars would be required for these projects.

VI. STRATEGIES TO CURB MILITANCY AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

Felbab-Brown (2016) averred that the state is hardly always just in suppressing militancy, even as suppressing militancy is its key imperative. Economic grievances, discriminations, and lack of equity and access are serious problems that any society should want to tackle. Even if there are "no legitimate grievances," the state does not have a license to combat militancy in any way it chooses. Its own brutality will be discrediting and can be deeply counterproductive.

The Federal should note that the use of force by military deployment is not the solution to the crises in the Niger Delta region. Curbing militancy in the Niger Delta Region is an enormous task that must embrace all stakeholders in the region. The oil and gas companies should see the host communities as a partner in progress; their rights should not be infringed upon by the companies. The Federal Government should tackle the problems of deprivation, neglect and poverty in the area with all serious mindedness in the quest to totally eradicate the perennial case of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta (Efeturi, 2016).

The amnesty programme seemed not to be a model in resolving issues in the Niger Delta region. Most of the youths are dissatisfied with the deal. And much of the population in the Delta still suffers the same level of deprivation and exclusion as before. The deal was a bandage without healing the wounds underneath. It's a question of how long it will continue sticking. Despite its many urgent and burning tasks and a real need to focus on the north, the Nigerian government should use the relative peace in the Delta to move beyond the plaster and start addressing the root causes of militancy and dissatisfaction there (Felbab-Brown, 2016).

The Federal Government should extensively involve the people of the Niger Delta region in decision-making processes as to avail them wide choices and opportunities of influencing the socio-economic and political agenda of the region. There should be adequate and functional training and orientation programmes for the youths. The unemployment and sufferings among the youth of the Niger Delta even among those with university certificate should be addressed spontaneously. Also, the Federal Government has to exhibit the political will to implement policies and programmes that will address the problem of the Niger Delta (Efeturi, 2016).

The increase in the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) as well as serious waste of lives and properties are the effects of the insurgency in the North East region (Baba, 2016). If the present trend toward growing insurgency and militancy is allowed to continue unfettered, the regional basis of the scourge will become blurred with time and unpredictable in its potential to destroy the nation (Muzan, 2014). It is advisable that those displaced from their original homes be rehabilitated and an Independent Commission established to rebuild the devastated and affected states in the North East region of the country. An Independent

Administrative or Judicial Panel of Inquiry would also be needed to investigate complains of human rights violation (Baba, 2016).

Also, the presence of a religious element in an insurgency usually has significant implications for policy response. First, such causes are easily sustainable so long as there are adherents to that religion, and particularly if there are new converts. If religion is a way of life and the insurgency is sympathetic to sustaining that way of life, then the insurgency itself is easily sustainable. If an insurgency is easily sustainable because of a belief system, then the basket of policy responses to the insurgency must go beyond the ordinary ones used to address the non-religious causative factors. There must be a special appeal to religious elements, such as peace and peaceful coexistence, a common heritage or fraternity and dialogue and diplomacy. Force, particularly military force, may miss the point as many historical examples outside Nigeria have seemed to indicate (Muzan, 2014).

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The activities of Boko Haram insurgency and Niger Delta Militancy have really hampered the corporate existence of Nigeria and dwindled her economic prosperity. Both the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgences have brought untold hard times to individuals, families, groups, foreigners, state and federal governments, and to the Nigerian economy in general (Yakubu, Aiguobarueghian and Orobator, 2016). In order to get of this quagmire the federal governments should sincerely and practically embark on job creation for the unemployed youths, particularly in the troubled regions. In the Niger Delta, the federal government should dialogue with stakeholders and sincerely implement outcomes of the peace talk (Yakubu, Aiguobarueghian and Orobator, 2016). The Federal Government should also focus on facilitating the integration and self-reliance of the forcibly displaced, regardless of the place where they are (i.e. communities of origin, host communities, or third locations), taking into account both the immediate priorities expressed by the affected populations for survival and the requirements for sustainable recovery and development necessary for longer-term regional stability (World Bank and UNHCR, 2016).

REFERENCES

- [1]. Abraham, N. M. (2011). Functional education, militancy and youth restiveness in Nigeria's Niger Delta: The place of multinational oil corporations (MNOCs). *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. 5(10), 442-447.
- [2]. Abegunde, O. (2013). Mediation in Niger Delta Resource Conflict: Assessing the Determinant of a Successful Process. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)* 13(2), 8-13.
- [3]. Adesote, S.A & Omojeje, A.V. 2012. Violence and Internal Population Displacement in Nigeria, 1999-2011. The 2nd Toyin Falola Annual International Conference on Africa and the African Diaspora at Excellence Hotel, Ogba, Lagos, 2nd - 4th July, 2012
- [4]. Adesote, A.S. (2017). Thematic Articles: Facets of Migration in Africa Internal Conflicts and Forced Migration in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective, *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, 11(1), 2-26.
- [5]. Afinotan, L. A., & Ojakorotu, V. (2009). The Niger Delta crisis: Issues, challenges and Prospects *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. 3(5), 191-198.
- [6]. Agbibo, D & Maiangwa, B (2014). Nigeria United in Grief; Divided in Response: Religious Terrorism, Boko Haram, and the Dynamics of State Response, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 14(1),
- [7]. Aghedo, I & Osumah, O. (2014) Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 1-15. published online 23 February 2014 DOI: 10.1177/0021909614520726
- [8]. Ajayi, A.I & Adesote, S.A. 2013. The Gains and Pains of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 2007-2012: A Preliminary Assessment. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48 (4), 515-
- [9]. Alabi, O. D. (n.d.) Militancy, Amnesty and Peace in Nigeria's Niger Delta, Dept of Political Science and Defence Studies Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna
- [10]. Amaize, E. (2016, January 18) Gas Pipeline bombing: We are closing in on perpetrators – JTF Commander. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/01/gas-pipeline-bombing-we-are-closing-in-on-perpetrators-jtf-commander/>
- [11]. Aminu, S. A. (2013). The Militancy in the Oil Rich Niger Delta: Failure of the Federal Government of Nigeria. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business*, 4(11), 815-827.
- [12]. Awojobi, O. N. (2014), "The Socio-economic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-east Nigeria", *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research*, 11 (11).
- [13]. Baba, I. (2016). Analysis of Cause and Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria. *Journal of Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka* .5, 59-72
- [14]. Crisis Group Africa (2015). Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta, *Crisis Group Africa Report N°231*, 29 September
- [15]. Efeturi, L. D. (2016, June 10). Resolving Militancy in the Niger Delta. *Premium Times*. R Retrieved from <http://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2016/06/10/militancy-niger-delta-facts-fallacies/>
- [16]. Felbab-Brown, V. (2016, January 20). The state is hardly always just in suppressing militancy. *Financial Nigeria Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.financialnigeria.com/the-state-is-hardly-always-just-in-suppressing-militancy-interview-31.html>
- [17]. Inchi, I. S. (1996). *The Nigerian Law Dictionary, (1st edn)* Zaria, Nigeria: Tamaza Publishing Company Limited
- [18]. Muzan, O. A. (2014). Insurgency in Nigeria: Addressing the causes as part of the solution. *African Human Rights Law Journal* 12(1), 217-243
- [19]. Mohammed M. (2012, March 7) Violence, Threat to Yobe's Economic Growth, *The Moment*, p.4
- [20]. Nweze, A. (2012) Diagnostic Overview of Insurgent and Group Terrorists Activisms in Nigeria: Psychological Dimensions, Expert and Eminent Persons Meeting Report 263-303
- [21]. Olalekan, A. (2017, August 1) Cost of managing 2.4 million IDPs enormous, says Osinbajo. *The Punch*. Retrieved on 8th August, 2017 from <http://punchng.com/cost-of-managing-2-4-million-idps-enormous-says-osinbajo/>
- [22]. Ovaga, O. (2013) Insecurity and Economic Development in 21st Century Nigeria: *Nigeria Journal of Social Sciences*, 9(1) 234-255
- [23]. Saturday Sun, August 18 2016
- [24]. Yakubu, M. J., Aiguobarueghian, O. V. & Orobator, A. D. (2016) Economic Terrorism in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency and Niger Delta Militancy on National Development, *JORIND* 14(2), 10-16.
- [25]. Wikipedia (2017, August 31). Forced Displacement. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_displacement
- [26]. World Bank and UNHCR, (2016) Regional Assessment of Forced Displacement by the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region. Washington, DC 20433, USA